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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the SRI fund literature by examining the role of 
fund families in the flow and investment strategy of individual SRI funds. First, I 
investigate spillovers in cash flow resulting from the existence of superior (poor) 
performing SRI funds to peer SRI funds within the fund family. Second, I investigate 
the existence of cross-subsidization between SRI family members. Using a sample of 
SRI funds domiciled in the United States and considering survivorship, I find a positive 
spillover effect from having star SRI funds on the monthly cash flow of their SRI 
siblings. However, no similar effect is found in the presence of poor SRI performers in 
the family. Further, the magnitude of the spillover effect in SRI fund families is lower 
than in conventional fund families. I also find evidence of cross-subsidization where the 
performance of winning funds is more likely to be subsidized by their peer losing funds. 
However, there is no evidence of cross-subsidization between high-fee and low fee SRI 
funds, and between young and mature SRI funds. Cross-subsidization is attenuated by 
manager ownership in subsidising funds, and is more likely to be performed between 
SRI funds with ethical screening than between SRI funds which screen on environment, 
social, and combined environmental-social-governance (ESG). These findings thus 
contribute to the SRI fund literature by documenting a spillover effect in SRI fund 
families and by showing that ESG principles are partially absorbed by fund families in 
their investment strategies, not only in asset selection.   
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 The past decades have witnessed a significant growth in the number of socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds, which incorporate environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) principles in addition to financial characteristics (risks and returns) 
in selecting assets. The integration of financial (Bauer et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 
2008) and social (Haigh and Hazelton, 2004; Nilsson, 2009) objectives have made the 
SRI fund industry particularly attractive to many investors, with existing and new 
investment providers offering funds that aim at “doing well while doing good.”1 
In the United States alone, ESG-constrained funds accounted for more than 11 
percent of the money managed professionally by fund managers in 2012 (USSIF, 2012). 
The SRI fund industry is likely to continue to grow faster in the future than the rest of 
the US market for three main reasons (Schueth, 2003). First, US investors are more 
successful than investors from other parts of the world at accessing information, and 
informed investors tend to be more willing to invest in a variety of funds, including SRI 
funds. Second, the increasing participation of women in firm management has expanded 
the market for SRI funds; women typically embrace the concept of SRI more quickly 
and easily than men. Lastly, the integration of financial and non-financial returns 
offered by SRI funds is attractive to investors by ensuring that they will get similar rates 
                                                     
1 SRI funds have been found to outperform matched conventional funds during the financial crisis by 
Nofsinger and Varma (2013). 
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of return that conventional funds offer with the added benefit of fulfilling the ESG 
principles.  
Many providers, including large investment companies such as American Funds, 
Vanguard, and Wells Fargo Advantages, see the potential gains from offering SRI 
funds, and have thus engaged in fund proliferation strategies, where a fund family offers 
multiple SRI funds. As a consequence, the growth in the number of SRI funds has far 
exceeded the growth in the number of SRI providers, from a mere 31 providers offering 
a total of 182 SRI funds at the end of the 20
th
 century to 54 providers offering 485 funds 
in 2012.2 
SRI fund families offer a wide range of SRI funds that contribute to bettering the 
environment, society, and governance by avoiding financial assets issued by companies 
considered harmful to society or the environment.
3
 Like traditional fund families, SRI 
fund families also professionally manage a number of SRI funds with various 
investment styles. Information about financial performance and other characteristics of 
a fund are likely to affect investors’ behaviour toward other funds within the family. 
Although the prospectus provides information on the strategy, style, and managers of a 
fund, characteristics of the fund family can also influence investors’ decisions. Massa 
(2003) goes so far as to suggest that fund family attributes are the first features that 
investors consider before choosing individual funds.  
My thesis is concerned with two key issues relating to SRI fund families. First, 
SRI fund attributes are not likely to be independent of their sibling funds’ attributes. An 
SRI fund with a good past performance signals the skill of its fund managers as well as 
                                                     
2 This is based on data from the online Morningstar Direct database, which identifies SRI funds as 
socially conscious funds. The number of funds includes share-class funds.  
3 SRI fund families are defined as fund families which manage two or more SRI fund families, including 
focused and mixed SRI fund families. The latter fund families are more common in the United States 
where most of SRI fund families managed both SRI and conventional funds. 
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the skill of the family’s managerial team. Given their limited promotional budget and 
resources, it is common for fund families to use star performers in promotion activities, 
aiming to highlight the skill of their managers.4 Previous studies show that, in the case 
of conventional funds, media coverage of fund performance can affect investors’ choice 
of funds and families (Kaniel et al., 2007). However, it remains an empirical question 
whether the same can be observed in SRI funds. Consistent with the conventional fund 
literature, I predict that there is a spillover cash flow from the existence good 
performing SRI funds to peer SRI funds within an SRI fund family. Since SRI investors 
are concerned with both social objectives and financial returns, I investigate whether 
SRI investors behave differently in the way they respond to good and poor performing 
SRI funds in the family. This proposition is further discussed in the hypothesis 
development chapter.  
The second issue relates to cross-fund strategies within fund families. An 
influential empirical study by Gaspar et al. (2006) suggests that fund families use 
favouritism strategy to boost the future performance of favoured funds at the expense of 
other member funds. Although ESG principles do not permit strategies that discriminate 
against certain investors, a practice of treating all investors equally may not be 
compatible with a fund family’s objective to maximise fee incomes. Recent allegations 
of late trading in the United States reveal that certain clients (especially major clients) 
receive favoured treatment from fund families (Cohen and Schmidt, 2009).5 If these 
clients concentrate their investments in certain funds, these funds are likely to receive 
                                                     
4 For example, William Danoff frequently endorses Fidelity in promotion activities. He presents his 
success in managing Fidelity Crossfund, which has beaten its market benchmarks since its inception date, 
and his reputation in bringing his managed funds to one of top three funds in terms of size in the United 
States. 
5 Frankel and Cunningham (2006) state that the scandal of market timing practices in the 2000s shows 
evidence of the existence of favoured (predator) and non-favoured (victim) investors in fund families.  
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preferential treatment from the family at the detriment of other funds, and thus their 
investors.  
To maximise the benefits from the non-linear flow-performance relationship6 
(Berk and Green, 2004; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Ferreira et al., 2012; Huang, 2007; 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998), fund families are likely to coordinate their low contribution 
(LC) funds in order to subsidise the performance of their high contribution (HC) funds. 
This suggests that the latter funds are favoured to be future winners. This cross-fund 
strategy sacrifices the LC fund's future financial returns, it thus discriminates against LC 
fund investors, and is unethical since it destroys portfolio diversification and future 
economic value of selected funds (Schmid and Walter, 2009).7 Prior empirical studies 
focus on this unobserved action in the mutual fund industry without considering the 
non-financial attributes used by constrained funds that influence the investment 
strategies of a fund family.8 My thesis aims to fill this gap.  
1.2 Research Aims  
The overarching aim of this thesis is to examine the role of fund families in SRI 
funds. Investigating the contribution of certain SRI funds to other SRI funds within a 
family will inform us on whether the ESG principles of SRI funds lead to differences in 
strategies taken by fund families as suggested in the literature. The two strategies, 
spillovers in cash flows and cross-subsidization, form the basis of my research. 
                                                     
6 The mutual fund literature reports a non-linear relation between past performance and current flows 
(Chevalier and Ellison (1999); Goetzmann and Peles (1997); Huang, 2007; Sirri and Tufano (1998)). That 
is, inflows to good performers are higher than outflows from poor performers. 
7 Favoritism is more likely to involve discriminating certain funds from holding certain assets, suggesting 
that there is a constraint in the diversification of those funds.  
8  According to Kacperczyk et al. (2008), an unobserved strategy is the action performed by fund 
managers that is not disclosed to investors. Accordingly, investors cannot observe certain actions or 
strategy, especially in recognising the real transaction time. 
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The first research aim is to investigate whether the benefit of having a star 
(good) performing SRI fund and conversely the cost of having a poor performing fund 
to flows of peer SRI funds within an SRI fund family. Specifically, I aim to investigate 
whether there is a spillover effect in SRI fund families from having high and low 
performing SRI funds. Specifically, I test whether the benefit (cost), in terms of fund 
flows, of having a star (poor) performing SRI fund spills over to sibling SRI funds in 
the fund family. An examination of the spillover from high performing SRI funds is 
important since these funds are often used to represent the whole family. Nanda et al. 
(2004) find evidence of a spillover for star funds in conventional fund families, 
highlighting the importance of having at least one star performer in attracting higher 
flows to the entire family.  
The extant literature, however, focuses on only conventional funds, and it is 
unclear whether a similar spillover effect would be observed for SRI fund families. For 
one, SRI investors are less sensitive to negative performance than conventional 
investors because of the higher switching costs in the SRI fund industry (Bollen, 2007). 
This argument is corroborated by SRI investors’ pursuit of social or ethical values, 
which further reduces their sensitivity to financial performance, and in particular, to 
negative performance (Bollen, 2007; Benson and Humphrey, 2008). Nevertheless, a 
casual reading of SRI fund prospectuses shows that much attention has been given to 
historical financial achievements, with promises of certain financial targets, presumably 
to attract greater fund flows. Additionally, SRI investors tend to reinvest in their current 
SRI funds due to difficulty in finding new SRI funds that meet their social objectives 
(Benson and Humphrey, 2008). This suggests that the flow from an SRI fund to other 
SRI funds within a family and/or other SRI fund families may be limited.  
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 The second aim of my research is concerned with the role of ESG principles in 
the investment strategies performed by SRI fund families. Adherence to ESG values 
suggests that the investment strategies performed are more likely to be ethical in the 
sense that SRI fund families treat their investors equally. I focus on the role of ESG 
principles in mitigating cross-subsidization strategy in SRI fund families and show for 
the first time how fund families intervene in the performance of their SRI funds.9 This 
test is motivated by the higher convexity of the flow-performance relationship in the 
SRI mutual fund industry (Bollen, 2007), where SRI funds with outstanding 
performance have higher growth in cash flows than conventional star funds, but poor 
performing SRI funds are not similarly punished by substantial outflows. I investigate 
whether the higher convex flow-performance relationship induces SRI fund families to 
use cross-subsidization strategy as a way to create star performers. Past studies show 
that the presence of star funds signals that the fund manager is skilled and provides a 
good financial reputation for the fund family (Ferreira et al., 2012; Jank, 2012; Nanda et 
al.,2004; Solomon et al., 2014), thus contributing to the flow of affiliated funds within 
the family. 
According to contract theory, a fund manager is employed to use her “hot 
hands” to ensure that her fund performs well. The fund manager is, however, also 
responsible for maximising the value of the fund family (Ber et al., 2001; Gaspar et al., 
2006; Massa, 2003; Massa and Rehman, 2008; Nanda et al., 2004; Reuter, 2006; Ritter 
and Zhang, 2007). Reputational incentives exist for improving the value of fund 
families, since fund families with outstanding performers are more valued by, and 
attractive to new and current investors over fund families without star performers. 
                                                     
9 Fund families can coordinate their funds’ portfolios by allowing certain funds for certain assets. For 
example, a fund family can coordinate their fund managers to take opposite trading (buying vs selling) for 
an undervalued asset.  
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Accordingly, fund families are motivated to coordinate their strategies to enhance their 
reputation by coordinating their fund managers to subsidise the performance of their 
higher contribution funds. 
Following Gaspar et al. (2006), I define high-contribution (HC) and low-
contribution (LC) SRI funds based on three considerations: past performance; fund age; 
and fees. There are three types of LC funds: poor past performers (losers); low-fee 
funds; and mature funds. Previous literature on mutual funds reports that HC funds 
provide a higher income contribution to the family than LC funds because past winning 
and young funds are more attractive to investors (Bollen, 2007). Regarding the fee 
criterion, for two SRI funds with equal total net asset value (TNAV), the SRI fund with 
a higher fee (a higher expense ratio) provides a higher contribution to fund family 
incomes. This prompts fund families to discriminate against their low-fee funds by 
coordinating fund managers to subsidise the performance of high-fee funds through 
rebalancing the portfolios of both funds. This enhances the performance of the favoured 
high-fee funds.   
1.3 Research Questions 
My thesis poses six research questions relating to spillover effects and cross-
subsidization strategies in SRI fund families. First, I ask whether having a star-(bad) 
performing SRI fund signals positive (negative) information to investors who respond 
by drawing to (withdrawing from) other SRI funds within the SRI fund family. Hence, I 
investigate for evidence of spillover effects in SRI fund families. Since there are non-
financial attributes to be considered, SRI investors need to put in extra effort when 
identifying the best funds to hold (Gil-Bazo et al., 2009).  I argue that SRI investors are 
more likely to choose SRI funds from families that have historically generated at least 
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one star performing SRI fund, consistent with Nanda et al. (2004) for conventional 
funds. This is due in part to the difficulty in measuring social performance (Schepers 
and Sethi, 2003). Public information derived from media and investment advisors is 
typically dominated by information about financial-based performance such as financial 
returns, financial ratings, and dollar flows. Non-financial information disclosed in 
prospectuses and providers’ websites is often about the types of screens used in 
selecting the assets. Calvert, for example, reports average annual returns, prices, and 
expenses ratios, all of which represent the financial performance of its SRI funds. There 
is no information related to ESG performance. 
It is costly enough for investors to acquire information on the social performance 
of SRI funds, let alone measure it. Thus, I expect investors to rely on publicly available 
information which is predominantly financial in nature. With limited information about 
fund attributes, investors would prefer to choose funds from well-known families due to 
the lower search costs (Sirri & Tufano, 1998). Indeed, Massa (1997) reports that 
investors initially look at fund families’ attributes before choosing the individual funds -  
a finding which explains why a fund’s prospectus typically contains more information 
about the fund family. Given the lack of information about ESG attributes, information 
about the fund family’s success in generating funds with good financial performance is 
valuable because it illustrates the skill of fund managers in the family. Investors would 
appreciate SRI fund families with star performing SRI funds because it demonstrates 
that managers could still increase investors’ wealth using a limited opportunity set. For 
these reasons, SRI investors are expected to choose SRI fund families with high 
performing SRI funds.  
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Internal diversification motives also drive the spillover effect. While investors 
are drawn to funds with a good historical performance record, they also diversify their 
investment by selecting different types of funds. One cost-effective approach is internal 
diversification, or buying other funds from the same family, as this eliminates search 
costs from looking into other fund families (Elton et al., 2007). If there are positive risk-
adjusted benefits from internal diversification, star SRI performers can potentially 
attract new investors and retain current ones to themselves as well as to other SRI funds 
within the family. Hence, analysing the performance of SRI funds and its effect on 
flows without studying the role of the fund family may bias the results because families 
can influence the performance and investment strategy of individual funds (Gaspar et 
al., 2006; Ritter and Zhang, 2007).  
My second research question investigates the role of stellar conventional funds 
in the flow to peer SRI funds within a family. According to SRI fund data provided by 
the online Morningstar Direct database, more than half of SRI fund providers are 
mixed-fund families where manage SRI and conventional funds at the same time.10 SRI 
funds are relatively younger than their conventional peer funds, and thus have a shorter 
performance track record. To assess the reputation of an SRI fund family, SRI investors 
have to resort to information on the past performance of the family, even though the 
information is likely to be dominated by conventional funds’ attributes. The existence of 
star conventional performers may signal the skill of fund managers employed by a fund 
family. Although SRI funds have different investment constraints from their 
conventional siblings, they use the same resources such as research and technology. 
Investors may interpret this resource sharing as an investment strategy of SRI fund 
                                                     
10Most of these families initially issued conventional funds. As their proliferation strategy, they enter 
niche markets in the mutual fund industry by issuing for instance funds that use the ESG principles. 
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managers which is not substantially different from that of peer conventional fund 
managers. To illustrate this point, I would investigate whether information about the 
success of say both conventional funds, Vanguard 500 index Adm and Vanguard TSM 
Idx Adm, is positive enough to attract SRI investors to their SRI siblings within the 
fund family of Vanguard Investment. 
Some investors might be concerned with the ability of fund managers to 
generate performance using the lower investment sets due to ESG constraints. Thus, I 
test the null hypothesis that there is no spillover effect from star conventional funds on 
the cash flow of SRI funds. SRI investors may focus on the detailed records of SRI 
funds within the mixed family. To test this null hypothesis, I measure the performance 
of conventional funds managed by mixed SRI fund families to determine whether an 
SRI fund family is a star or poor fund family.  
The third question asks whether the spillover effect of SRI funds differs from 
that of conventional funds. The mutual fund literature shows that star funds attract 
positive cash flows to other funds in the family, while bad performers do not adversely 
impact the cash flows of other members (Nanda et al., 2004). To the best of my 
knowledge, however, no attempt has yet been made to examine the role of non-financial 
(ESG) constraints in influencing investors’ attitude towards the financial performance 
of fund families. The disproportional flow-performance relationship is likely to lower 
the intensity of the spillover effect in SRI fund families. By investigating the difference 
in the spillover effect between SRI fund families and conventional fund families, I aim 
to address the role of ESG principles in investment decisions of fund families. In this 
regard, I compare the contribution of star (poor) performers to the cash flow of peer 
funds in both SRI fund families and conventional fund families.   
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My fourth research question asks whether SRI funds with superior past 
performance (winners) receive better treatment from their fund family than their sibling 
“loser” SRI funds. The higher convexity in the flow-performance relationship provides 
an incentive for SRI fund families to elevate the performance of one or more SRI funds, 
even though this may result in the creation of one or more poor performers. Fund 
families put forth their past high-performing funds as HC funds because of the higher 
cash inflow associated with consistently good performance (Abdelsalam et al., 2014; 
Fama and French, 2010). Enhancing the financial performance of past winners exhibits 
the presence of a “smart money” effect.11 Thus, from the investors’ perspective, their 
new investment in winning funds can further improve the future performance of those 
funds. To achieve consistency in performance, SRI fund families coordinate their non-
winning funds’ managers to subsidise the performance of past winners.  
My fifth question asks whether fund families coordinate their low-fee SRI funds 
to subsidise the performance of high-fee SRI funds. Theoretically, the value of SRI fund 
families is mainly determined by future fee incomes, which depend on fee rates and 
TNAV.  As a result, SRI fund families attempt to attract higher cash flows to their high-
fee funds to maximise their value. Prior studies suggest that there is no relationship 
between the expense ratio and the cash flows of mutual funds, including SRI funds (In 
et al. 2014; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008; Wahal and Wang, 2011). Furthermore, Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) suggest that fees such as search costs associated with obtaining 
information on new funds are less important than non-fee attributes.12 
                                                     
11 The smart money effect refers to the ability of flows to improve the future performance of funds. Prior 
work suggests that funds with higher inflows outperform funds with lower inflows (Gruber, 1996; 
Keswani and Stolin, 2008). 
12 Search costs are not considered as fees because they are related to the dollar spent by investors in 
searching information about fund attributes before they buy the fund. Fees are related to the cost that 
investors have to pay after buying a fund for the fund to be professionally managed by fund managers. 
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Additionally, the strategy to improve the performance of high-fee funds is 
encouraged by the absence of price competition in the mutual fund industry. Some 
analysts argue that price competition in that industry is similar to the perfect market 
competition, as there are no substantial differences between the fees charged by 
providers. Thus, investors focus on other fund attributes such as the quality of 
managers, families, and performance when selecting funds. Fund families, including 
SRI fund families, are motivated to improve those non-price features in order to attract 
more inflows from SRI investors. To maximise the family’s fee incomes, I predict that 
SRI fund families are motivated to enhance the performance of high-fee SRI funds than 
low-fee SRI funds.  
My last research question asks whether the life cycle of SRI funds matters to the 
way SRI fund families treat their member funds. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) suggest 
that younger funds are more attractive to investors than mature funds with the same 
performance. Higher inflows to young funds are a result of investors’ prior belief about 
a particular strategy employed by a fund provider to enhance the performance of those 
funds (Evans, 2010). The literature also highlights that young funds appear more 
attractive because they possess fewer performance records, and have better consistency 
in meeting the promises stated in the prospectus (Evans, 2010). In line with this 
preference for younger funds, Bollen (2007) finds that the intensity of the performance-
flow relationship for younger SRI funds is higher than for more mature SRI funds.   
1.4 Research Motivations 
The bulk of the existing literature investigates the effect of ESG constraints on 
three main SRI fund attributes: (i) performance (Bauer et al., 2005; Belghitar et al., 
2014; Bello, 2005; Goldreyer and Diltz, 1999; In et al., 2014; Kempf and Osthoff, 2008; 
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Renneboog et al., 2008); (ii) screening effects (Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 2014; 
Humphrey and Lee, 2011); and (iii) fund flows (Benson and Humphrey, 2008; Bollen, 
2007; Renneboog et al., 2012). I offer a novel insight into the effect of ESG principles 
on fund attributes that are neither related to performance nor flows. To be precise, I test 
whether having a star (poor) SRI fund contributes positively (negatively) to the flow to 
sibling SRI funds. I also provide first empirical analysis of the role of ESG principles in 
influencing the investment strategy of SRI fund families. To the best of my knowledge, 
no studies have examined the spillover effect in SRI fund families, and the association 
between ESG principles and the investment strategy performed by fund families or fund 
managers.  
I argue that ESG principles constrain not only the SRI fund’s asset selection but 
also the behaviour of SRI fund managers. According to the USSIF (2014), ESG 
principles have a positive impact on management policies and strategies of funds, 
suggesting that there is a full integration of ESG principles within fund families. This 
integration of ESG principles is motivated by the fact that SRI fund families have to 
satisfy both the financial and non-financial objectives of their investors (Barreda-
Tarrazona e al., 2011,  Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). 
The top-down approach to fund selection (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008; Massa, 
2003), where mutual fund investors initially choose fund families before deciding which 
funds to hold, explains why fund families are motivated to improve their reputation 
through several routes, including having a top-performing fund. By selectively 
enhancing the performance of some SRI funds, which can potentially provide a higher 
contribution to the future profits of the fund family, the future performance of other 
funds within the family may be sacrificed. Through this cross-fund subsidization 
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strategy, the fund family discriminates against member funds with low (existing and 
expected) contributions, rather than focusing on risk sharing (Guedj and Papastaikoudi, 
2004). I argue, however, that the incentive to adopt such discriminatory strategies is 
attenuated in SRI fund families. Motivated by ESG principles, SRI fund families focus 
on good corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance to ensure that 
none of their policies discriminate against any of their investors. Therefore, my 
empirical study aims to ascertain whether ESG principles can ameliorate discriminatory 
strategies in SRI fund families, or fail to create ethical investment strategies in SRI fund 
families. 
1.5 Summary of Findings  
My sample consists of 782 SRI mutual funds in the United States from 2000 to 
2012. I estimate cross-sectional regressions to confirm the contribution of SRI funds 
above (below) the 95
th
 (5
th
) percentile of year-to-date risk-adjusted performance. 
Results show evidence of a positive spillover effect in SRI fund families for star 
performers, suggesting that SRI star funds attract new flows to their family. Poor-
performing SRI funds, however, do not significantly adversely affect the cash flow of 
other SRI funds in the family. These findings are robust to the use of the four-factor 
Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) model and Morningstar ratings to proxy past financial 
performance. Nanda et al. (2004) also find similar spillover effects in conventional star 
families.  
Furthermore, I examine the heterogeneity of SRI funds resulting from the 
different screens used in asset selection. I find the spillover effect is more pronounced in 
SRI funds with a lower opportunity set, as shown by the higher contribution of the star 
(bad) performers to the flow of combined-ESG and environmental funds. Specifically, 
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there are positive (negative) contributions from the star (bad) SRI performers to the cash 
flow of ESG and environmental funds. The social and ethical investors are, however, 
less sensitive to the existence of poor performing funds within the family.  
I subsequently confirm that SRI investors are more concerned with the 
reputation of the fund family in managing SRI funds than in managing conventional 
funds. A fund family with a track record for generating good financial performance for 
its conventional funds does not significantly contribute to the flow of its SRI funds, 
suggesting that SRI investors are only concerned with the performance of SRI funds in 
the family. The performance of affiliated conventional funds does not provide 
information about a fund family’s skill in managing SRI funds. Therefore, to attract 
higher flow from SRI investors, a mixed fund family has to show its managers’ ability 
to generate good SRI performers, rather than high performing conventional funds. This 
suggests that SRI investors do care about the ESG they adhere to. Only a good 
performance track record in managing SRI funds can draw their investors. 
To answer the third question, I perform pooled cross-sectional regressions of 
SRI and conventional funds. I find the spillover effect is less pronounced in SRI fund 
families than in conventional fund families. Star and bad conventional performers 
significantly affect the cash flow of their sibling conventional funds. In SRI fund 
families, a significant contribution to fund flow is reported only if an SRI star fund is 
present. Unlike the conventional funds, bad SRI funds have no impact on other SRI 
funds. However, I also find that the star-fund spillover effect is economically higher in 
SRI fund families than in conventional fund families. This suggests that SRI investors 
are different to conventional fund investors. They do not respond to poor performance, 
yet they are more sensitive to good past performance than conventional investors. This 
 
 
16 
 
might be due to SRI investors' known tendency to be more loyal than conventional 
funds investors (Benson and Humphrey, 2008).  
I find evidence of cross-subsidization strategy between winning and losing SRI 
funds. The monthly return to winning funds is, on average, 27 basis points higher than 
to losing sibling funds. This performance gap is also statistically higher than for non-
family pairs which consist of winning SRI funds and matched losing SRI funds. 
Therefore, ESG principles do not appear to be effective in eliminating discrimination 
strategy through performance subsidization. There is, however, no evidence supporting 
cross-subsidization between young and old SRI funds, and between high and low-fee 
SRI funds. Although younger SRI funds are more sensitive to positive past performance 
than older funds, SRI funds families do not use this incentive to favour their younger 
funds. Further, fund families do not coordinate older SRI funds in order to subsidise the 
performance of the younger siblings. Similar results are found for the fee criterion, with 
the average monthly return of high-fee funds being insignificantly different from that of 
low-fee funds.  
My regression analysis shows that manager ownership in LC SRI funds is an 
important determinant of whether a cross-subsidization strategy is likely to be 
implemented. Loser and low-fee SRI funds in which managers have an ownership stake 
are less likely to subsidise the performance of winner and high-fee sibling funds, 
respectively. The performance of mature funds with manager ownership, however, 
appears to be subsidised by their younger siblings in the same investment style. I also 
find the cross-subsidization strategy tends to be performed across ethically-screened 
SRI funds than across funds which screen on social, environmental, labour relationship, 
and governance issues. This finding suggests that ethically constrained SRI funds which 
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have a larger investment opportunity set are more likely to be coordinated by their fund 
families using cross-subsidization strategy. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
My research makes several important contributions to the literature. First, it 
contributes to the delegated asset management literature by showing that additional 
ESG constraints affect investors’ sensitivity to the reputation of SRI fund families. I 
show that the intensity of the spillover effect in SRI fund families is lower than in 
conventional fund families, with fund flows being more responsive to the presence of a 
star or bad performer(s) in conventional fund families. However, SRI fund families with 
star performing SRI funds receive greater benefits through new inflows to the rest of the 
SRI funds, and the magnitude of the inflow is higher than that to conventional funds due 
to having conventional star performers in the family. 
My study also contributes to the SRI fund literature in several ways. I provide 
new evidence showing how the various types of SRI funds are related to the existence 
of star (poor) performers in the family. I find the sensitivity of SRI funds to the presence 
of a star (poor) performer(s) in SRI fund families is related to non-financial constraints 
in selecting assets. The cash flows of funds which are concerned with environmental 
and combined-ESG issues are more sensitive to the presence of star (poor) performing 
SRI funds than of funds which are concerned with social or ethical issues. Furthermore, 
I find strong evidence of cross-subsidization between winning and losing SRI funds, 
supporting the existence of agency conflicts in the delegated asset management 
literature.  
Second, I extend the scope of ESG principles beyond asset selection to the 
investment strategy undertaken by fund families. I do not find evidence of cross-
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subsidization between high-fee and low-fee SRI funds and between young and mature 
SRI funds for conventional funds. This is contrary to what Gaspar et al. (2006) have 
argued. My findings suggest that SRI fund families are more ethical in the treatment of 
their investors.      
My contribution also lies in providing support for the literature on the non-
performance attributes of mutual funds. Prior studies find that SRI and non-SRI funds 
have different non-performance attributes. For example, the flow-performance 
relationship characterises the extent to which SRI and non-SRI funds are different 
(Benson and Humphrey, 2008; Bollen, 2007; Renneboog et al., 2008). My results offer 
a better understanding of family attributes that can distinguish SRI funds from 
conventional funds. I find that SRI and conventional investors react differently to 
information related to the past reputation of the family in yielding a high financial 
performance. Although the family’s track record in generating high performing funds 
are important to both SRI and conventional investors, only SRI investors are insensitive 
to the poor track record of a family in generating star performers.     
This study also contributes to the literature on fund governance. Information 
asymmetry remains crucial in the mutual fund industry (He and Xiong, 2013). The 
scandal of late trading, and the misuse of market timing involving some highly 
reputable investment banks reveals that fund families can benefit from information 
asymmetries. My study shows that good values, which are intrinsic to and embedded in 
the ESG principles, can help mitigate the motivation of SRI fund families to take 
advantage of information asymmetry by discriminating high-fee and young SRI funds 
from low-fee and mature SRI funds. The lower incidence of favouritism through cross-
subsidization in funds with manager ownership supports the corporate governance 
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literature that lower agency costs, as proxied by higher managerial ownership, decrease 
perverse managerial strategies or actions which can potentially decrease the future value 
of funds.        
1.7 Thesis Layout 
The remainder of this thesis will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I present an 
overview of the SRI fund industry. A literature review is presented in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 develops the hypotheses, and Chapter 5 describes the data and research 
methods. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results for the spillover effects in SRI fund 
families, and Chapter 7 presents the empirical results for cross-subsidization strategies 
in SRI fund families. A summary and conclusion with a discussion of the limitations of 
my study and some avenues for future research are presented in Chapter 8. 
  
 
 
20 
 
Chapter 2   
An Overview of SRI Funds 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter overviews the historical and current information about SRI fund 
industry. Section 2.2 presents the background of socially constrained investors and the 
establishment of SRI mutual fund market. Section 2.3 presents the detailed information 
about the Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) principles used in the asset 
selection of SRI funds. Section 2.4 describes the benefit earned by SRI funds in 
choosing ESG compliant companies. Section 2.5 reviews the negative screenings versus 
positive screenings. Section 2.6 reviews SRI fund families in the United States.  The 
chapter summary is presented in section 2.7.  
2.2 Background and History of SRI Funds 
Ethical, social, and religious values have been embraced by certain investors 
even before the establishment of the contemporary financial market. Several religious 
communities have introduced the prohibition investing in particular assets or business 
entities. These religious communities categorise assets as being acceptable or sinful. For 
example, in 1758, the Quakers, a Christian community in Philadelphia, prohibited its 
members from investing in firms that participated in slavery. Such human right issues 
are still crucial in businesses, as well as in financial markets, where there exists a niche 
investment market for investors who want to avoid investing in financial assets issued 
by firms involved in activities that violate human rights. Since 1908, the Methodist 
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Church’s investment has demonstrated a concern with humanity-related issues in the 
workplace by excluding firms that have poor working conditions and that employ 
underage labour. During the twentieth century, investors concerned with conflicts 
between countries such as the two world wars, the South African apartheid, the Korean 
War and the Vietnam War turned away from firms which produce weapons or nuclear.   
  Although some analysts separate religious-based funds from SRI funds, the 
inception of SRI funds market is motivated by religious values that are concerned with 
social, humanity and environmental issues. There are currently three popular faith-based 
mutual funds: Protestant funds, Catholic funds, and Islamic funds. Protestant funds are 
the most popular, especially in the United States. Some SRI fund providers including 
Thrivent, Domini, Praxis Funds, New Covenant Funds, Guidestone Funds, and Timothy 
Plan Funds are connected with the Protestant faith. While they are commonly known as 
providers who engage the ESG principles in forming portfolios, they are actually 
concerned with religious principles. Most of their managed funds apply negative 
screenings by avoiding financial assets issued by firms whose activities relate to 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, pornography, child labour, slavery, and abortion.  
Ave Maria is the largest fund that uses Catholic values in its investment strategy, 
followed by LKCM Aquinas and Epiphany. Sharia funds are based on Islamic values 
where they have similar screening criteria as other religious funds with the additional 
screenings stated in Al-Qur’an e.g., prohibition of investment in firms which receive or 
pay interest or produce pork products. Sharia funds are popular not only in Muslim-
majority countries but also in other countries including the United States and the United 
Kingdom.   
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In the 21
st
 century, environmentalists argue that business activities have 
contributed to the destruction of the environment. The Kyoto Protocol and Bali Protocol 
have raised the issue of global warming and carbon emissions caused by certain 
business activities. Investors concerned with these issues environmental issues took a 
pro-active role by avoiding financial assets issued by polluting firms. Investment 
providers such as Allianz were quick to respond to these investors’ needs by issuing 
environmentally screened funds.  
Figure 2.1  
Growth in the number of SRI and conventional funds, 1998-2012 
The growth rate is measured as the percentage increase in the number of SRI funds between consecutive 
years. Data are sourced from the online Morningstar Direct database. 
 
 
According to USSIF (2015), there were $4.74 trillion assets managed by SRI 
fund families domiciled in the United States in 2014. In comparison, assets managed by 
SRI fund families was $614 billion in 2012 representing almost 18 percent of managed 
assets in the country. This trend suggests that SRI funds are attractive since they offer 
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social engagement while also promising financial benefits to investors. The online 
Morningstar Direct database shows that the first professional SRI funds, Steward Small-
Mid Cap Enhanced Idx Indv and American Funds Washington Mutual A listed in 1952, 
were respectively issued by Capstone and American Funds. These funds are still 
actively traded today. These funds select assets based on not only financial records of 
firms but also on whether the firms meet the ESG constraints. 
Figure 2.2  
Growth in the size of SRI and conventional funds, 1998 - 2012 
The growth rate is measured as the percentage increase in the size of SRI funds between consecutive 
years. Data are sourced from the online Morningstar Direct database. 
 
 
Despite the heightened concerns such as environment and social concerns, 
investment institutions have been slow in tapping into this niche market. It was not until 
1971 that other professional SRI funds were listed. The 1990s saw a turnaround in the 
SRI fund industry.  The number of SRI funds and SRI fund families has systematically 
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SRI providers in the US market, based on the number of SRI funds. Although the 
growth in the number SRI funds is, on average, higher than that of conventional funds, 
shown in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 shows that the growth in the size of SRI funds is 
relatively similar to that of conventional funds. 
These ESG-constrained funds are domiciled not only in developed markets such 
as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and countries the European Union 
countries but also in developing markets in the South American and Asian regions. In 
2013, the association for sustainable and responsible investment in Asia (ASRIA) 
reported that were 500 sustainable investment funds with US $44.9 billion managed 
assets in the Asian region (excluding Japan). The association notes that these funds 
predominantly constrain their asset choice based on sustainable investment assets, 
climate change, energy, and water security. Funds from Indonesia and Malaysia mostly 
focus on the use of Sharia law. These funds exclude financial assets issued by non-
Sharia compliant firms including conventional banks, and firms whose activities relate 
to pork products, entertainment, and gambling. 
2.3 ESG Principles 
The screens applied by SRI fund managers in selecting assets can be categorised 
into three principles: Environment, social, and governance (ESG). These principles are 
in line with corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues in contemporary corporate 
governance. The USSIF notes that the current listed SRI funds use one or all principles 
in managing their portfolio. This portfolio strategy affects the opportunity set of SRI 
funds. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) suggest that investors pay a price for avoiding sin 
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stocks because sin stocks outperform socially constrained stocks by an average 3 to 4 
percent annually.  
The USSIF has set some criteria for each screening, plus additional screenings 
based on products. The environmental screening, which is concerned with firms on 
climate change, pollution and environment. Financial assets issued by firms with poor 
track records in environmental engagements such as deforestation, pollution, oil spills, 
and carbon production. The social screening focuses on community development, 
diversity, human rights, labour relations, and business in Sudan. Some SRI funds 
exclude firms that operate in Sudan, similar to the apartheid ban in the 1980s. These 
funds aim to punish firms that potentially support the regime in mass killing in Sudan 
and to penalise firms for not contributing through paying taxes to the regime. Nearly 
half of SRI funds in the United States use this sub-screening.  Governance screenings 
are related to board issues and executive pay. The former is related to investor 
protection because it views the board as having a duty of care to protect small investors. 
The latter is related to the fairness received by employees by investigating the deviation 
between executive and non-executive salaries.   
In applying product-based screening, SRI funds avoid firms which produce 
socially harmful products, such as alcohol, weapons, gambling, and tobacco. Product 
screening is mainly used by fund families that are affiliated with religious groups. 
Sharia funds even have further screenings that exclude conventional financial 
institutions, and firms that produce pork products.   
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2.4 Why Do SRI Funds Choose “Good” Firms? 
In traditional corporate finance, engaging CSR will burden firms with additional 
costs that can lead to a higher cost of capital. This will not attract traditional investors to 
buy firms’ financial assets because CSR costs can reduce either the operating profit 
margin and earnings per share (EPS) of a firm. This raises the question of "why do firms 
practice CRS?". Becker-Blease (2012) argues that the implementation of CSR in a 
sustainable firm’s policies can improve the relationship between the firm and its 
stakeholders. This is known as “corporate socially responsible investment (CSRI)”, 
which improve a firm’s long-term value. Studies by Godfrey (2005) and Hong and 
Kacperczky (2014) show that engaging in CSRI can increase the demand from socially-
constrained investors, resulting in a lower cost of capital. 
There are many ESG-constrained or ESG-conscious investors who support 
“good” companies. Their demand for non-sinful assets can potentially motivate more 
firms to engage in CSRI policies contribute to bettering relationships with employees, 
customers, the environment, and regulators.  
The USSIF argues that the aim of SRI funds goes beyond the flow of capital, 
and involves challenging firms to improve their environmental and social performance. 
As shareholders, SRI funds can require firms to meet the  ESG principles, and advocate 
the capital benefit that flows from adherence to ESG principles.   
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2.5 Negative versus Positive Screening 
Concerning issue in the SRI fund industry relates to how fund managers can 
ensure that their funds are compliant with the ESG principles. There are two main 
screening strategies: negative and positive screenings. Negative screening is widely 
used by SRI fund managers since it requires certain assets issued by firms which do not 
meet certain criteria to be excluded. Funds concerned with adverse social impact of 
alcohol and gambling screen out from their investment set firms involved in alcohol and 
gambling activities. According to the USSIF, there are four restricted products and/or 
activities that are commonly used in negative screening, and they are alcohol, gambling, 
weapons, and tobacco. In recent times, certain SRI funds have also excluded firms 
based on business connectivity with environmental and social issues, instead of 
products. Some funds have constraints in investing in firms that create pollution or that 
operate in Sudan.  
Positive screening, on the other hand, excludes sinful or non-social assets and 
reviews the ESG performance/rating of firms. Best practice is the main consideration in 
positive screening. A firm which passes, say, the environmental screening is not 
guaranteed that its financial assets are eligible for positively-screened funds. This is 
because Those positively-screened funds rank financial assets on ESG performance and 
the choose best-ranked assets. Positive screening thus imposes a higher limitation on 
asset choices than negative screening. 
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2.6 SRI Fund Families      
Massa (2003) reports that conventional fund providers often perform fund and 
style proliferation to accommodate heterogeneous investor preferences. This 
proliferation strategy is also observed in the SRI fund industry, where a provider 
constructs an SRI fund family comprising SRI funds with various investment styles. Not 
all providers, however, are interested in expanding their SRI fund business, as shown by 
the limited number of SRI funds provided. For example, Fidelity only manages an SRI 
fund while owning thousands of conventional funds. Despite Fidelity’s long experience 
in managing traditional funds, it takes only a small portion of this niche market by 
issuing only one SRI fund, named ‘Fidelity Select Environment and Alternative Energy 
Portfolio’. 
In terms of the number of managed SRI funds, Table 2.1 shows that at the end of 
2012, Calvert investment was the largest SRI fund family managing a total of 109 SRI 
funds. This is followed by Pax World, Timothy Plan, Praxis Mutual Fund, and 
American Funds, which professionally manage 37, 36, 21 and 18 SRI funds 
respectively. In terms of the dollar value of asset managed, only American Funds and 
Calvert Investments are in the top five, with $54.8 billion and $9.6 billion respectively. 
Pax World and Timothy Plan manage only $2.7 billion and $550.9 million respectively. 
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Table 2.1  
SRI fund families’ profiles in the United States, 2012 
Size presents the cumulative size of SRI funds managed by a fund family. No of funds means the total 
number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Data are sourced from the online Morningstar Direct 
database. 
 
 
No Firm Name Size ($)
Rank in 
Size 
No of 
funds
Rank in No. of 
Funds
1 American Funds 54,873,491,794 1 18 5
2 Calvert Investments 9,596,845,969 2 109 1
3 Parnassus 6,811,041,038 3 7 11
4 Pimco 4,353,679,072 4 6 12
5 American Century Investments 3,937,086,823 5 9 9
6 Pax World 2,665,708,379 6 37 2
7 Neuberger Berman 1,953,591,649 7 9 9
8 Invesco 1,549,442,141 8 8 10
9 Community Capital Management 1,515,921,193 9 3 15
10 Dimensional Fund Advisors 1,376,862,531 10 7 11
11 Ariel Investments, LLC 1,335,093,233 11 6 12
12 TIAA-CREF Mutual Funds 1,310,464,127 12 8 10
13 Domini 1,052,850,670 13 11 7
14 Touchstone 1,007,907,167 14 9 9
15 New Covenant 995,314,434 15 4 14
16 Praxis Mutual Funds 882,295,309 16 21 4
17 Ave Maria Mutual Funds 867,545,744 17 6 12
18 VALIC 824,320,631 18 2 16
19 Capstone 635,514,266 19 10 8
20 Vanguard 619,111,456 20 2 16
21 RBC Global Asset Management (US) Inc610,203,401 21 3 15
22 Timothy Plan 550,909,721 22 36 3
23 Delaware Investments 531,361,482 23 1 17
24 Portfolio 21 387,972,844 24 2 16
25 Sentinel 305,212,721 25 6 12
26 Boston Trust & Walden Funds 289,977,499 26 5 13
27 SEI 285,540,963 27 1 17
28 Dreyfus 247,522,985 28 5 13
29 Appleseed Fund 238,586,455 29 2 16
30 Brown Advisory Funds 162,557,428 30 3 15
31 New Alternatives 147,679,760 31 1 17
32 1919 Funds 140,368,898 32 5 13
33 Green Century 116,619,478 33 2 16
34 Boston Common 115,921,771 34 2 16
35 City National Rochdale 110,059,512 35 2 16
36 Allianz Funds 109,173,555 36 6 12
37 Northern Funds 108,567,912 37 1 17
38 North Country Funds 103,015,348 38 1 17
39 Shelton Capital Management 101,426,213 39 1 17
40 LKCM 93,599,843 40 3 15
41 AXA Equitable 84,462,879 41 2 16
42 Great-West Funds 81,436,296 42 3 15
43 Fidelity Investments 74,440,976 43 1 17
44 Gabelli 55,734,660 44 5 13
45 Jordan Funds 49,718,644 45 1 17
46 Alger 49,148,875 46 4 14
47 Eventide Funds 33,021,112 47 10 8
48 Meeder Funds 30,336,623 48 1 17
49 Integrity 27,634,346 49 2 16
50 American Trust 18,995,250 50 1 17
51 UBS 18,589,515 51 4 14
52 Frontier Funds 17,341,699 52 1 17
53 Epiphany Funds 15,345,422 53 12 6
54 Guinness Atkinson 13,083,756 54 1 17
55 CAMCo 9,627,210 55 1 17
56 Fairfax 6,178,400 56 1 17
57 Firsthand Funds 2,000,000 57 1 17
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Figure 2.3 
 Number of SRI funds and SRI fund families, 1998 to 2012 
The number of SRI funds and SRI fund families represents the number of registered SRI funds and SRI 
fund families in the United States between consecutive years. Data are sourced from the online 
Morningstar Direct database. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows a significant increase in the number of SRI funds before the 
2008 financial crisis. The number of fund families is almost flat, implying that new 
funds are mostly issued by existing families. This increasing popularity of fund 
proliferation strategies suggests that research on the role of fund families in determining 
the attributes of individual member funds, such as performance and flow, is crucial. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the SRI fund industry in the United 
States. The overview has included discussion of how religion started faith-based mutual 
funds. SRI funds exist as an opportunity for investment bank to gain from a niche 
market which is concerned with ethical investment.  
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According to the above overview of the industry, such constrained funds are 
important in financial markets. Like conventional funds, this industry comprises a 
number of fund families with several managed SRI funds. This means that the 
dependence between SRI funds within the family is potentially more likely to be 
managed in achieving fund family objectives.  The existence of variety of SRI funds 
within the family motivates us to investigate the relationship between the attributes 
across SRI funds by examining the spillover effect from the performance of funds on 
the cash flows of peer siblings. The increase in the number of managed SRI funds in a 
fund family also provides the opportunity for researchers to investigate whether that 
proliferation strategy aims to attract more flows through providing more opportunity for 
investors to choose funds (Massa, 2003) or through the star-creating strategy (Gaspar et 
al., 2006).  
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Chapter 3   
Literature Review 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter summarises the four strands of mutual fund literature that are 
related to this study: the performance of SRI funds; the relationship between screening 
intensity and performance; the flow-performance relationship; and fund families. A 
large body of research evaluates whether SRI funds outperform or underperform their 
benchmarks, i.e. the market or matched conventional funds. These studies aim to 
examine the effect of non-financial constraints used by fund managers when selecting 
assets on fund performance.  
The literature on the flow-performance relationship describes investors’ 
behaviour in response to fund performance. In the traditional mutual fund literature, 
performance is an important determinant of the investment decision made by investors. 
Studies on the flow-performance relationship of SRI funds focus on whether ESG-
constrained investors are less concerned with fund performance than investors of 
conventional funds. If social objectives drive the investments made by SRI investors, 
these investments may be less dependent on the financial records of funds and families. 
The lack of information on non-financial performance may, however, result in financial 
information being particularly important when investors select SRI funds. The 
relationship also implies the potential incentives for SRI fund families to use certain 
investment strategies such as the performance enhancement strategy. 
 
 
33 
 
Recent mutual fund research is concerned not only with the dependency of fund 
attributes, but also with the attributes of fund families and peer funds within a family.  
Studies on this issue have criticised the earlier literature, which assumes the 
independence of funds from the attributes of member funds in the family. In fact, the 
literature suggests that investors prefer to seek information about the reputation of fund 
families before choosing individual funds. The rest of this chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 3.2 discusses the literature on the performance of SRI funds. In section 
3.3, I present the literature on the number of screening-performance relationship. The 
literature on the relationship between flows and performance will be described in 
section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the literature on fund families. Section 3.6 concludes 
the chapter. 
3.2 Performance of SRI Funds 
Several studies compare SRI funds with their non-SRI counterparts on a number 
of performance measures. These measures include traditional mean-variance 
frameworks, risk-adjusted returns, and frontier techniques. One of the earliest references 
is Hamilton et al. (1993) who investigate SRI funds’ performance using a CAPM-based 
Jensen’s alpha. Based on a sample of 32 SRI funds in the United States from 1981 to 
1990, they find no statistical difference between the mean monthly excess return of SRI 
funds and conventional funds. They also test whether significant results vary over time 
by doing a subsampling method that randomly splits their samples into two time 
categories: funds that were established before 1986, and funds that were established in 
or after 1986. The study finds that there is no difference in performance between SRI 
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and conventional funds. Their small samples, however, makes it difficult to generalise 
about whether SRI investors pay a cost for their social or ethical beliefs.  
Statman (2000) compares the performance of the Domini Social Index (DSI) and 
conventional equity index from 1990 to 1998.  He uses the DSI to minimise the bias in 
results from comparing a small number of SRI funds with a large number of 
conventional funds. He measures differences in mean returns and CAPM alpha of DSI 
and S&P 500, and finds the performance measures are lower for DSI than for S&P 500, 
but the difference is not statistically significant.  
In contrast to these studies, Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) argue for the outperformance 
of SRI funds over their conventional counterparts. Based on a sample of 455 US SRI 
funds from 1997 to 2005, they find that the before-fee Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) 
alpha of SRI funds outperforms their matched conventional funds by 0.96 to 1.83 
percent per year. They also suggest that the specialisation of fund families determines 
the performance of SRI funds. SRI funds from focused fund families outperform their 
matched conventional funds, while SRI funds issued by non-focused families 
underperform their matched conventional funds.  
In the United Kingdom, Luther et al. (1992) confirm that there is an insignificant 
difference between the financial performance of SRI funds and conventional funds. By 
evaluating the UK’s 15 ethical unit trusts from 1972 to 1990, they find evidence that the 
monthly returns of ethical funds are not statistically different from the benchmarks used, 
which are FT All-Share and MSCIP World. Similar to prior studies, they find that risk-
adjusted returns (Jensen’s alpha) of those ethical funds do not significantly 
underperform their conventional benchmarks.  
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Mallin et al. (1995) find a weak evidence that ethical funds outperform non-
ethical ones in the United Kingdom. By employing several performance measurements, 
they compare the performance of 29 UK ethical funds and their 29 matched non-ethical 
funds from 1986 to 1993. Measuring the difference in the raw and market-adjusted 
returns, they find that non-ethical funds systematically outperform the ethical funds.  
However, based on Jensen’s alpha, 18 out of 29 ethical funds outperform their matched 
non-ethical funds.  
Using a sample of 60 European SRI funds from 1995 to 2001, Kreander et al. 
(2005) corroborate that the average financial performance  (Sharpe Ratio, Treynor 
Ratio, and Jensen Alpha) of ethical funds is not statistically different from that of 
matched non-ethical funds. The average of Treynor ratio and Jensen alpha for ethical 
and non-ethical funds is very similar, suggesting that no costs are consumed by 
investors for using ethical principles in constructing a fund’s portfolio. 
Employing 25 Australian SRI funds in their sample, Bauer et al. (2006) find that 
the performance difference between SRI funds and their matched conventional funds 
varies over time. During the period of 1992 to 1996, SRI funds underperform 
conventional funds, but there is no difference in the FFC alpha between these funds 
during the 1996-2003 period.  
Bauer et al. (2005) use a broad sample of 504 SRI funds from the US, the UK, 
and Germany from 1990 to 2001. They perform single CAPM and four risk factor 
(FFC) models taken from Carhart (1997) to calculate the risk-adjusted returns of SRI 
and conventional funds. They find no evidence to support differences in performance 
between SRI funds and conventional funds in those countries. Although the CAPM and 
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FFC alpha of SRI funds are higher in the US and the UK than conventional funds, the 
difference is not statistically significant. The significant underperformance (both CAPM 
and FFC) is only for German international funds. SRI funds have been found to be less 
sensitive to this risk than conventional funds, shown by the lower market Beta of 
CAPM and FFC model than conventional funds.     
Jones et al. (2007) criticise prior research on SRI funds, especially research that 
employs non-US SRI funds. Their main concern is the small sample size. They expand 
upon Bauer et al. (2006) by investigating a larger number of SRI funds in Australia - 89 
SRI funds from 1986 to 2005. They compare the single, FF, and FFC alpha of SRI 
funds and ASX All Ordinaries by employing the Chow test of the alpha created by the 
non-pooled SRI and ASX All Ordinaries regression pricing model. They find SRI funds 
significantly underperform the market by 55 basis points for the single alpha, and 74 
basis points for the FFC alpha.   
Bauer et al. (2006) replicate their previous study on eight Canadian SRI funds 
from 1994 to 2003. Univariate test of difference between the alpha of SRI funds and 
conventional funds show that Canadian SRI funds generate an alpha of -3.18, which is 
not significantly different from -2.90 alpha of conventional funds. Interestingly, the risk 
coefficients on these four risk factors are relatively similar, suggesting that imposing 
ethical screenings in building portfolios does not affect average returns earned and risk 
taken by investors. Their study is, however, subject to survivorship bias as they exclude 
dead funds for all periods of study. Consequently, the performance of those dead funds 
is overlooked.  
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The issue of survivorship bias is considered by Renneboog et al. (2008). They 
employ a sample of 440 SRI funds from the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Europe, and Asia-Pacific from 1995 to 2005. Risk factors are estimated using the FF 
three factors model and the FFC four factors model. They find that the FFC-adjusted 
alpha of SRI funds underperforms their domestic FFC benchmark by -2.2 to -6.5 
percent, indicating a higher price for using the ESG principles. However, there is little 
evidence that SRI funds underperform conventional funds except in three European 
countries (France, Ireland, and Sweden) and Japan. Interestingly, they report that SRI 
investors are not able to detect SRI funds that potentially outperform the benchmark. 
They also find no “smart money” effect on SRI funds because there is no evidence on 
the relation between current inflows and future performance of SRI funds.  
The above studies do not consider heterogeneity in the screening criteria. Using 
a sample of seven US green funds from 1987-2009, Climent and Soriano (2011) find 
that green funds significantly underperform conventional funds, suggesting that green 
investors pay a price for engaging in environmental issues. Furthermore, green funds 
are more reactive to market information than other SRI and conventional funds. In a 
study of shari'a (or Islamic) equity funds around the world, Nainggolan et al. (2015) 
analyse the risk-adjusted performance of 387 global shari’a funds. They find that those 
shari’a-constrained funds, on average, underperform conventional funds by 40 basis 
points per month on the FF alpha. Those findings suggest that SRI investors have to pay 
costs for taking a particular screening, especially for screening which potentially 
remove more assets in the investment set of fund, such as green and shari’a funds. 
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Derwall et al. (2005) further expand the research on the performance of SRI 
funds by controlling the “eco-efficiency” scores of portfolios. 13  SRI portfolios that 
comprise companies that score highly on eco-efficiency outperform those portfolios 
comprised of low-ranked companies. Between 1995 and 2003, the former have positive 
risk-adjusted returns (single CAPM), while the latter generate negative alpha. Their 
finding thus suggests that SRI performance depends on the social performance of their 
assets.  
Subsequent studies have attempted to examine the performance persistence of 
SRI funds. Using a sample of 32 ethical funds domiciled in the UK from 1989 to 2002, 
Gregory and Whittaker (2007) confirm the insignificant difference in the alpha of SRI 
and conventional funds. Their most significant contribution to the SRI literature is their 
examination of risk-adjusted performance over a 36-month horizon. They find evidence 
that FF and FFC of SRI winners are persistent over time. This implies that SRI investors 
are able to earn future abnormal returns by holding winning SRI funds. 
Abdelsalam et al. (2014) also confirm the persistence in performance of SRI 
funds. Based on a sample of 636 worldwide SRI funds during the period from 2001 to 
2011, they construct a ten-decile portfolio, where the first (top) decile consist of the top 
performing SRI funds in the past.  They find the performance of SRI funds in the top 
and bottom deciles is persistent. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) investigate whether ethically constrained investors 
suffer from asset exclusion by analysing a sample of stocks listed on Nasdaq, Amex and 
NYSE from 1976 to 2006, instead of bundling all SRI funds together. They form 
                                                     
13 Eco-efficiency is ratio of value added of companies from producing goods or services and the waste 
resulted from the production.  
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portfolios consisting of “sin stocks,” or stocks issued by non-ethically compliant firms 
such as tobacco, alcohol and gaming firms. Sin stocks have less institutional ownership, 
which affects the demand for those stocks. From 1980 to 2006, only 28 percent of sin 
stocks were held by institutional investors. They also report that those sin stocks had 
less analyst coverage during the period from 1976 to 2006. A result of the low demand, 
sin stocks have a lower price-earning (P/E) ratio and a more stable market value. 
However, the risk-adjusted returns of the portfolio of sin stocks outperform that of the 
portfolio of comparable non-sin stocks by average of 30 basis points per month after 
controlling for market, SMB (small minus big size stocks) and HML (high minus low 
market to book ratio (MB) stocks); and by 26 basis points when controlling for the 
momentum factor (MOM). The outperformance of the sin stock portfolio is driven by 
their lower MB ratio. The higher MB of non-sin stocks causes these stocks to be more 
active, thus increasing their price volatility.    
Derwall et al. (2011) follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) in examining the 
performance of ESG-screened portfolios. They construct a non-ESG screened portfolio 
consisting of “shunned” stocks and an ESG constrained portfolio consisting of stocks 
that score highly with reference to employee relation. The shunned-stock portfolio 
contains non-ESG compliant firms issued by KLD,14 while the ethical portfolio consists 
of firms in the above 70 percentile of good-employee-relations, based on KLD 
categories. Using US data from 1992 to 2008, they find the performance of the 
shunned-stock portfolio is higher than that of the ethical portfolio. The mean annual 
return and Sharpe ratio of the shunned-stock portfolio are 11.72 percent and 0.51 
respectively, which are 2.53 and 0.2 higher than for the ethical portfolio. Regarding 
                                                     
14 KLD is an independent research institution that has launched criteria for categorising ethical and non-
ethical companies. 
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risk-adjusted returns, the FFC alpha of the shunned-stock portfolio tends to be more 
stable over time, ranging from 2.58 to 2.86 percent annually. In comparison, the ethical 
portfolio has a more volatile alpha such that SRI investors can generate profits only in 
the short-term, as the profit seems to disappear over the longer-term period.  
 Lean et al. (2014) study the performance of SRI funds in Europe and North 
America using a sample of 748 SRI funds from 2001 to 2011. They also investigate the 
performance persistence of those funds. They find that SRI funds from both regions 
outperform the market, which is proxied by Eurekahedge SRI funds Index (ESFI). 
Additionally, they find evidence of higher performance persistence for funds funds in 
Europe than for funds in North America. They explain that the higher persistence in SRI 
fund performance in Europe is due to the less efficient European market.  
Some studies attempt to compare the effect of market crisis on the performance 
of SRI and conventional funds. Nofsinger and Varma (2013) examine whether SRI 
funds which include the ESG compliant companies outperform their non-SRI 
counterparts during the 2000-2002 technology bubble crisis and the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. By employing the 240 SRI funds domiciled in the US from 2000 to 2012, they 
find that SRI funds have lower downside risk during the financial crisis. They even 
outperform conventional funds’ FF alpha by 2.18 percent during the crisis periods, 
regardless the screening type used. They also find that investors who are concerned with 
the downside risk tend to choose funds with the less non-ESG-compliant assets. In 
addition, investors are more likely to stay with SRI funds. Thus, fund families will be 
less worried if their investment strategy potentially decreases the future returns of some 
SRI funds. 
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Similarly, Leite and Cortez (2015) find the underperformance of SRI funds 
against conventional funds  is lower during the crisis than during non-crisis.  They use 
three kinds of crisis to examine the performance and risk difference between both types 
of funds. Using the French’s 74 SRI funds from 1999 to 2012, they find the risk of 
adjusted returns of SRI funds is not statistically different from that of conventional 
funds during the crisis. The results are different to the before crisis findings where SRI 
funds significantly underperform their conventional counterparts. In terms of risk, the 
risk exposure of both funds toward market premium is significantly positive but the 
difference between those beta is not significant during the crisis, contrary to the 
significant difference during non-crisis periods.  
3.3 Screening-Performance Relationship 
The above literature is concerned with only the performance of SRI funds 
relative to conventional funds. Barnett and Salomon (2006) consider the heterogeneity 
of SRI funds by investigating the effect of screening intensity on performance. They 
investigate how the number of screens used affects the monthly Jensen’s alpha. By 
employing a panel data of 67 SRI funds from 1972 to 2000, they find that the intensity 
squared measure is statistically related to alpha, suggesting a significant curvilinear 
relationship between the two variables. A decrease in alpha results when the number of 
screenings is increased to seven. Alpha, though, increases for each subsequent 
additional screening until twelve screenings. 
Lee et al. (2010) extend the Barnet and Salomon (2006) study by considering 
non-risk and risk-adjusted performance in their model.  Using a sample of 61 domestic 
SRI funds domiciled in the United States between 1989 and 2006, they find no relation 
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between the number of screens and non-risk adjusted returns (such as the three-year-to-
date returns), Sharpe ratio, and Information ratio.15  They find the FFC alpha of the 
funds reduces by 70 basis points for each screen used. These researchers also test the 
curvilinear relationship between screening intensity and fund returns. Unlike Barnett 
and Salomon (2006), they find no evidence of a curvilinear relationship between 
screening intensity and returns. A significant curvilinear relationship is only found 
between screening intensity and risk, which they proxy by the standard deviation of 
returns. Their results show a lower standard deviation for more screenings. However, as 
the number of screenings increase beyond six, the standard deviation increases.   
Capelle-Blancard and Monjon (2014) study whether the relationship between 
screening intensity and fund performance varies across countries. They use the number 
of screens employed by SRI funds to proxy the intensity of screenings. In evaluating a 
sample of 116 French SRI funds during the period 2004 – 2007, they find a negative 
relationship between the number of screens and financial performance. After controlling 
for fund characteristics, each additional screen reduces the risk-adjusted performance of 
by an average of 4.9 percent. They report that the negative relationship is determined by 
the use of exclusionary screenings which exclude sin stocks. Positive screens such as 
environmental and labour relationship do not affect the performance of SRI funds. The 
environmental screening type negatively affects the annual risk-adjusted returns by 5-6 
percent. 
                                                     
15 The information ratio is calculated by dividing the performance difference between the portfolio and its 
benchmark with the volatility of that difference. 
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3.4 Flow-Performance Relationship 
In this section, I discuss the literature on how past performance affects the 
behaviour of mutual fund investors in this section. This relationship is important 
because the primary motivation for performing the favouritism strategy is to attract 
inflows to funds and families. This strategy will provide greater benefits to families 
when investors are responsive to positive performance but are not as responsive to poor 
performing funds. Extensive studies exist on this issue. 
The literature provides mixed evidence on the flow-performance relationship. 
Early studies, including Pate et al. (1994) and Kane et al. (1991), find a positive linear 
relationship between past performance and current cash flows. Funds with good 
performance attract higher future cash flows from new and current investors, and vice 
versa. Subsequent studies, however, report the relationship is not linear, with the 
inflows to funds with outstanding performance being substantially higher than outflows 
from poor performers (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Huang et al., 2007; Sirri and 
Tufano, 1998). 
There are several explanations as to why the relationship between performance 
and flow is non-linear. First, searching costs determine the investor’s decision to buy or 
to sell a fund (Gallaher et al., 2006 and 2012; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Investors are 
reluctant to switch the poorly-performing funds they hold with new funds unless the 
benefits from switching outweigh the costs. Load fees are important for fund investors 
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because they have to pay these fees for new funds, and, possibly for their current 
funds.16  
The second reason is that there is still a running debate over whether 
performance is related to managerial skill or luck. Fama and French (2010) find strong 
evidence supporting the relationship between before-fee returns and managers’ skills, 
but the majority of managers have insufficient skills to maintain an adequate 
performance after considering the expenses. In investigating a sample of 3,156 US 
domestic equity funds over the period of 1984 to 2006, they find the number of fund 
managers who are able to generate positive benchmark-adjusted performance after costs 
are substantially less than the number of fund managers with a negative alpha after 
costs. This finding leads them to conclude that most high-performing funds are the 
result of luck rather than skill. 
Cuthbertson et al. (2008) examine whether top performing funds have ex-post 
outperformance, suggesting that perhaps only star fund managers have superior skill. 
They investigate the ex-post risk-adjusted abnormal performance of a sample of 935 
equity funds in the United Kingdom. Their results indicate that only the top 5-10 
percent of fund performers show evidence of superior stock-picking ability. They also 
report that the poor performance of certain funds in the UK driven by poor management 
skill instead of bad luck.  
Ferreira et al. (2012) examine the convex performance-flow relationship and 
how this is related to market efficiency and participation costs paid by fund investors. 
They use a sample of 12,007 funds from 28 countries. Their results are consistent with 
                                                     
16 Share class funds have different load fee characteristics. Some funds use front load fees while other 
funds use end load fees. 
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previous studies where performance, proxied by Jensen’s alpha and FFC alpha, and 
flows relation is non-linear. Interestingly, the relationship is less convex in developed 
countries than in developing countries. They suggest the sophisticated market and lower 
participation costs in developed countries lead to a less convex performance-flow 
relationship.  
However, the flow-performance relationship is different for funds with ESG 
screenings. Bollen (2007) compares the sensitivity of SRI and conventional investors to 
past performance. Their sample covers 205 SRI funds and 8,009 matched conventional 
funds in the United States from 1998 to 2002. The results show that, relative to 
conventional investors, SRI investors are more responsive to positive performance but 
less responsive to negative performance. Specifically, inflows to SRI funds rise by 1.5 
percent for every one percent increase in the previous year’s return compared to 0.65 
percent for conventional funds. Conversely, the cash outflows for SRI and conventional 
funds increase by 0.32 and 0.53 percent, respectively, for every one percent decrease in 
the previous year’s return. Accordingly, SRI investors are more (less) responsive to 
positive (negative) performance than conventional investors. SRI funds with positive 
performance have higher incentives than conventional funds with similar performance. 
Bollen (2007) also reports evidence of persistence in the behaviour of SRI investors, in 
that the flow-performance relationship is consistent over time. 
Benson and Humphrey (2008) further examine the flow-performance 
relationship by separating short-term performance from long-term performance. They 
use monthly lagged returns for short-term performance, and annual lagged returns for 
long-term performance on a sample of 148 US SRI funds that only invest in US stocks 
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from January 1999 to September 2005. They report that SRI investors are less sensitive 
to short-term and long-term returns than are conventional investors, suggesting a lower 
sensitivity of SRI investors to past fund performance. Similar to conventional funds, 
SRI funds with good performance disproportionally attract higher inflows. However, 
poor performing SRI funds do not experience substantial outflows of similar 
magnitudes.  
Similar findings are demonstrated by Renneboog et al. (2008) using a sample of 
440 SRI funds from the United States, Europe, and the Asian-Pacific region. Consistent 
with Benson and Humphrey (2008), they also report that the sensitivity of SRI funds to 
past performance is lower than that of conventional funds. Using the Jensen alpha, 
Fama-French (FF) alpha, and FF-Carhart (FFC) alpha to estimate fund performance, 
they confirm a lower sensitivity of SRI investors to negative past performance than that 
of conventional investors. The cash outflows of SRI (conventional) funds grow by an 
average of 0.3 (0.6) percent per every percent decrease in the FFC alpha if the previous 
average alpha is negative. However, in regards to investors’ sensitivity to positive 
returns, the results vary across the different screening types. Funds with environmental 
screens are more sensitive to positive past performance, while funds with social screens 
have a weaker positive performance-flow relationship. They also confirm that flows to 
SRI funds from large families have greater exposure to performance than funds from 
small families.  
Osthoff (2008) reports evidence of a time-varying flow-performance 
relationship, which he attributes to the increase in the number SRI funds over time. 
Using a sample of 49 US SRI funds from 1996 to 2005, he finds that the rapid growth in 
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the number of SRI funds has given SRI investors more alternatives, which in turn 
increases the sensitivity of SRI investors to past financial performance. He also finds 
that in order to avoid higher search costs, SRI investors are more likely to reinvest in 
current funds than conventional investors. An interesting finding is that flows are 
related to the ethical standard achieved by the SRI funds.  
In sum, the literature on the flow-performance relationship shows that although 
there is no performance difference between SRI and conventional funds, SRI investors 
behave differently in response to information about past fund performance. Specifically, 
SRI investors are less sensitive to past fund performance than conventional investors. It 
is, however, unclear how SRI investors respond to similar information at the fund 
family level. That is, if SRI investors were less concerned with the financial 
performance of individual funds, would they also be less concerned with the ability of 
fund families to generate star-performing member funds? My study aims to fill this gap 
by examining how the additional non-financial constraints used in asset selection affect 
the behaviour of SRI investors in choosing a fund family.  
3.5 Fund Families 
This strand of literature describes the role of the fund family in influencing a 
fund’s attributes. According to the online Morningstar Direct database, most SRI funds 
are affiliated with other funds in that they typically belong to the same fund family, 
which professionally manages either SRI or conventional funds, or a combination of 
both fund types. A fund family encompasses a wide range of funds to attract investors 
with different investment objectives, and thus offers an opportunity for investors to 
diversify investments across funds within the family. Fund managers of a fund family 
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share resources and information, such as research and development (R&D) and 
technology.  
There is a growing body of literature that examines the role of fund families in 
determining the attributes of their fund members. Sirri and Tufano (1998) study the cash 
flows of a sample of 690 US open-end equity funds from 288 fund families during the 
period from 1971 to 1990, and conclude that investors benefit from investing in larger 
fund families due mainly to the lower search costs. Large fund families receive media 
attention more often than small families, resulting in lower search costs paid by 
investors in analyzing large families. They also report a positive effect of funds with 
high performance on the inflows of peer funds in the family.   
Massa (2003) investigates the role of fund families in determining the 
competition between funds in the industry, through either fund or category proliferation 
strategies.17 The heterogeneity of funds is related to competition between funds across 
families and within a family. By using a comprehensive data set of 18,616 US mutual 
funds from 1992 to 2000, he finds that category proliferation strategy in fund families is 
positively related to fund differentiation. However, there is no relationship between 
fund-category proliferation and fund performance, suggesting the independence of a 
fund from its peer funds within the family. 
Fang et al. (2014) examine the role of fund families in coordinating their fund 
managers by investigating the association between market efficiency and managerial 
placement strategies. Based on a sample of 1,869 mutual funds in the United States 
from 1991 to 2010, the study finds that fund families prefer to allocate highly skilled 
                                                     
17 Category proliferation strategy aims to offer new funds from new investment style. 
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managers to less efficient funds, the idea being that these managers are more likely to 
turn around the funds so that higher abnormal returns can be generated. This finding 
suggests that fund managers are not free from interventions by fund families, and these 
interventions seem to aide in improving the overall value of the family rather than 
maximizing the value of their investors’ investment. 
 Khorana and Servaes (1999) suggest further explanations about the role of fund 
families in determining their strategy to issue new funds. Based on a sample of 1163 
new funds from 1979 to 1992, they find that fund families with higher excess returns 
are more likely to open new funds, indicating that fund families tend to enhance their 
reputation by having funds with higher positive returns before expanding their range of 
funds. Issuing new funds are also related with family’s size and family experience 
where large funds and experienced families are more likely to issue new funds than 
small and less experienced families.   
Khorana & Servaes (2011), furthermore, find the existence of a stellar fund 
performer provides a positive signal to investors about the reputation of a fund family. 
New flows are found to travel not only to the star fund itself but also to peer funds in the 
family. They report that star funds positively affect the market share of the fund family, 
as demonstrated by an increase in the ratio of assets professionally managed by the 
family with a star performer to total assets of the mutual fund industry. A star-
performing fund can contribute to an average increase in the market share of its family 
by 42 percent. While a fund’s Morningstar rating increases from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile, its family increases its market share by 34 percent. The results are robust 
when they use Morningstar ratings to proxy performance.  
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Gaspar et al. (2006) examine how a fund family influences the investment 
strategy of individual member funds. They test the favouritism hypothesis by 
investigating performance subsidization between high-value funds and low-value funds 
from 1999 to 2001. Using a comprehensive sample of US mutual funds from the top 50 
fund families, they find evidence of performance subsidization from poor past 
performing and low-fee funds to stellar and high-fee funds, respectively. There are two 
kinds of strategies used by fund families to enhance the performance of their high-value 
funds: opposite trading and IPO preference. Opposite trading is undertaken by 
coordinating high-value funds to take a long (short) position for hot (poor) assets, and 
low-contribution funds to take the opposite position. The IPO preference strategy is 
used to maximise the benefits from undervalued IPOs.  
The preference of fund families for high contribution (HC) funds is motivated by 
the desire to earn higher rewards from the flow-performance relationship. For example, 
young funds that perform outstandingly tend to receive higher flows than old funds with 
the same performance. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) compare the effect of past 
performance on the cash flows of young and mature funds. By analyzing a sample of 
780 young and 2,256 old funds from 1988 to 1995, they find the sensitivity to past 
performance is higher for young funds than for old funds. Bollen (2007) investigates the 
role of social and moral attributes in the flow-performance relationship for a sample of 
143 young and 70 mature SRI funds from 1990 to 2002. Young funds are defined as 
funds that are operating less than six years following their inception date, while old 
funds are defined as funds that are six or more years of age. Bollen (2007) finds that 
young SRI funds have higher flow advantages from positive past performance than 
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older SRI funds. Therefore, fund families could benefit from performing unequal 
treatment if their main objective is to maximize their future income. 
Another motivation to enhance the performance of particular member funds is to 
achieve a good rating for the family. Ratings issued by reputational institutions such as 
Morningstar make it easier for investors to analyze the reputation of fund families. 
Guercio and Tkac (2008) examine the importance of Morningstar ratings by 
investigating how changes in these ratings relate to the abnormal flow of funds. By 
examining more than 10,000 Morningstar rating changes over a three-year period from 
1996 to 1999, they find a linear relationship between Morningstar rating changes and 
abnormal flows where the latter is defined as the difference between actual flows and 
expected flows. There is a positive abnormal flow to funds coinciding with an upgrade 
in Morningstar ratings from upgraded month to the following six months. Upgrading the 
rating of funds from four to five stars increase inflows to the funds by earning on 
average $32 million higher than expected flows. Funds that receive a downgraded rating 
experience abnormal negative flows, especially the downgrade from 4 to 3 stars, from 3 
to 2 stars, and from 2 to 1 star.   
Kempz and Ruenzi (2008) test the relationship between funds’ ranking within a 
family and flows. Using a sample of 17,588 fund-year observations from 1993 to 2001, 
they find that mutual funds in the top performance decile of family rankings have 
almost 7 percent greater cash flows than funds in other rankings. Moreover, funds that 
were previously in the bottom performance decile experience a 20 percent flow growth 
when they reach the top decile of performance. They also find that the increase in cash 
inflows to top-decile funds is more pronounced in large fund families. Thus, 
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performance ranking is linearly related to flows. This is one of the rationales for the 
cross-subsidization strategy in families to improve the performance ranking of their HC 
funds.  
Later studies have investigated the benefits of having star performing funds in 
fund families. Most of these studies report that having star performers attracts higher 
cash flows to the family through a significant increase in inflows to the star performing 
funds, as well as through a spillover in the increased flows from those star performers to 
sibling funds. One such study is Nanda et al. (2004), who find evidence of a spillover 
effect on cash flows to non-star performers in families with star funds.  They define star 
performing funds as funds in the top five percent of FF adjusted returns. Studying a 
sample of 141,663 fund-year observations over the period 1992 – 1998, they find that 
flows to fund families with at least one star fund are substantially higher than flows to 
fund families without a star fund. Further, top performing funds positively contribute to 
their own flows and to those of their sibling funds. The flow growth of non-star funds 
that have star siblings is, on average, 37 percent higher than that of non-star funds 
without a star sibling. However, there is no evidence of similar spillovers from low 
ranking funds, for example, poor performers do not negatively affect the cash flows of 
their peer funds within the family.  
Understanding the spillover effect in fund families is crucial to determining how 
to proportionally treat individual funds within a family. Zhao (2004) studies the 
propensity of closing funds for a sample of 7,500 US funds from 1992 to 2001. He finds 
that the spillover effect determines the family’s decision in closing fund from new 
flows. Providers offer other funds in the family to investors to prevent heavy assets in 
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some star performers. This strategy aims to attract more flows to other funds within the 
family because closing funds from new flows is a signal of the ability of fund family to 
generate funds that perform well. He also finds the large fund families get a higher 
benefit from the closed funds because there will be a spillover effect to cash flows of 
newly-issued funds.   
Although there is an objective to engage in social responsibility, SRI fund 
families also aim to maximize financial values through fee incomes. Therefore, 
disclosing information about their financial achievements (such as having a star 
performing fund member) may attract more SRI investors and subsequently increase the 
family’s managed assets. In this regard, SRI investors differ from philanthropy 
organisations, as they require some financial returns for their social contributions, i.e., 
they require their investment to do well while still “doing good” (Hamilton et al., 1993; 
Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). Accordingly, SRI investors may prefer to hold SRI funds in 
reputable fund families as long as their social objectives are also satisfied.   
 According to Bhattacharya et al. (2013), another important role of fund families 
is to involve in providing an insurance pool for their funds with low liquidity. Based on 
a sample of 20,623 affiliated funds of mutual fund (AfoMFs)-month observation from 
2002 to 2007, they find that the family insures funds with higher investor withdrawal 
through the flows from their AfoMFs.18 The liquidity insurance is primarily provided to 
less liquid funds. They  examine the role of AfoMFs in rescuing distress funds from 
selling actions. 
                                                     
18 AFoMFs are defined as mutual funds from the same fund family, or an affiliated family, that collect 
money from investors to invest in other mutual funds, including sibling or affiliated funds.  
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
SRI fund families have dual roles in terms of their relationship with their 
investors. They bridge the socially constrained investors and social compliant firms by 
collecting money from investors to buy financial securities issued by ESG firms. 
Secondly, SRI fund families act like conventional investment families that aim to earn 
future income and generate future wealth for their investors. Therefore, the spillover and 
cross-subsidization in SRI fund families are both expected to be unique. Non-financial 
principles used in forming fund portfolio, and the fact that SRI investors are less 
sensitive to past financial information, can lead to different spillover effects in SRI fund 
families from conventional families.  
The good value in ESG principles is expected to guide the way the family treats 
their investors. Financial returns promised by SRI funds could, however, make fund 
families perform several strategies to boost the performance of their funds in order to 
attract higher flows. Since the competition in mutual funds is partly determined by 
lagged returns of funds, the favouritism strategy could exist in SRI fund families despite 
it being against the social values SRI funds should uphold. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the literature on SRI fund performance, while Table 3.2 
summarizes the literature on the relationship between screening and performance. The 
literature on the flow-performance relationship and fund families are summarized in 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 respectively.   
 
 
55 
 
Table 3.1  
A Summary of the literature on SRI fund performance 
No Authors Year Sample Country Study Period Performance indicators Findings 
1 Hamilton et al. 1993 32 SRI Funds US 1981 to 1990 CAPM alpha No performance difference between SRI and 
conventional funds 
2 Statman 2000 DSI Index US 1990 – 1998 CAPM alpha No statically difference in the performance of DSI 
and S&P 500 index 
3 Gil-Bazo et al. 2010 455 SRI Funds US 1997-2005 Fama-French (FF) alpha; 
Fama-French-Carhart 
(FFC) alpha 
The average before and after FFC alphas of SRI funds 
outperform their matched conventional funds. 
4 Luther et al. 1992 15 ethical 
funds 
UK 1972-1990 Monthly returns; 
Jensen’s alpha 
No significant difference 
5 Mallin et al. 1995 29 ethical 
funds 
UK 1986-1993 Monthly returns; Sharpe 
Ratio; Jensen’s Alpha; 
Treynor ratio 
The Jensen’s alpha of 18 ethical funds outperforms 
non-ethical funds. 
6 Kreander et al. 2005 60 SRI Funds Europe 1995-2001 Sharpe Ratio, Treynor 
Ratio, and Jensen Alpha 
No Difference 
7 Bauer et al. 2006 25 SRI funds Australia 1992-2003 FFC alpha There is no significant difference in the performance 
of SRI funds from conventional funds after 1996. 
8 Bauer et al. 2005 504 SRI funds US, UK 
and 
Germany 
1990-2001 CAPM alpha; FFC alpha No significant difference in the performance of  SRI 
and conventional funds in the US and UK. The 
international German SRI funds underperform their 
matched conventional funds. 
9 Jones et al.  2007 89 SRI funds Australia 1986-2005 CAPM  alpha, FF alpha, 
FFC alpha 
SRI funds underperform the conventional benchmark 
(ASX All Ordinaries index) 
10 Bauer et al.  2006 8 SRI funds Canada 1994-2003 Sharpe Ratio; Jensen’s 
alpha; FFC alpha 
No significant difference in the performance of  SRI 
and conventional funds 
11 Renneboog et al. 2008 440 SRI funds Worldwide 1995-2005 CAPM alpha; FF alpha; 
FFC alpha 
No significant difference in the performance of  SRI 
and conventional funds 
12 Climent and 
Soriano 
2011 7 Green Funds US 1987-2009 CAPM alpha; FFC alpha Green funds underperform their matched 
conventional funds 
13 Nainggolan et al. 2015 357 Shari’a Worldwide 1987-2009 CAPM alpha; FFC alpha Shari’a funds underperform their matched 
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funds conventional funds 
14 Derwall et al.  2005 450 companies US 1995-2003 CAPM Highly eco-efficiency portfolios outperform 
portfolios consisting of low eco-efficiency scores. 
15 Gregory and 
Whittaker 
2007 32 ethical 
funds 
UK 1989-2002 FF alpha; FFC alpha Insignificant difference in the CAPM and FFC alpha 
of SRI and conventional funds 
16 Abdelsalam et al. 2014 636 SRI funds Worldwide 2001-2011 Annual gross and net 
returns 
The performance of poor (star) SRI funds is 
persistent.  
17 Hong and 
Kacperczyk 
2009 193 sin stocks 
and non-sin 
stocks 
US 1980-2006 CAPM alpha; FFC alpha Sin portfolios outperform their comparable portfolios 
by 30 basis points per month when controlling for 
market, SMB and HML, and 26 bps when adding 
momentum factor (MOM) 
18 Nofsinger and 
Varma  
2013 240 SRI Funds US 2000-2012 FF alpha SRI funds have lower downside risk during the 
financial crisis. They even outperform conventional 
funds’ FF alpha by 2.18 percent during the crisis 
periods 
19 Leite and Cortez 2015 74 SRI funds French 1999-2012 FFC+local factors alpha The risk of adjusted returns of SRI funds is not 
statistically different from that of conventional funds 
during the crisis. The results are different to the 
before crisis findings where SRI funds significantly 
underperform their conventional counterparts. 
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Table 3.2  
A summary of the literature on SRI fund performance 
No Authors Year Sample Country Study 
Period 
Performance 
indicators 
Finding on relation number of 
screening and performance 
1 Barnett and  
Salomon 
2006 67 SRI 
Funds 
US 1972-
2000 
CAPM alpha Curvilinear relationship 
2 Lee et al. 2010 67 Domestic 
SRI Funds 
US 1989-
2006 
Year-to-date 
returns, Sharpe 
ratio and 
Information ratio 
No relationship between the number 
of screening and non-risk adjusted 
returns 
3 Capelle-
Blancard and 
Monjon 
2014 455 SRI 
Funds 
French 1997-
2005 
Risk-adjusted multi 
factor 
Negative relationship 
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Table 3.3  
A summary of literature on flow-performance relationship 
No Authors Year Sample Country Study 
Period 
Performance 
indicators 
Finding on relation number of 
screening-Performance 
1 Bollen 2007 205 SRI 
Funds 
US 1998-
2002 
Lagged year-to-date 
returns 
SRI investors are more (less) 
responsive to positive (negative) 
lagged returns 
2 Renneboog et 
al. 
2010 440 SRI 
funds 
Worldwide 1995-
2005 
CAPM alpha; FF 
alpha; FFC alpha 
The sensitivity of SRI funds to 
past performance is lower than 
that of conventional funds 
 
3 Benson and 
Humphrey 
2008 148 SRI 
funds 
US 1999-
2005 
Lagged annual 
returns 
SRI investors are less sensitive to 
short-term and long-term returns 
than are conventional investors 
 
4 Osthoff 2008 49 SRI 
funds 
US 1996-
2005 
Raw returns The rapid growth in the number of 
SRI funds increases the sensitivity 
of SRI investors to past financial 
performance 
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Table 3.4  
A Summary of the literature on fund families 
No Authors Year Sample Country Study 
Period 
Issue Findings 
1 Sirri and Tufano 1998 690 open-
equity funds 
(288 fund 
families) 
US 1971-
1990 
Search 
costs; 
Spillover 
effect 
 Investors benefit from investing in 
larger fund families due mainly to the 
lower search costs 
 A positive effect of funds with high 
performance on the inflows of peer 
funds in the family 
2 Massa 2003 18,616 
mutual funds 
US 1992-
2000 
Proliferation 
strategy 
 Category proliferation strategy in 
fund families is positively related to 
fund differentiation 
 No relationship between fund-
category proliferation and fund 
performance 
3 Khorana and 
Servaes 
1999 1163 new 
funds 
US 1979-
1992 
Issuing new 
funds 
 Fund families with higher excess 
returns are more likely to open new 
4 Khorana and 
Servaes 
2011 12,365 
mutual fund 
family year 
observations  
US 1976- 
2009 
Family 
market 
share 
 A star-performing fund can 
contribute to an average increase in 
the market share of its family by 42 
percent 
5 Fang et al. 2014 1,869 mutual 
funds 
US 1991-
2010 
Fund family 
intervention 
 Families prefer to allocate highly 
skilled managers to less efficient 
funds 
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6 Gaspar et al. 2006 50 fund 
families 
US 1991-
2001 
Favouritism 
strategy 
 There is a performance subsidization 
from poor past performing, and low-
fee funds to stellar, and high-fee 
funds, respectively. 
7 Kempz and 
Ruenzi 
1999 17,588 fund-
year 
observations 
US 1993-
2001 
Fund 
competition  
 Mutual funds in the top performance 
decile of family rankings have almost 
7 percent more cash flows than funds 
in other rankings 
8 Nanda et al. 2004 141,663 
fund-year 
fund 
observation 
US 1992 - 
1998 
Spillover 
effect 
 Top performing funds positively 
contribute to their own flows and to 
those of their sibling funds 
 No evidence of spillovers from low 
ranking funds 
9 Zhao 2004 7,500 mutual 
funds 
US 1992-
2001 
Closed 
funds 
 Spillover effect determines the 
family’s decision in closing fund 
from new flows 
10 Bhattacharya et 
al. 
2013 20,623 
AFoMFs-
month 
observation 
US 2002-
2007 
Affiliated 
funds 
 The family insures funds with higher 
investor withdrawal through the 
flows from their AFoMFs. 
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Chapter 4   
Hypotheses Development 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I develop two sets of hypotheses in line with the two research 
aims of my thesis. The first set relates to the spillover effect hypothesis, which is 
premised on the existence of a star SRI fund and its impact on the flow of sibling funds 
in the SRI fund families. Since my hypotheses are related to fund flow and 
performance, I focus on theories and literature on the flow-performance, signaling 
effects and family contributions to fund members.  
The second set of hypotheses focuses on cross-subsidization in SRI fund 
families. Here, I draw on theories and literature about the fund family’s intervention, 
managers’ incentives and agency problems. In addition to the cross-subsidization 
strategy, manager ownership and the type of screening used by fund manager can 
conceivably explain the return gap between high-contribution (HC) and low-
contribution (LC) SRI funds. Therefore, I also develop hypotheses on the role of 
manager ownership and screenings in the cross-subsidization strategy of SRI fund 
families. Section 4.2 discusses hypotheses on spillover in SRI fund families. Section 4.3 
focuses on the development of hypotheses in the cross-subsidization strategy. The 
chapter concludes in section 4.4.  
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4.2 Spillover Effect Hypotheses 
Although the social engagement of SRI funds sets them apart from conventional 
funds, the literature shows this is not the only factor that attracts cash flow from SRI 
investors (Bollen, 2007). Like conventional investors, SRI investors also pursue 
financial performance due to the difficulty in measuring social performance. With only 
limited fund information, investors must rely on information regarding the fund family 
in making their investment decisions (Nanda et al., 2004). 
The literature on mutual funds postulates that fund investors are more likely to 
buy and hold funds that previously have a superior risk-adjusted return (Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Gruber, 1996; Ippolito, 1992; Patel et al., 
1994; Sirri and Tufano 1998). Nanda et al. (2004) discuss the role of stellar funds in 
attracting higher flows to fund families. These stellar funds signal information about the 
skill of managers employed by the fund family, and build a prior investor belief about 
the same management skill set being deployed in peer funds within the family. Investors 
recognize the important role played by fund families in maximising the value of 
member funds, with evidence showing that fund managers are indeed not free from 
family interventions (Gaspar et al., 2006; Ritter and Zhang, 2007). For example, 
managers of poor performing funds are more likely to be coordinated by the fund family 
to follow the strategies used by star performing funds. 
I argue that this spillover effect, manifested in the contribution of a star fund to 
the cash flows of peer funds in a family, is also present in SRI fund families. SRI funds 
tend to be younger and smaller than conventional funds (Renneboog et al., 2008). With 
the limited information about the SRI fund’s performance track record, investors are 
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expected to put more weight on the reputation of the SRI fund family in managing its 
funds, including its ability to generate a star performer. This argument suggests that SRI 
investors are more likely to buy SRI funds from families that have been successful in 
managing SRI funds that have performed outstandingly.  
The effort to minimize search costs also supports the spillover argument for SRI 
fund families. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find evidence of cost sensitivity in fund flows. 
That is, investors who hold funds from a particular fund family are more likely to 
choose other funds from the same family, since searching for funds from other fund 
families is more costly. This is particularly the case for SRI funds, as search costs also 
need to cover non-financial aspects. The motivation to diversify internally rather than 
choosing funds from other families is stronger if the incumbent family has at least a star 
performer (Osthoff, 2008).  I thus predict that new cash flow can be observed not only 
for the star fund, but also for other peer SRI funds within the family: 
H1:  A star SRI fund positively contributes to the cash flow of peer SRI funds 
within a fund family.  
The next hypothesis is developed to generate a prediction about the spillover in 
flows to sibling SRI funds from having a star conventional fund in the family. Most SRI 
funds are members of a mixed family in which both conventional and SRI funds co-
exist. I predict that the performance of non-SRI funds also affects SRI investors’ choice 
of funds and fund families. The rationale for this argument is premised on the financial 
objective of SRI investors, i.e. SRI investors require their investment to do well while 
still doing good (Hamilton et al., 1993). Thus, the presence of conventional funds with 
outstanding performance would signal to SRI investors about the superior skill of 
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managers employed by the fund family. To attract investors, including SRI investors, it 
is common for fund families to choose funds that have performed strongly in the past to 
represent the whole family in their marketing activities (Jain and Wu, 2000; Jones and 
Smythe, 2003). Information about the fund family’s ability to generate a star-
performing fund, albeit without SRI attributes, is useful to SRI investors, who will skew 
their investment towards fund families that can potentially improve their future financial 
wealth.  
Internal diversification also provides a rationale for the spillover effect of star 
conventional funds on their peer SRI funds. Good performing funds can attract both 
new and current investors to invest in the family (Nanda et al., 2004). Conventional 
investors who are attracted to the star conventional fund may also be motivated to hold 
other funds, including SRI funds, in the same family for reasons such as diversification 
and engagement in social responsibility. To pursue these motives, conventional 
investors are likely to prefer SRI funds from providers who can potentially award them 
with higher risk-adjusted returns.  
H2:  A star conventional fund positively affects the cash flow of peer SRI funds 
within the fund family. 
Next, I formulate a hypothesis about the intensity of the spillover effect between 
SRI and conventional fund families. This test is motivated by the existence of non-
financial constraints which affect the flow-performance relationship for SRI funds 
(Bollen, 2007; Renneboog et al., 2008). All else equal, switching between SRI funds is 
more costly than switching between conventional funds since SRI investors will be 
further burdened with search costs of social attributes. SRI investors need information 
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about whether ESG principles used by an SRI fund will meet their social needs. This 
additional search cost motivates the current SRI investors to reinvest in their current 
SRI funds (Osthoff, 2008). The higher switching costs for SRI funds makes SRI 
investors more “loyal” toward their fund than conventional investors, who only have 
financial objectives to consider (e.g. Benson and Humphrey (2008); Renneboog et al. 
(2008)). SRI investors are therefore less sensitive to the past performance of funds, even 
if the past performance is poor. Accordingly, this argument suggests that the probability 
of current SRI investors switching to peer SRI funds is smaller than that of current 
conventional investors switching to peer conventional funds.  
H3:  The intensity of the spillover effect for SRI fund families is lower than for 
conventional fund families. 
4.3 Cross-subsidization Hypotheses 
Like conventional fund managers, SRI fund managers are responsible for 
contributing to the value of their fund family. Since managerial compensation is 
determined by the family, this allows fund families to coordinate their fund managers to 
enhance the performance of HC funds by sacrificing the performance of LC funds using 
strategies such as opposite trading and IPO preferences. 19  This cross-subsidization 
strategy suggests that fund families potentially treat their investors unequally.    
Motivated by Gaspar et al. (2006), Khorana and Servaes (2011), and Nanda et al. 
(2004) for conventional funds, I conjecture that SRI fund families are incentivized to 
coordinate their funds’ portfolio. First, the flow-performance relationship is more 
                                                     
19 Opposite trading refers to investment strategies performed by two or more affiliated funds where one or 
more funds take a buy/sell position while other funds take an opposite position in one or more assets. IPO 
preferences are a strategy used to allocate undervalued IPOs to preferred funds within the family. 
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convex for SRI funds (Bollen, 2007), suggesting that fund families can earn higher 
flows by having a stellar fund and a poor performer than having two mediocre 
performers. Fund families can also benefit from having a star performer due to the 
positive spillover effect on the cash flow of sibling funds (Khorana and Servaes, 2011; 
Nanda et al., 2004). Another incentive is due to the considerable heterogeneity across 
the clienteles where fund families attract higher flows from subsets of investors who are 
concerned with performance, such as hedge funds (Tkac, 2004).  
To perform the cross-subsidization strategy, fund families identify which 
member funds will provide a higher contribution to the family (i.e., HC funds), and then 
subsidize these funds’ performance from identified lower contribution funds (i.e., LC 
funds). Following Gaspar et al. (2006), I define HC and LC SRI funds based on past 
performance, fees, and age and develop hypotheses on cross-subsidization in SRI family 
funds along these contribution dimensions. 
My first hypothesis focuses on the performance criterion. I categorize winning 
funds as HC funds and losing funds as LC funds. The greater sensitivity of the flow-
performance relationship in SRI funds provides incentives for SRI fund families to 
enhance or maintain the performance of their star funds. Performance-enhancing 
strategies also provide the benefits of performance persistence where a fund family can 
signal the skill of its managers by maintaining the performance of its past winners 
(Fama and French, 2010). However, enhancing or maintaining the performance of 
winning funds could possibly be at the expense of past poor performers. Since SRI 
investors are less sensitive to poor fund performance track records, the family can 
coordinate poor performers to subsidize peer star performers.  
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The existence of poor performers in a fund family does not affect flows to the 
family because poor performance is less informative about managers’ skill and family 
strategies. Lynch and Musto (2003) examine subsequent inflows to poor-performing 
funds that disclose the future change in their investment strategies. Besides acquiring 
higher inflows to good performers, they find fund families can maintain the total net 
asset value (TNAV) of poor performers by revealing their strategy for the poor 
performing funds. This motivates SRI fund families to improve their managed assets 
through subsidization strategy. The provision made by fund families to losing funds is 
also suggested when the affiliated funds of mutual funds (AFoMFs) 20  are used to 
provide liquidity to affiliated losing funds (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). This liquidity 
provision indicates that fund families are motivated to boost the performance of their 
past winning funds without worrying about the flow of their losing funds. Therefore, I 
predict: 
H4: Losing SRI funds are more likely to subsidize the performance of their 
winning SRI siblings. 
I then consider the role of governance issue in influencing the success of the 
cross-subsidization strategy performed by SRI fund families. The existence of agency 
conflict suggested in the mutual fund literature can prompt fund managers to take 
actions that cannot be easily observed by their shareholders. Recent literature on mutual 
funds suggests that agency conflicts can be reduced by allocating shares in the funds to 
fund managers. This means that a fund manager is positioned not only as a person who 
manages the portfolio, but also as an owner of the fund. Manager ownership thus aims 
                                                     
20 Some fund families issue funds of funds which are defined as funds that invest their managed money in 
other mutual funds. Affiliated funds of mutual funds (AFoMFs) are those funds which invest in their 
affiliated funds.  
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to dismiss strategies that potentially cost the future return of the managed fund. In this 
study, I focus on the effect of manager ownership in losing funds in limiting the cross-
subsidization between winners and losers because those losing funds occupy an inferior 
position when this strategy is performed. I predict that fund managers are less likely to 
sacrifice the performance of their funds when they own this fund.  
H4A: Losing SRI funds with manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the 
future performance of their peer winning funds.  
My next hypothesis relates to fund fees paid periodically by investors. It is well 
documented that fund flows are not associated with expense ratios, which have a low 
variance, thus driving the non-competitive advantage in fund prices (Barber et al., 
2003). Fund families often compete over performance attributes to attract flows from 
investors. In the absence of price competition, it is possible for fund families to 
maximize fee incomes by transferring performance from low-fee funds to high-fee 
funds since flows to high fee funds contribute more to the family’s incomes. I argue that 
this unequal contribution motivates SRI fund families to coordinate their fund managers 
to enhance the performance of high-fee funds although this strategy may be at the 
expense of the performance of low-fee member funds. 
The potential for higher fees thus incentivizes fund managers to take actions that 
improve future fund performance (Massa and Patgiri, 2009). Investors concerned with 
governance issues would prefer to invest in funds with lower potential agency problems 
even if they end up paying higher fees. Indeed, evidence shows that SRI investors do 
not view fees as an important determinant of their investment decision (Benson and 
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Humphrey, 2008), suggesting that favouritism toward high-fee funds is more likely to 
present itself in SRI fund families. 
The proposition that higher fees resulted from the use of additional screenings 
will diminish the net financial returns is not supported by Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) and In 
et al. (2014). The latter suggest that competition in the SRI fund industry does not lower 
the future performance of funds despite new funds entering the industry with lower fees. 
Instead, there is a positive impact of competition on performance due to the increase in 
demand for assets held by SRI funds. This argument suggests that fees do not affect the 
flow of SRI funds as long as gross returns increase at least as much as the fee gap 
between the highest and lowest fee SRI funds. Therefore, fund families are more 
concerned with performance enhancement strategy rather than lowering their fees. Since 
there is no significant effect on fund flows, incomes from high-fee SRI funds 
incentivize SRI fund families to favour these funds. 
H5:  Low-fee funds are more likely to subsidize the performance of their high-
fee SRI siblings. 
As in hypothesis H4A, I also test the role of manager ownership in LC funds 
(low-fee funds) in the success of the cross-subsidization strategy. I argue that fund 
managers are more unwilling to sacrifice the performance of their fund if they have a 
personal ownership in it. If a fund family intends to perform cross-subsidization by 
coordinating their fund managers to support the performance of high-fee funds, low-fee 
fund managers who own shares in their managed fund are likely to bargain with the 
family to ensure that future performance of their managed and owned fund is not 
sacrificed. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:  
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H5A:  Low-fee funds with manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the 
future performance of their peer high-fee funds within the family. 
The next hypothesis relates to the life cycle of SRI funds. Prior literature 
examines differences in the contribution of past performance to the flow of young and 
mature funds, with results showing that young funds are more sensitive to past 
performance than mature fund (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). The literature on the flow-
performance relationship offers a number of reasons why young funds are more 
attractive to investors. First, young funds have fewer historical records, making it easier 
to analyze them (Bollen, 2007). Second, family funds are known to implement the 
incubation strategy, which gives special treatments to young funds (Evans, 2010). 
Third, young funds usually enter a new market category (Massa, 2003) which 
potentially delivers higher future returns or flows from investors who are not 
accommodated by existing funds. Fourth, young funds have fewer hierarchical 
structures which provide their managers with greater flexibility in decision making 
(Garavito, 2010). Accordingly, SRI fund families have greater incentives to enhance the 
performance of young funds, leading to coordination across member funds aimed at 
subsidizing young member funds. I thus hypothesize the following: Thus, I hypothesize 
the following: 
H6: Mature SRI funds are more likely to subsidize the performance of their 
young SRI siblings. 
As in previous hypotheses, I also predict that the likelihood of cross- 
subsidization across young and mature SRI funds is lower if the fund manager has 
holdings in the mature funds. As discussed, manager ownership can lessen the agency 
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conflict, thus alleviating strategies that can potentially cost the future performance of 
their managed funds. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
H6A: Mature SRI funds with manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the 
future performance of their young peer funds within the family. 
Since cross-subsidization is more reliable for funds with the greater investment 
set, the type of screening used by SRI funds will be considered by the family. This is 
due to a negative relationship between screening and asset choices. SRI funds that use 
positive screening have a lower asset choice because positive screening eliminates more 
assets than the exclusion (negative) strategy. Since the cross-subsidization strategy is 
related to the asset composition of mutual funds, SRI funds with a larger investment set 
are more likely to be involved in the cross-subsidization strategy. Ethical funds that 
only exclude sin assets have larger investment sets than full-ESG constrained funds due 
to the greater number of screenings used. Accordingly, coordinating the portfolio 
composition between lower-constrained funds such as ethical funds is easier than 
between more constrained funds.  
Furthermore, portfolio theory suggests that SRI funds with a lower screening 
intensity such as ethical-screened funds have lower diversification costs. This means 
that it is less risky to perform cross-subsidization across funds with fewer screenings 
than across funds with more screenings such as full ESG screened funds. Therefore, I 
predict that: 
H7: SRI funds with the lower screening constraints are more likely to be 
paired by the family in the cross-subsidization strategy than SRI funds 
with the higher screening constraints.  
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
I propose that the spillover effect should exist in SRI fund families. The success 
of fund families in creating a star fund involves making visible information for investors 
to recognize the skill of fund managers employed by the family. The existence of a star 
fund in the family will attract flows to the family, not only to the star fund, but also to 
other sibling funds in the family. I further expect the positive contribution of 
conventional funds in the cash flows of their sibling SRI funds. Since literature on SRI 
funds suggests the lower sensitivity of SRI funds to past performance, I expect that the 
magnitude of the spillover effect in SRI fund families will be lower than in conventional 
fund families.   
I also expect the existence of the cross-subsidization strategy in SRI fund 
families since the contribution of SRI funds in the future income of their fund family 
will vary due to their differences in attracting flows and their expense ratio. The 
literature on mutual fund examines that inflows to winning and young funds are 
empirically higher than inflows to losing and mature funds respectively. Then, the 
contribution of higher expense ratio (high fee) funds to fund family incomes are 
expected to be higher than the lower expense ratio (low fee) funds, especially when the 
TNAV of former is larger than that of the latter. My hypothesis is that the performance 
of winning, high fee, young SRI funds are subsidized by their losing, low-fee and 
mature sibling SRI funds respectively. 
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Chapter 5  
Data and Research Methods 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data and how it will be used to test the hypotheses 
found in the previous chapter. Section 5.2 presents the data and method used to examine 
the spillover effect in SRI fund families. The data and research method used to test the 
cross-subsidization hypotheses in SRI fund families are both described in section 5.3.  A 
summary of the chapter is presented in section 5.4.   
5.2 Tests of Spillover Effect 
5.2.1 Data and Sources 
 I first extract monthly data on fund characteristics of SRI funds in the US 
including returns, size, total net asset values (TNAV), inception date, turnover, flows, 
fees, and expenses ratio from the online Morningstar Direct database covering the 
period from January 2000 to December 2012. This database uses the term “Socially 
Conscious” to describe SRI funds. Only funds with an ISIN code are included. Fixed 
income, tax-preferred, and money market funds are excluded, as are balanced funds 
with less than 60 percent of their portfolio to equity (Benson and Humphrey, 2008); the 
latter aims to minimize the risk exposure from non-equity assets on fund returns so that 
equity assets remain the predominant contributor of risk-adjusted returns. These 
selection criteria result in a final sample of 782 surviving and non-surviving managed 
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SRI funds issued by small and large fund families; of these, 485 funds are actively 
traded as of December 2012. Data on the types of screening used by SRI funds are 
obtained from the USSIF website and fund prospectuses. I categorize the screening 
types as combined-ESG, environmental, social, or ethical. 
I include only fund families (both SRI and conventional) with at least two funds. 
For the matched conventional funds in tests of the spillover effect, I follow the method 
of Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) in matching SRI funds with conventional funds, based on size, 
age, and investment style. To match by size, I exclude conventional funds with size 
greater than the maximum size of SRI funds for each year. I then match the funds on 
their age. This matching procedure has resulted in a total of 93,490 conventional fund-
year observations in my control sample.  
Data on the Fama-French (FF) factors are accessed from Kenneth F. French’s 
website. I use the FF factors for US domestic SRI and conventional funds. Similar to 
Zambrana and Zapatero (2015), I use the FF global factors to measure the performance 
of international equity funds because the online Morningstar Direct database does not 
provide data on the country destination of international funds but provides only the 
percentage of equity assets in the US and non-US equity markets.  
5.2.2 Performance Measurements 
To determine which fund is a star fund, I calculate the monthly risk-adjusted 
performance. Following Nanda et al.’s (2004) method in categorizing conventional 
funds, I define star SRI funds as SRI funds that have a risk-adjusted return above the 
95
th
 percentile in performance. Conversely, bad funds are defined as funds with a 
performance that falls below the 5
th
 percentile. The number of star (bad) SRI funds 
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varies over the sample period because the number of SRI funds changes over the sample 
period. I use the FF three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) to measure the 
monthly risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, as the model is widely used in the mutual 
fund literature to analyze the return and risk of a portfolio: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) +  𝛽𝑖,𝑆 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
where Ri,t is the gross return of fund i at time t; Rf is the risk-free rate; Rm,t is the market 
return; SMB represents the size factor that subtracts the return of large firms from the 
return of small firms; and HML is the book-to-market factor that subtracts the return of 
firms with low book-to-price ratio from the return of firms with high book-to-price 
ratio. For robustness, I also use the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) model (Carhart, 1997) 
by adding a momentum factor (MOMt), which considers the investment strategy of 
buying past winners and selling past losers. The FFC model takes the following form: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(2) 
   
5.2.3 Cash Flows Measurements 
Changes in cash flows are used to proxy the investment decision made by 
investors. When a fund experiences a positive cash flow during a period, I infer that 
investors invest or reinvest their money in the fund.  I calculate the cash flows for fund i 
at time t (𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) as follows: 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) (3) 
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where TNAVi,t and TNAVi,t-1 is the fund’s total net asset value in month t and the 
previous month  t-1 respectively and ri,t is the gross return of fund i in month t. Growth 
in cash flows is measured as follows: 
𝐶𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
  (4) 
5.2.4 Spillover Effect Model 
To examine the spillover effect on SRI funds, I use a multivariable analysis with 
cash flow growth of individual funds in the family as the dependent variable. The 
objective is to test hypothesis H1 that a stellar (poor) SRI fund provides a positive 
(negative) contribution to its family through inflows to (outflows from) peer SRI funds 
within the family.  The regression equation is as follows: 
𝐶𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖+ 𝑏1 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑏3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑏4  𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏5𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏6𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖,𝑡−1 +   𝑏𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(5) 
where CF Growthi,t is the new cash flows of fund i at time t to its total net asset at t-1, as 
defined in Equation 4. Star (Bad) Fundi,t-1 is a dummy, taking the value of one if the 
fund’s alpha is in the top (bottom) 5 percent and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) Familyi,t-1 
takes the value of one if fund i is not a star (bad) fund but belongs to a family that has at 
least one fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent alpha, and zero otherwise. These dummy 
variables represent the contribution of star (poor) performers to the cash flows of their 
siblings. Motivated by Joo and Park (2011), I also employ Star (Bad) Fund Ratioi,t-1, 
which is the ratio of the number of star (bad) funds to the total number of funds in the 
family in time t-1, in the regression.  
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In addition to these dummy variables, I control for other SRI fund-specific 
attributes that can also affect the flow. I control for the past performance of an SRI fund 
using its previous month’s FF Alpha, because SRI investors tend to choose funds with 
good historical records (Bollen, 2007). I control for the market value of an SRI fund by 
employing the natural logarithm of fund size (Ln Size), since prior studies find a lower 
cash flows growth in larger funds (Chen et al., 2004; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Pollet 
and Wilson, 2008; Zhao, 2004). I include fund turnover (Turnover) to control for the 
relation between active/passive strategy and cash flow (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; 
Sorensen et al., 1998). Following Nanda et al. (2004), I also include the fund’s age (Ln 
Age) as Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find a negative relation between funds’ age and 
flows. I control for fees or expense ratios (Expense Ratio) as it negatively affects fund 
flows (Drago et al., 2010; Iannotta and Navone, 2012). Family proliferation strategy, 
which provides the opportunity for intra-family diversification (Massa, 2003) is also 
controlled for by using the natural logarithm of the number of funds in a fund family 
(Ln No of Funds).  
I construct the following equation to test hypothesis H2 which predict the 
positive (negative) contribution of star (bad) conventional funds to the cash flow of peer 
SRI funds within the family: 
𝐶𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑏3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑅𝐼 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(6) 
 
Mixed Star(Bad) Family equals one if the SRI fund is not a star (bad) fund but is 
a member of a family with at least one conventional fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent 
alpha, and zero otherwise. Percentage of SRI Funds is the percentage of the number of 
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SRI funds in the mixed fund family. Control variables consist of fund and family 
characteristics: FF alpha, number of funds in the family, fund age, fund size, fund 
turnover and expenses ratio. FFAlphai,t  is the year-to-date risk-adjusted returns. Ln No 
of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. 
Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception 
date of the fund. Ln Size  is the natural logarithm of current market value of total 
managed asset.  Turnoveri,t  is the percentage of new assets purchased and sold divided 
by total net asset value; and Expensei,t is the percentage annual fee.  
The following equation is used to test hypothesis H3 which estimate the lower 
spillover effect in SRI fund families than in conventional fund families: 
𝐶𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑆𝑅𝐼 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏4𝑆𝑅𝐼 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝑏2𝑆𝑅𝐼 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑏3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏4𝑆𝑅𝐼 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝑏𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(7) 
SRI equals one if fund i is the SRI fund, zero otherwise. SRI (Conv) Star Family 
takes the value of one if an SRI (conventional) fund is non-star SRI (conventional) fund 
but belongs to a fund family with at least one SRI (conventional) fund in the top 5 
percent alpha, and zero otherwise. SRI (Conv) Bad Family takes the value of one if an 
SRI (conventional) fund is non-bad SRI (conventional) fund but belongs to a fund 
family with at least one SRI (conventional) fund in the bottom 5 percent alpha, and zero 
otherwise.  SRI (Conv) Star Fund takes the value of one if SRI (conventional) fund’s 
alpha is in the top 5 percent, and zero otherwise. SRI (Conv) Bad Fund takes the value 
of one if SRI (conventional) fund’s alpha is in the bottom 5 percent, and zero otherwise. 
I include control variables to control for past performance and fund characteristics.  
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5.2.5 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of sample SRI funds. Panel A shows, on 
average, there are 17 funds in an SRI fund family. Therefore, the fund proliferation 
strategy of offering more funds is common in SRI fund families in order to attract more 
investors (higher flows). Although not tabulated, the data also show that SRI fund 
families are more likely to offer SRI funds with different investment styles such as large 
cap and small cap funds rather than with different ESG screenings. Most SRI fund 
families choose a similar screen for their SRI funds. For example, Allianz Funds only 
offer SRI funds with environmental screenings, and Thrivent uses only ethical screening 
for all its SRI funds. Homogeneity in screening facilitates the selection of assets for the 
investment portfolio of fund families. 
Panel B compares the attributes of SRI funds from star and non-star SRI 
families, where a star family is defined as a fund family with at least one SRI fund 
performer in the top 5 percent. The panel shows that flows to SRI funds from star 
families grow by an average of 0.422 percent per month compared to 0.225 percent for 
SRI funds from non-star families but the difference is not significant (t-value = 0.94). 
The insignificant difference is also shown in the cash flow growth of SRI funds from 
bad and non-bad fund families. There is, however, a significant difference in the 
monthly FF alpha of SRI funds from star families and non-star families, with the former 
having a 0.15 percent higher alpha (t-value = 6.69). This indicates that SRI star families 
are more likely to have skilled managers who can generate a positive alpha (0.116 
percent). Non-star fund families, in comparison, have a negative alpha (-0.033 percent).  
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Results also show that star funds are more likely from larger families, as 
indicated by the larger number of SRI funds managed. Star families manage, on 
average, 26 SRI funds compared to only 13 SRI funds for non-star families. Panel C 
reports that SRI funds from bad families, on average, have more peer SRI funds than 
from non-bad families. This suggests that large SRI fund families are more likely to 
generate star and poor performers at the same time, consistent with Gaspar et al. (2006) 
who find that the favouritism strategy, which generates star and poor performers within 
a fund family, is more prevalent in large fund families.  
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Table 5.1  
Summary statistics of SRI funds from star (bad) and non-star (non-bad) fund 
families, 2000-2012 
Star (bad) fund families have at least one SRI fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent performance (presented 
by FF alpha) of the SRI mutual fund industry. CF Growth is the ratio of new cash flows to total net asset 
values. Alpha is the year to date risk-adjusted return. Number of Funds is the number of managed SRI 
funds in the family. Age is the number months since the inception date. Size is the market value of total 
assets held by the SRI fund. Turnover is the percentage of an SRI fund’s holding that is traded over a year 
period. Expense Ratio is the percentage of annual fee charged by an SRI fund. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
All
Star 
Family
Non-
Star 
Family
Star 
Family-
Non-Star 
Family
Bad 
Family
Non-
Bad 
Family
Non-
Bad 
Family - 
Bad 
CF Growth (%)
Mean 0.288 0.422 0.225 0.197 0.155 0.343 0.188
(0.94) (0.89)
Standard Deviation 4.463 4.469 4.460 4.350 4.508
FF Alpha
Mean 0.015 0.116 -0.033 0.150 *** -0.069 0.049 0.118 ***
(6.69) (5.82)
Standard Deviation 0.411 0.534 0.327 0.429 0.399
Number of Fund
Mean 17.229 25.587 13.279 12.307 *** 25.177 13.969 -11.208 ***
(15.55) (-13.52)
Standard Deviation 16.599 18.014 14.281 18.151 14.733
Age (months)
Mean 102.775 94.418 106.723 -12.305 *** 93.270 106.672 13.403 ***
(-3.60) (3.85)
Standard Deviation 81.588 64.720 88.193 65.333 87.105
Size (in $million)
Mean 377.053 371.960 379.460 -7.500 339.731 392.359 52.629 **
(-0.26) (1.90)
Standard Deviation 576.580 655.156 535.685 575.779 576.404
Turnover (%)
Mean 66.386 80.405 59.531 20.874 *** 77.989 61.659 -16.330 ***
(4.68) (-3.48)
Standard Deviation 76.397 109.097 52.285 107.494 58.618
Expense Ratio (%)
Mean 1.542 1.822 1.412 0.410 *** 1.662 1.494 -0.168
(3.16) (-1.24)
Standard Deviation 2.200 3.135 1.572 1.691 3.121
Panel B Panel C
 
 
82 
 
SRI funds from star families are, on average, younger (about 12 months) than 
those from non-star families, confirming the outperformance of young funds over 
mature funds (Evans, 2010). On average, SRI funds from bad fund families (93.27 
months) are also younger than those from non-bad families (106.67 months) as shown 
in Panel C. Younger funds in star families and bad families indicate that the 
performance of young SRI funds is more likely to vary or the performance variance is 
higher 
There is no difference in the size of SRI funds from star and non-star families. 
The size of SRI funds from bad families is however significantly smaller than those 
from non-bad families. The mean size of SRI funds from bad families is $339.731 
million, compared with $392.359 million for SRI funds from non-bad families. 
The turnover of SRI funds from star (bad) is, on average, 20.87 percent (16.33 
percent) higher than those from non-star (non-bad) families; the difference is 
parametrically significant at the one percent level. The results indicate that an active 
strategy can generate either top or poor performing SRI funds. Interestingly, differences 
in the expense ratio, as presented in Panel B, suggest that SRI investors pay higher fees 
from holding funds from star families. On average, these investors pay 1.822 percent 
annual fees, which are significantly higher than the fees charged by SRI funds from 
non-star families. This finding is consistent with Massa and Patgiri (2009), who report a 
positive relation between fees and performance. The results, however, show that fees 
charged by SRI funds from bad and non-bad families are not statistically different.   
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Table 5.2  
Pearson correlation matrix 
CF Growth refers to new cash flows over the previous total net asset values of an SRI fund. Alpha represents year to date of risk-adjusted returns of an SRI fund. Ln No 
of Funds is natural logarithm of number managed SRI funds in the family of an SRI fund. Age is the month differences between the current period and the inception 
date of the SRI fund. Size represents the market values of total assets held by an SRI fund. Turnover illustrates the percentage of an SRI fund’s holding traded over a 
period. Expense Ratio represents the percentage annual fees charged by an SRI fund. 
 
  
CF Growth FF Alpha
Ln No of 
Funds
Ln Age Ln Size Turnover
Expense 
Ratios
CF Growth 1
FF Alpha 0.085 1
Ln No of Funds -0.037 -0.103 1
Ln Age -0.178 -0.044 -0.003 1
Ln Size -0.085 -0.025 0.183 0.326 1
Turnover -0.047 0.028 0.119 -0.010 0.010 1
Expense Ratios 0.047 0.037 0.023 -0.069 -0.210 0.056 1
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Table 5.2 shows the cross-sectional Pearson correlations between the continuous 
test variables for SRI funds. CF Growth is positively correlated with FF Alpha, 
suggesting that the risk-adjusted performance of SRI funds is positively correlated with 
future cash flows. The highest positive (negative) correlation is observed between Ln 
Size and Ln Age (Expense Ratio) at 0.326 (-0.210), suggesting that potential 
multicollinearity is not likely to be a concern in my regression analysis. 
5.3 Tests of the Cross-subsidization Strategy 
5.3.1 Data Selection 
Unlike the test on the spillover effect, when examining the existence of cross-
subsidization strategies in SRI fund families, I include a comprehensive monthly data 
set of SRI funds in the United States from January 2005 to December 2012. I exclude 
the period before 2005 because of the lack of SRI funds to construct family and non-
family pairs, and the lack of information on manager ownership in the funds. As in the 
study of the spillover effect, I exclude duplicated funds, which can be identified by the 
ISIN codes. I also exclude global, fixed-asset, alternative and preferred-tax funds, as 
well as SRI balanced funds that invest less than 60 percent of their TNAV in equity 
assets. My study is concerned with the strategy related to asset choices. Therefore, 
equity funds are more reliable to investigate because of their larger investment sets. The 
final sample of the cross-subsidization strategy analysis consists of 5,121 SRI fund-
month observations. 
I check the inception and disappearance dates of the funds. To minimize the 
effect of survivorship bias, dead SRI funds are included in the sample. The Morningstar 
Direct provides data on dead funds until their disappearance date. I exclude funds that 
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have been traded for less than 24 months. I consider SRI funds with multiple share 
classes by checking their inception date and their matched funds. If there are two or 
more matching share-class funds, I only use the oldest fund in the share class. 
Furthermore, I include a share-class fund that has a paired share-class fund within the 
family. For example, I include a share class A for high contribution (HC) SRI funds if 
there is only one share class A in its pair of low contribution (LC) SRI funds. 
The Morningstar Direct database does not classify the type of screening used by 
SRI funds. I solve this problem by using the data from the USSIF website and fund 
prospectuses. The USSIF provides detailed data on the screenings used by each SRI 
fund. Some funds categorized as “socially conscious” by Morningstar Direct are not 
included in the USSIF. In these cases, I extract information on screenings from fund 
prospectuses. I use this information in my investigation into the effects of screening on 
the cross-subsidization strategy, where I categorize the screening types as either 
combined-ESG, environmental, social, or ethical. 
5.3.2 Research Methods 
To test cross-subsidization hypotheses, I follow past studies on SRI funds in 
terms of using risk-adjusted returns to measure performance (Bollen, 2007; Renneboog 
et al., 2008). Following these studies, I also use the FF three-factor model (Equation 1) 
to calculate the performance of SRI funds instead of FFC alpha. This is because FFC 
failed to explain all momentum in the US equity market (Avramov and Chordia, 2006).  
 I first determine high contribution (HC) funds and low contribution (LC) funds 
by following the method outlined by Gaspar et al. (2006). I categorize HC SRI funds as 
top past performing funds (winners), high-fee funds, and young funds, and LC SRI 
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funds as bottom past performing funds (losers), low-fee funds, and mature funds. Every 
month during the period spanning the 2005 to 2012 period, I review these HC and LC 
funds. I classify winners (losers) as SRI funds with performance above the 75
th
 
percentile (below 25
th
 percentile) of the year based on FF alpha. I adapt the method in 
Gaspar et al. (2006) in determining young (old) funds and low (high) fee funds by 
following Bollen (2007) so that funds with an age of six years or below are classified as 
young funds and the rest are classified as old funds. Lastly, I classify high (low) fee 
funds as funds that are positioned above the 75
th
 percentile (below 25
th
 percentile) of 
expense ratios within the family.  
5.3.2.1 Monthly Return Gap 
I identify the cross-fund strategy by examining the return gap, defined as 
difference in performance between HC and LC funds within the same family: 
 ∆𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 
 
(8) 
   
where ∆Rij,t is the return gap between funds i and j at time t; Ri,t is the monthly gross 
return of HC fund i; and Rj,t is the monthly gross return of LC fund j. Funds i and j are 
from the same fund family. I call the pair of HC and LC funds the family pair.  
Next, I compute the return gap between HC funds and matched LC funds from a 
different fund family. Following Gaspar et al. (2006), I replace the LC fund from a 
family pair with a matched LC fund from a different fund family. The matched LC fund 
has to have the same screening, investment style, and attributes as the LC fund from the 
family pair. I denote this pair as the non-family pair, and calculate the return gap using 
the following equation:    
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 ∆𝑅𝑖𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑘,𝑡 
 
(9) 
where ∆Rik,t is the return gap between funds i and k at time t; and Rk,t  is the monthly 
gross return of LC fund k, where fund i and k are from different fund families. To 
examine cross-subsidization in SRI fund families, my analysis focuses on differences in 
the return gap between family and non-family pairs (∆𝑅𝐺𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝐹𝑒𝑒,𝐴𝑔𝑒):  
∆𝑅𝐺𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝐹𝑒𝑒,𝐴𝑔𝑒 =  ∆𝑅𝑖𝑗,𝑡 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝐹𝑒𝑒,𝐴𝑔𝑒) − ∆𝑅𝑖𝑘,𝑡 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝐹𝑒𝑒,𝐴𝑔𝑒)  (10) 
  
Cross-subsidization exists when either the mean or median of ∆RG Performance, Fee, Age, is 
positive and significant. If ESG principles are present in the investment strategies, and 
the average ∆RG Performance, Fee, Age is not significantly different from zero, this suggests 
the existence of a risk-sharing strategy in SRI fund families. 
5.3.2.2 The Multivariate Model of Cross-subsidization Strategy 
I run a multivariate analysis of cross-fund subsidization in SRI fund families by 
performing the following regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑘),𝑡
+  𝑏2 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 +  𝑏3 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑘),𝑡
+ 𝑏𝑛 (𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 +  𝜀  
 
 
(11) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 is the return gap between SRI funds i and j (k). Same Family is a 
dummy variable which takes the values of one for funds i and j (k) which are from the 
same fund family, and zero if otherwise. This variable disregards the investment style of 
funds since according to the Investment Company Act (ICA) of 1940, fund managers 
can put assets that do not meet the style requirements as long as those assets are not 
more than 20 percent of the total portfolio value. Same Family Same Style equals one if 
funds i and j (k) are from the same family and have the same investment style, and zero 
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otherwise. Same Style equals one if funds i and j (k) have the same investment style, and 
zero if otherwise.  
The cross-subsidization hypothesis is supported if either b1 or b2 is positively 
significant. The b2 coefficient is specific to the cross-subsidization that exists between 
SRI funds within the same family and with the same investment style. The b3 is the 
coefficient that presents whether the monthly return gap of the same style family pairs/ 
non-family pairs is higher than that of the different style family pairs or the non-family 
pairs. 
I control for several fund attributes in tests of differences in monthly return gaps 
between HC and LC SRI funds. First, I control for the natural logarithm of fund size (Ln 
Size) since the performance enhancement of large funds is different from that of small 
funds (Evans, 2010; Khorana and Servaes, 1999), and for the natural logarithm of fund 
age (Ln Age) since the life cycle of funds determines the flow-performance relationship 
(Bollen, 2007; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). I also control for Morningstar Rating since 
funds with a higher Morningstar rating give higher flow benefits to the funds and their 
family (Guercio and Tkac, 2008, Nanda et al., 2004). Research shows that manager 
ownership is related to agency costs, and also to performance and risk style (Evans, 
2008; Khorana et al., 2007; Ma and Tang, 2014). I thus include in the regression 
Ownership, which equals one if fund managers of HC/LC SRI fund own shares in the 
managed funds, and zero otherwise. I control for Turnover, which is related to fund 
performance and idiosyncratic risk (Chen et al., 2000; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). 
Expense Ratio, which proxies for fees that directly affect net returns earned by investors 
(Khorana et al., 2009; Massa and Patgiri, 2009), are also controlled for in the regression. 
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Since cross-subsidization is performed by fund families, I control for a number of 
family attributes, and they are Family Size, Family Age, and No of SRI Funds. Family 
Size is the sum of SRI fund size within the family. Bhojraj et al. (2012) find a positive 
relation between family size and the performance of individual funds. Family Age is the 
number of calendar months since the inception date of the family, and No of SRI funds 
is the number of managed SRI funds within the family.   
I then investigate the screening fixed effect on return gaps since fund managers’ 
behaviour may be heterogeneous, depending on the screening used. Screenings that are 
more highly constrained result in a smaller investment set because more assets will be 
eliminated from the opportunity set. With fewer assets to choose from, SRI funds with 
higher screening constraints are less likely to perform a cross-subsidization strategy 
than SRI funds with a greater investment set. I extend Equation 11 by differentiating 
Same Family, Same Family Same Style, and Same Style according to the screening used 
by family and non-family pairs: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 =  𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙/ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙/ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡/ 𝐸𝑆𝐺
+ 𝑏2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙/ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙/ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡/ 𝐸𝑆𝐺
+  𝑏3𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙/ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙/ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡/ 𝐸𝑆𝐺
+ 𝑏𝑛 (𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠) +  𝜀  
 
 
 
(12) 
Same FamilyEthical/ Social/ Environment/ ESG equals one if the HC SRI fund is from the 
same fund family and has the same ethical, social, environment, ESG screening as its 
LC SRI fund pair, and zero otherwise. Same Family Same Style Ethical/ Social/ Environment/ ESG 
equals one if the HC SRI fund is from the same fund family and and both have the same 
ethical, social, environment, ESG screening as its LC SRI fund pair, and zero otherwise.  
Same Style Ethical/ Social/ Environment/ ESG equals one if an HC SRI fund has the same ethical 
(social, environment, or ESG) screening as its LC SRI fund pair, and zero otherwise. I 
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use Ln Age, Ln Size, Morningstar Rating, Turnover, Ownership, and Expense Ratio to 
control fund characteristics. I also control for family characteristics consisting of No of 
Funds, Family Size, Family Age and Cross-Funds Deviation.  
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics: HC vs. LC SRI Funds 
Table 5.3 presents summary statistics of HC and LC funds. Young and high-fee 
SRI funds have lower capital than their peer mature and low-fee funds. The median 
(mean) size of low-fee SRI funds is $152.28 million ($458.85 million dollars), which is 
higher than the $109.38 million ($334.09 million dollars) of high-fee funds, suggesting 
that SRI investors prefer low-fee SRI funds. The larger size of low-fee funds may be 
due to their longer experience in the market, as shown by their age. Young SRI funds 
are on average smaller than mature SRI funds. 
Contrary to the univariate results for the fee and life-cycle criteria, tests using 
the past performance criterion show that winning SRI funds whose the past year-to-date 
FF alpha is above the 75
th
 percentile of performance (HC funds) manage higher capital 
than losing funds with performance below the 25
th
 percentile of the industry (LC funds). 
This suggests that past winners historically receive higher flows than poor performers. 
On average, winners professionally manage $689.11 million worth of assets compared 
to $245.75 million for losers. Prior literature suggests that money flows to winners are 
higher than to losers due to prior beliefs about performance persistence (Busse et al., 
2010; Carhart, 1997;), the smart-money effect (Keswani and Stolin, 2004; Sapp and 
Tiwari, 2004), and managerial skills (Cuthbertson, 2008; Fama and French, 2010).  
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Table 5.3  
Fund characteristics: High-contribution vs. low-contribution SRI funds within a 
family 
High contribution (HC) funds are defined as winning, high-fee, and young funds, and low contribution 
(LC) funds are defined as losing, low-fee, and mature funds. Winners (Losers) are in above (bottom) 75
th
 
(25
th
) percentile of lagged annual Fama and French (FF) alpha. High (low) fee funds are in the top 
(bottom) 75
th
 (25
th
) of expense ratio in the fund family. Young funds are six years mature and younger, 
and mature funds the rest. Size is total net asset value (TNAV). Monthly Gross Returns is the change in 
portfolio value relative to past month’s value. Turnover is the percentage of new assets purchased and 
assets sold to TNAV. Expense Ratio is operating expenses divided by TNAV. Age is the number of 
calendar years since the inception date. Morningstar Rating is the Morningstar rating of SRI funds. 
 
Size  ($ Millions)
  Winners 92.73 185.28 577.89 689.11 2824.18 10.65 120.17
  Losers 64.82 118.88 456.45 245.75 250.75 1.83 9.40
  High Fee 45.31 109.38 463.26 334.09 475.85 2.28 8.96
  Low Fee 64.52 152.28 587.11 458.85 637.51 2.49 11.59
  Young 28.68 56.07 102.92 147.80 265.40 2.83 10.25
  Mature 78.69 179.92 502.01 370.08 455.90 2.26 9.22
Monthly Gross Returns (%)
  Winners -1.88 1.43 3.97 0.96 5.32 -0.22 4.12
  Losers -2.31 1.45 4.14 0.68 5.47 -0.43 3.57
  High Fee -1.88 1.2 3.99 0.81 5.19 -0.43 4.51
  Low Fee -1.62 1.39 3.74 0.91 5.03 -0.34 4.36
  Young -2.17 1.08 4.01 0.54 5.41 -0.51 4.52
  Mature -2.14 1.18 3.79 0.54 5.51 -0.39 5.11
Turnover  (%)
  Winners 35 51 81 62.16 45.17 1.85 7.66
  Losers 43 73 115 78.40 58.61 2.26 11.66
  High Fee 35 58 94 76.88 66.28 2.06 8.44
  Low Fee 22 42 71 56.27 51.69 2.01 7.61
  Young 24.62 46 82.74 67.02 67.52 2.71 12.53
  Mature 25.72 55 100 78.58 72.14 1.29 3.56
Expense Ratio
  Winners 0.8 1.17 1.61 1.38 0.92 3.02 17.77
  Losers 0.86 1.16 1.7 1.45 0.97 2.64 14.33
  High Fee 1.23 1.64 2.18 1.92 1.28 4.12 27.55
  Low Fee 0.91 1.2 1.58 1.33 0.86 5.16 49.22
  Young 0.98 1.56 2.13 1.73 1.05 1.63 6.76
  Mature 1.09 1.21 1.51 1.32 0.47 0.72 4.57
Age  (years)
  Winners 4.66 8.05 12.43 9.63 7.56 2.10 8.11
  Losers 4.57 8.03 10.32 7.97 4.79 0.39 2.65
  High Fee -1.87 7.27 11.76 8.98 8.01 3.27 19.05
  Low Fee 4.49 7.87 12.73 9.78 7.37 2.02 9.73
  Young 2.46 3.39 4.57 3.48 1.30 0.07 1.98
  Mature 8.99 11.42 14.04 14.59 11.26 2.87 11.00
Morningstar Rating
  Winners 2 3 4 2.84 1.42 -0.66 2.76
  Losers 1 2 3 2.05 1.06 -0.35 2.54
  High Fee 1 3 3 2.32 1.46 -0.24 2.18
  Low Fee 2 3 3 2.48 1.31 -0.30 2.61
  Young 0 2 3 1.87 1.71 0.24 1.70
  Mature 2 2 3 2.49 0.94 0.37 2.86
Kurtosis
25
th 
Percentile
50
th 
Percentile
75
th 
Percentile
Mean Std Dev Skewness
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Although fund families are expected to enhance the performance of young funds 
(Gaspar et al., 2006), my data show that top performing SRI funds tend to be older than 
losing SRI funds, with an average age of 9.63 and 7.97 years old respectively. In terms 
of gross returns, there is no significant difference between the current performance of 
HC and LC funds. The mean monthly gross return of top performers is, on average, 
higher than that of poor performers. However, the reverse is found for the fee criterion, 
as shown by the higher current average performance of low-fee funds compared to high-
fee ones. Still, 25 percent of high-fee funds outperform low-fee funds. Similarly, 25 
percent of young SRI funds have better current performance than mature peer funds. 
The mean returns of HC and LC funds are not significantly different from each other 
because this strategy involves only a small number of funds (Garavito, 2010). 
Half the winners have at least three Morningstar ratings, compared to only 25 
percent for poor SRI performers. This indicates that the performance of past winners is 
persistent, which is consistent with the findings of Jegadesesh and Titman (1993). 
However, there is no difference in Morningstar ratings between high-fee and low-fee 
SRI funds. In terms of the life-cycle criterion, mature SRI funds, on average, have 
higher ratings than young SRI funds. A caveat is in order since the rating method used 
by Morningstar includes only funds that are at least three years of age. The 50
th
 and 75
th
 
percentiles of young and mature funds’ ratings are, however, the same, two and three 
stars respectively. 
Looking at the turnover and expense ratio of HC and LC SRI funds, and based 
on the performance and age criteria, mature and poor performing LC funds have on 
average higher turnover than HC funds (young and winners), suggesting that HC funds 
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are less active. On the contrary, high-fee funds categorized as HC funds are more active 
than low-fee funds, supporting Massa and Patgiri’s (2009) argument that higher fees 
provide incentives for fund managers to take on higher risks in order to achieve higher 
future returns. There is no substantial difference in the expense ratio between winners 
and losers, with young SRI funds more likely to have a higher expense ratio than mature 
SRI funds. 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
The data used in examining the spillover effect and the cross-subsidization 
strategy can be accessed from the online Morningstar Direct, which is supported by the 
USSIF website, fund family websites, and Kenneth French website. To test the spillover 
effect, I regress the cash flow growth of funds on the main dummy variables, Star 
Family, and control variables including past alpha, size, age, expense ratio and turnover.  
I test the cross-subsidization strategy by pairing high contribution (HC) funds 
and low contribution (LC) funds from the same family. I then calculate the monthly 
return gap between HC and LC funds. Non-family pairs which are formed by changing 
each LC fund in family pair with matched LC funds from different fund families are 
used to test the existence of cross-subsidization in SRI fund families. The cross-
subsidization is more likely to exist if the dummy variables Same Family or Same 
Family Same Style are positive and statistically positive.  
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Chapter 6  
Empirical Results: The Spillover Effect in SRI Fund Families 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on the empirical results on the spillover effect in SRI fund 
families. More specifically, in Section 6.2, I investigate whether there is a spillover 
effect from the existence of star (poor) SRI and conventional performers into the cash 
flows of peer SRI funds in the same family. I also present a comparative study of the 
spillover effect in SRI fund families and conventional fund families. Section 6.3 reports 
on the robustness check by analyzing whether the spillover effect in SRI fund families 
is robust to the use of other performance measurements: Fama-French Carhart (FFC) 
alpha and the Morningstar rating. Section 6.4 discusses the results of spillover effects 
across various ESG screens. Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 The Spillover Effect 
6.2.1  The Contribution of Star SRI Funds to Peer SRI Funds in Fund Families 
Hypothesis H1 predicts a significant spillover from the existence of star and 
poor SRI performers in the flows of sibling SRI funds within the family. To test this, I 
first identify fund families with at least one star SRI fund, and then measure the cash 
flow growth of non-star peer SRI funds in the family. If there are substantial inflows to 
non-star performers, I can infer the presence of a positive spillover effect in the SRI 
fund family. I extend this spillover argument to bad SRI funds as well to test whether 
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having at least one bad SRI fund would conversely result in substantial cash outflows 
from peer SRI funds in the family. Therefore, my primary coefficient of interest is the 
Star (Bad) Family dummy variable in Equation 5. I predict a positive coefficient for 
Star Family and a negative coefficient for Bad Family if SRI investors’ choice of fund 
family is based on the existence of star (poor) fund performers. 
Table 6.1 reports the results for the spillover effect in SRI fund families with star 
SRI performers in Panel A (specifications 1 to 5) and with bad performers in Panel B 
(specifications 6 to 10). As shown in Panel C, the last two specifications include 
dummies indicating star and bad SRI performers.  
Specifications 1 to 3 show no evidence to support a statistically significant 
contribution of SRI star performers in the cash flows of their peer SRI funds within the 
family. However, when I include Star Fund Ratio, the results show a significant 
contribution of star performers to sibling funds, as shown by the coefficient on in 
specification 4, after controlling for past FF alpha and in specification 5 after 
controlling other fund characteristics. Economically, the monthly cash flows growth of 
SRI funds from a star family is, on average, 0.696 percent higher than that of SRI funds 
from families with no star performers (specification 5). This finding remains in Panel C, 
which considers star and bad funds in the regressions. Therefore, the results suggest a 
positive spillover effect of star performers on the cash flows of their SRI siblings, 
consistent with Nanda et al. (2004) for conventional funds. 
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Table 6.1  
Contributions of star (bad) performing SRI funds to SRI fund siblings 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t.  Star (Bad) Fund takes the value of one 
if fund’s alpha is in the top (bottom) 5 percent FF risk-adjusted returns, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) 
Family equals one if the SRI fund is not a star (bad) fund but is a member of a family with at least one 
SRI fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent FF risk-adjusted returns, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) Fund 
Ratio is the percentage of star (bad) funds in the family. FF Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted 
returns. Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. 
Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the fund. Ln 
Size  is the natural logarithm of current market value of total managed asset. Turnoveri,t is the percentage 
of new assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset value. Expense is the percentage of annual fee. 
*,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5
Constant 0.111 0.143 6.307 *** 0.150 6.747 ***
(1.15) (1.49) (6.33) (1.57) (6.77)
Star Fund 0.197 -0.611 -1.079 ** 0.519 0.330
(0.53) (-1.44) (-2.56) (0.97) (0.62)
Star Family 0.212 0.195 0.304 0.421 ** 0.696 ***
(1.19) (1.10) (1.54) (2.23) (3.21)
Star Fund Ratio -2.514 *** -3.256 ***
(-3.41) (-4.31)
Bad Fund
Bad Family
Bad Fund Ratio
FF Alpha 0.872 *** 0.935 *** 0.955 *** 1.037 ***
(3.97) (4.30) (4.33) (4.77)
Ln No of Funds -0.143 * -0.242 **
(-1.72) (-2.83)
Ln Age -1.146 *** -1.138 ***
(-9.15) (-9.13)
Ln Size -0.038 -0.053
(-0.69) (-0.97)
Turnover -0.002 ** -0.002 *
(-2.14) (-1.90)
Expense Ratio 0.037 0.045
(0.86) (1.07)
F Value 0.784 5.767 *** 16.20 *** 7.250 *** 16.59 ***
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.061 0.014 0.070
Panel A
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Table 6.1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Constant 0.204 ** 0.164 * 6.616 *** 0.164 * 6.368 *** 6.749 *** 7.413 ***
(2.16) (1.72) (6.53) (1.73) (5.76) (6.66) (7.29)
Star Fund -0.890 ** 0.516
(-2.08) (0.96)
Star Family 0.348 * 0.738 ***
(1.72) (3.33)
Star Fund Ratio -3.268 ***
(-4.31)
Bad Fund -0.734 ** -0.182 -1.102 *** 0.155 -0.758 -1.021 ** -0.423
(-1.99) (-0.44) (-2.62) (0.33) (-1.45) (-2.38) (-0.87)
Bad Family 0.042 0.064 0.075 0.232 0.334 0.015 0.271
(0.24) (0.35) (0.38) (1.06) (1.29) (0.07) (1.12)
Bad Fund Ratio -1.185 -1.795 * -2.116 **
(-1.43) (-1.92) (-2.48)
FF Alpha 0.666 *** 0.406 * 0.653 ** 0.308 0.650 *** 0.718 **
(3.11) (1.90) (3.05) (1.32) (2.63) (2.90)
Ln No of Funds -0.092 -0.070 * -0.164 * -0.308 ***
(-1.16) (-0.79) (-1.92) (-3.42)
Ln Age -1.145 *** -1.018 *** -1.170 *** -1.178 ***
(-9.13) (-7.47) (-9.32) (-9.42)
Ln Size -0.057 -0.076 -0.0520 -0.069
(-1.03) (-1.27) (-0.95) (-1.26)
Turnover -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 *
(-2.17) (-2.47) (-2.04) (-1.81)
Expense Ratio 0.032 0.011 0.037 0.049
(0.76) (0.24) (0.87) (1.15)
F Value 2.106 4.636 ** 15.87 *** 3.994 *** 14.83 *** 13.56 *** 13.48 ***
R-squared 0.002 0.007 0.060 0.008 0.063 0.064 0.076
Panel B Panel C
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However, the Star Fund dummy is insignificant in specification 1, 2, 4 and 5, 
suggesting that either current investors prefer to diversify their investment across funds 
in the family rather than adding new money to the star funds, or new investors have a 
limited ability to invest in star SRI funds due to asset distribution motives of fund 
families. 21  Star Fund Ratio has significantly negative coefficient in this variable in 
specifications 4, 5 and 12. The denominator of this ratio is the number of SRI funds in 
the family. This means that larger star fund families tend to have a lower Star Fund 
Ratio.Therefore, negative coefficients suggest that SRI investors prefer large star 
families, presumably due to their greater diversification opportunity, consistent with 
Gallaher et al.'s (2008) findings that flows to larger fund families are higher than that of 
those small ones. Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2004) argue that the attractiveness of larger 
fund families relates to the positive relation between performance persistence and the 
number of funds in the family.   
Focusing on the results for spillover effects of poor (bad) performers on the cash 
flow of sibling SRI funds, the specifications 6 to 10 of Panel B show the coefficient on 
Bad Family is insignificant. Therefore, having an SRI fund(s) with performance (FF 
Alpha) below the 5
th
 percentile does not significantly affect the cash flow of peer SRI 
funds within the family. This result suggests that SRI investors are less responsive to 
poor performers in an SRI fund family. However, they seem to punish the bad SRI fund 
itself, as indicated by the significant coefficient on Bad Fund in specifications 6, 8 and 
11. Contrary to Bollen’s (2007) findings that poor performers do not experience 
substantial outflows, I find that investors of poor performing SRI funds withdraw their 
money from these funds in order to minimize further losses.    
                                                     
21 Zhao (2004) suggests the family’s  motivation to close a fund from new investors in order to limit the 
fund size for the purpose of flow distribution to other funds within the family. 
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The results are consistent with the use of pooled Star Family and Bad Family 
dummies, as shown in specifications 11 and 12. While the coefficient on Star Family is 
significantly positive, it is insignificant for Bad Family. Therefore, there is a positive 
spillover effect on SRI fund families from having a star SRI performer(s), but the 
reverse does not hold from having bad SRI funds. The loyalty of SRI investors to bad 
families is somewhat ensured by the high search costs for financial and ESG 
information that would be incurred if these investors were to switch to other funds (Gil-
Bazo et al., 2009). 
As for the control variables, Ln Size and Expense Ratio are not associated with 
cash flows to SRI funds. The number of funds is negatively associated with the flow of 
SRI funds, suggesting that SRI funds from a large fund family have lower cash flow 
growth. This finding may be due to internal diversification as investors put their money 
into SRI funds of the same family. Ln Fund Age is also negatively related to cash flow, 
consistent with Bollen’s (2009) finding that young SRI funds have higher cash flow 
growth than mature SRI funds.  
In sum, the results for the spillover effect in SRI fund families are consistent 
with the findings of Khorana and Servaes (1999) and Nanda et al. (2004). These 
researchers find that there has been a positive contribution of star performers in the cash 
flow of peer funds in the same conventional fund family. My results show that the 
reputation of SRI fund families in generating outstanding financial performers is a 
positive signal that SRI investors utilize when they select SRI funds, consistent with the 
spillover effect hypothesis H1. Investors are drawn to SRI funds from star families with 
the expectation of yielding reasonable future incomes based on past performance − the 
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most accessible piece of information about SRI fund families. These results are robust 
when controlling for heteroscedasticity, which is outlined in Appendix 4. These findings 
support the family preference hypothesis of Massa (2003) that investors analyze 
information about fund families before choosing individual funds.  
In further tests, I consider the life cycle of SRI funds. In doing this, I recognize 
that investors may have different prior (Bayesian) beliefs depending on the stage of the 
funds’ life cycle. That is, young and mature funds may have different flow-performance 
relationships to one another (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999). Following Bollen (2009) in 
defining young and mature SRI funds, I create a dummy that takes a value of one if the 
sibling SRI fund is “young”, i.e., less than six years of age and zero otherwise. The 
interaction between this dummy and the Star Family dummy is referred to as Young 
Star Family. Table 6.2 shows that this interaction dummy has a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that younger SRI funds receive greater benefits in the form of 
fund flow if they have star-performing siblings. Specification 1 shows that the monthly 
cash flow growth of young SRI funds from star families are, on average, 0.625 percent 
higher than mature SRI funds and young funds from non-star families. This suggests 
that, in star families, young SRI funds provide a greater contribution to the family than 
their mature siblings since they receive higher flows.. 
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Table 6.2  
The spillover effect: Young versus mature SRI funds 
This regression aims to examine which SRI funds receive the flow benefits from the existence star (bad) performers 
within the family. I compare the spillover effect of star performers on the cash-flows of young and mature SRI funds. 
This is motivated by Bollen (2007) who examine the difference in the flow-performance relationship between young 
and mature SRI funds. I use the following regression specification:    
𝐶𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖+ 𝑏1 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2 𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏4  𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where, CF Growth is the new cash flows of SRI fund i to its total net asset values at time t-1. Young (Old) Star 
Family equals of one if young (old) fund i is not a star fund but belongs to a family with at least one fund with a top  
5 percent alpha, zero otherwise. Young (Old) Bad Family takes the value of one if young (old) fund i is not a bad fund 
but is a member of a family with at least one fund with a bottom 5 percent alpha, zero otherwise. Control is a vector 
of control variables identified from the literature, and they are fund size, turnover, fees, expenses, number of fund 
family member, and age. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level 
respectively. 
 
 
 
1 2 3
Constant 5.699 *** 6.381 *** 5.929 ***
(4.88) (5.52) (5.04)
Young Star Family 0.625 ** 0.776 **
(2.09) (2.46)
Old Star Family 0.133 0.050
(0.54) (0.20)
Young Bad Family -0.177 -0.435
(-0.55) (-1.28)
Old Bad Family 0.201 0.242
(0.83) (0.97)
FF Alpha 0.673 *** 0.682 *** 0.680 ***
(3.49) (3.53) (3.52)
Ln No of Funds -0.124 -0.093 -0.127
(-1.47) (-1.16) (-1.47)
Ln Age -1.052 *** -1.165 *** -1.104 ***
(-7.68) (-8.58) (-7.85)
Ln Size -0.030 -0.040 -0.030
(-0.50) (-0.67) (-0.51)
Turnover -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 **
(-2.23) (-2.19) (-2.16)
Expense Ratio 0.038 0.037 0.037
(0.85) (0.82) (0.80)
F Value 13.33 *** 12.94 11.16 ***
R-Squared 0.059 0.057 0.060
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6.2.2 The Contribution of Star Conventional Funds to Peer SRI Funds in Fund 
Families 
My second hypothesis is motivated by the coexistence of conventional and SRI 
funds in the same family. To test hypothesis H2, I investigate whether the performance 
of conventional funds affects the cash flows of peer SRI funds in the same family. I 
identify a star (bad) family as a family with at least one star (bad) conventional fund. As 
before, star (bad) conventional funds have an FF alpha above (below) the 95
th
 (5
th
) 
percentile of monthly performance.   
Table 6.3 presents the regression results for the mixed fund families. Mixed Star 
(Bad) Family takes the value of one if the mixed family has a star (bad) conventional 
fund, and zero otherwise. Results show that this dummy has an insignificant coefficient 
in all specifications, showing no evidence for the prediction that a star (poor) 
conventional fund provides a substantial contribution to the cash flow of peer SRI funds 
in mixed families. 
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Table 6.3  
Contributions of conventional funds to sibling SRI funds  
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t. Mixed Star(Bad) Family equals one if 
the SRI fund is not a star (bad) fund but is a member of a family with at least one conventional fund in the 
top (bottom) 5 percent alpha, and zero otherwise. Percentage of SRI Funds is the percentage of the 
number of SRI funds in the mixed fund family. Control variables consist of fund and family 
characteristics: FF Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted returns; Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm 
of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family;  Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of 
calendar months since the inception date of the fund; Ln Size  is the natural logarithm of current market 
value of total managed asset;  Turnoveri,t  is the percentage of new assets purchased and sold divided by 
total net asset value; and Expense is the percentage annual fee. *,** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Constant 0.658 *** 0.638 *** 4.992 ** 0.425 ** 0.431 ** 5.070 ** 4.916 **
(3.15) (3.07) (2.19) (2.03) (2.07) (2.23) (2.15)
Mixed Star Family -0.354 -0.257 -0.199 -0.364
(-1.07) (-0.78) (-0.47) (-0.80)
Mixed Bad Family 0.225 0.258 0.256 0.382
(0.68) (0.79) (0.68) (0.94)
FF Alpha 1.308 *** 1.129 *** 1.341 *** 1.128 *** 1.121 ***
(3.50) (3.04) (3.60) (3.04) (3.02)
Percentage of SRI Funds 0.016 0.0294 0.0204
(0.13) (0.25) (0.17)
Ln No of Funds -0.294 -0.412 ** -0.328
(-1.30) (-2.04) (-1.43)
Ln Age -1.275 *** -1.254 *** -1.264 ***
(-4.76) (-4.68) (-4.71)
Ln Size 0.114 0.118 0.116
(0.94) (0.97) (0.95)
Turnover -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.009 ***
(-3.49) (-3.21) (-3.22)
Expense Ratio 0.505 *** 0.504 *** 0.504 ***
(3.53) (3.53) (3.53)
F Value 1.153 6.692 *** 8.772 *** 0.466 6.699 *** 8.804 *** 7.894 ***
R-squared 0.001 0.014 0.072 0.000 0.014 0.073 0.073
71 2 3 4 5 6
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For robustness, I split the sample period into two parts: before and after 2005. I 
choose 2005 as the cut-off as it marks the beginning of a rapid increase in the number of 
SRI funds and SRI fund families. In et al. (2014) report that the increasing number of 
SRI funds has changed the competition between SRI and conventional funds. Results in 
Appendix 5 show an insignificant relationship between the performance of conventional 
funds and the cash flow of SRI funds in the same family for both periods. Based on 
these results, I conclude the behaviour of SRI investors in response to information on 
the financial performance of non-SRI funds belonging to their fund family is persistent 
over time. 
In sum, my findings show no evidence to support a spillover effect from the 
financial performance of conventional funds on the cash flows of sibling SRI funds, 
contrary to the second hypothesis (H2).  The results are robust to the pooling of the 
mixed and focused family data, which is reported in Appendix 6. SRI investors appear 
to be more concerned with the SRI funds and not with the reputation of fund families in 
managing conventional funds for making an investment decision. This suggests that SRI 
investors have priority on their ESG values, fund managing skills only in the SRI sphere 
are considered. Skills demonstrated in the non-SRI sphere are not considered relevant.   
6.2.3 The Spillover Effect: SRI vs. Conventional Funds 
To test the third hypothesis, I analyze whether the intensity of the spillover 
effect in SRI fund families is different from that in conventional fund families. I use the 
following dummy variables to distinguish between SRI and conventional funds. SRI 
Star (Bad) Family takes the value of one if an SRI fund is not a star (bad) performer but 
it belongs to a fund family with at least one star (bad) SRI fund, and zero otherwise. 
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Conventional Star (Bad) Family takes the value of one if a conventional fund is not a 
star (bad) performer and its family has at least one star (bad) conventional fund.  
Table 6.4 reports the results from pooled regressions in which SRI and 
conventional funds are combined. As before, the contribution of star (bad) SRI funds 
and star (bad) conventional funds to their fund family is examined. Specifications 1 and 
3 show that the coefficient on SRI Star Family is positive and significant (5 percent 
level) corroborating the results in Table 6.1 of a positive spillover effect of star SRI 
funds. The coefficient on Conventional Star Family is also positive and significant at (1 
percent level) showing the positive contribution of star conventional performers to the 
cash flow growth of peer funds within the family. The greater magnitude of the 
coefficient on SRI Star Family indicates a greater economic contribution of star SRI 
performers to their family compared to star conventional funds to their family. 
Specification 3, for instance, shows that SRI star performers attract an average of 0.445 
percent monthly cash flow growth to their family while conventional star performers 
attract an average of only 0.277 percent monthly cash flows growth to their peers. I 
conclude from these results that SRI investors are more sensitive to the success of SRI 
fund families in creating star funds than conventional investors for conventional fund 
families. This may be driven by the fact that star SRI funds signal the higher skill of 
fund families in professionally managing SRI funds because these funds have a more 
limited investment opportunity set than conventional funds. 
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Table 6.4  
The Spillover effect: SRI vs. conventional funds 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t. Star (bad) funds are funds that are in 
the top (bottom) five percent FF risk-adjusted returns of SRI mutual fund industry. For the explanatory 
variables, I have several dummy variables that distinguish between SRI and matched conventional funds. 
First, SRI equals one if fund i is the SRI fund, zero otherwise. Second, SRI (Conv) Star Family takes the 
value of one if an SRI (conventional) fund is non-star SRI (conventional) fund but belongs to a fund 
family with at least one SRI (conventional) fund in the top 5 percent alpha, and zero otherwise. Third, SRI 
(Conv) Bad Family takes the value of one if an SRI (conventional) fund is non-bad SRI (conventional) 
fund but belongs to a fund family with at least one SRI (conventional) fund in the bottom 5 percent alpha, 
and zero otherwise.  Fourth, SRI (conventional) Star Fund takes the value of one if SRI (conventional) 
fund’s alpha is in the top 5 percent, and zero otherwise. Fifth, SRI (conventional) Bad Fund takes the 
value of one if SRI (conventional) fund’s alpha is in the bottom 5 percent, and zero otherwise. I include 
some variables to control for past performance and for fund characteristics. FF Alpha is the year-to-date 
risk-adjusted returns. Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a 
fund family. Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of 
the fund. Ln Size  is the natural logarithm of current market value of total managed asset. Turnover is the 
percentage of new assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset value. Expense is the percentage of 
annual fee. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3
Constant 4.601 *** 4.815 *** 4.928 ***
(25.83) (26.85) (27.29)
SRI 0.078 -0.037 -0.010
(0.63) (-0.31) (-0.08)
SRI Star Family 0.449 ** 0.445 *
(2.00) (1.88)
Conv Star Family 0.244 *** 0.277 ***
(5.10) (5.73)
SRI Star Fund 0.014 0.180
(0.03) (0.39)
Conv Star Fund -0.203 ** 0.055
(-2.00) (0.54)
SRI Bad Family 0.118 -0.040
(0.51) (-0.17)
Conv Bad Family -0.163 *** -0.196 ***
(-3.43) (-4.07)
SRI Bad Fund -0.864 * -0.957 ***
(-1.85) (-2.03)
Conv Bad Fund -0.963 -0.951 **
(-9.93) (-9.59)
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Table 6.4 –Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3
FF Alpha 0.402 *** 0.093 ** 0.170 ***
(9.22) (2.47) (3.53)
Ln No of Funds -0.072 *** -0.006 -0.049 ***
(-5.17) (-0.45) (-3.14)
Ln Age -1.504 *** -1.541 *** -1.544 ***
(-58.53) (-59.43) (-59.54)
Ln Size 0.126 *** 0.126 *** 0.123 ***
(14.20) (14.24) (13.91)
Turnover -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(-9.15) (-7.89) (-7.88)
Expense Ratio -0.008 *** -0.005 -0.005
(-1.21) (-0.74) (-0.74)
F Value 303.64 *** 314.31 *** 224.38 ***
R Squared 0.042 0.044 0.044
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The existence of poor performing conventional funds significantly impairs the 
cash flow of other funds in the family, as indicated by the significantly negative 
coefficient on Conv Bad Family. The results are consistent with the sub-sample 
conventional funds presented in Appendix 8.  Current investors react negatively by 
withdrawing investment from bad fund families, and new investors avoid investing in 
them. This finding contrasts with Nanda et al. (2004) who find no spillover effect 
caused by bad conventional performers. 
Supporting the results in Table 6.1, there is no spillover effect caused by poor 
performing SRI funds on the cash flows of sibling funds. This suggests that the main 
difference in the spillover effect between SRI fund families and matched conventional 
fund families is the contribution of poor performers. SRI investors are not economically 
sensitive to the existence of poor SRI performers in the family. 
Therefore, I conclude two main points on the comparative spillover effect in SRI 
and conventional fund families. First, the spillover effect due to the existence of star 
performing funds is higher in SRI fund families than in conventional fund families. 
Benson and Humphrey (2008) confirm that SRI investors tend to reinvest in their 
current funds because of the difficulty in searching for alternative SRI funds. Since SRI 
funds of the same family are more likely to use the same screening, fund families can 
attract greater flows from investors if they can convey additional positive information 
such as generating a star SRI performer. Second, SRI investors are less sensitive to 
information about the existence of poor funds in the family than conventional investors. 
The reason for this is also related to the difficulty in finding alternative SRI fund from 
other fund families with the same social objectives. Overall, the regression results in 
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Table 6.4 provide evidence on the lower intensity of the spillover effect for SRI fund 
families than for conventional fund families, supporting hypothesis H3. 
6.3 Robustness  
I conduct additional robustness tests using the Fama-French Carhart alpha and 
Morningstar ratings to measure past fund performance. First, I construct star (non-star) 
and bad (non-bad) SRI funds using the year-to-date FFC Alpha with the similar ranking 
method used by Nanda et al. (2004).  
Appendix 9 shows that SRI funds with the top 5 percent of FFC alpha generate a 
positive contribution to the cash flows of other SRI funds in the same family as 
indicated by Star Family in Specification 3 where I combine star and bad funds, and 
find the result remains intact. Therefore, after adjusting for the momentum factor, I find 
SRI investors respond positively to good performing SRI funds by reinvesting in the 
star fund itself and diversifying across other SRI funds in the same family. These results 
confirm the spillover effect hypothesis in SRI star families. 
Next, I use the Morningstar ratings to proxy the past performance of SRI funds. 
This rating is calculated by involving several fund attributes: past risk-adjusted returns 
and the life cycle of funds. Compared to the risk-adjusted return measure, the 
Morningstar ratings are more accessible to investors as they are freely available on the 
Morningstar and fund families’ websites. Morningstar ratings are defined in terms of the 
number of stars. Five-star SRI funds refer to SRI funds that are in the top five percent 
performance of the mutual fund industry. My analysis considers only how five-star 
funds affect the cash flow to their family relative to other funds. 
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Table 6.5  
Robustness test: Contributions of five-star SRI funds 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t. MS Star Fund takes the value of one if 
fund’s Morningstar ratings are five and zero otherwise. MS Star Family equals one if the SRI fund is not a 
five-star fund but is a member of a family with at least one five-star SRI fund, and zero otherwise. MS 
Star Fund Ratio is the percentage of five-star star funds in the family. I include some variables to control 
for past performance and for fund characteristics. FF Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted returns. Ln 
No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the fund. Ln Size  is the 
natural logarithm of current market value of total managed asset. Turnoveri,t is the percentage of new 
assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset value. Expense is the percentage of annual fee. *,** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
  
1 2 3
Constant 0.181 0.178 -0.479
(0.93) (0.91) (-0.21)
MS Star Family 0.674 * 0.442 1.616 ***
(1.66) (0.99) (3.05)
MS Star Fund 2.826 1.954 2.803
(3.46) *** (1.80) ** (2.49) **
MS Star Fund Ratio 2.294 -0.247
(1.22) (-0.12)
FF Alpha 0.524
(1.08)
Ln No of Funds -0.582
(-3.09) ***
Ln Age -0.003
(-1.02)
Ln Size -0.011
(-0.10)
Expense Ratio 0.071
(0.66)
F Value 6.87 *** 5.08 *** 11.47 ***
R-Squared 0.007 0.007 0.050
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Table 6.5 reports the spillover effect of having a five-star rated SRI fund(s) on 
the cash flow of other SRI funds in the family. The coefficient on MS Star Fund is 
significantly positive in all specifications, consistent with Del Guercio and Tkac (2008). 
They show that information about Morningstar ratings is valuable in attracting cash 
flow to individual funds. Controlling for fund characteristics, the monthly cash flow 
growth of five-star rated SRI funds is, on average, 2.803 percent higher that of other 
SRI funds, shown by MS Star Fund in specification 3. Five-star SRI funds also 
contribute to the cash flows of other SRI funds within the family. The coefficient on MS 
Star Family in the specification 3 is 1.616 (t-statistic = 3.05). In economic terms, the 
presence of at least one five-star SRI fund in the family increases the monthly cash flow 
growth of peer SRI funds by an average of 1.6 percent, all else equal. The economic and 
statistical significance on both MS Star Fund and MS Star Family suggest the positive 
contribution of star SRI performers not only to their own cash flows, but also to the rest 
of SRI funds in the family. Therefore, my main findings of a positive spillover effect in 
SRI fund families with star performers are robust to alternative performance measures. 
6.4 Screening Heterogeneity 
In an effort to control for possible heterogeneity in the spillover effect, I develop 
a testable prediction about the heterogeneity of screening used by SRI funds. Not all 
SRI funds use all combined ESG constraints in selecting assets. Some of them focus 
only on a particular screening such environment, social, or ethical. I predict that the 
intensity of spillover in SRI fund families is different for each screening used by SRI 
funds. This is crucial because the higher intensity of screening affect the opportunity set 
of an SRI fund.  
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I combine the screening identification employed by USSIF and Morningstar to 
categorize SRI funds. I identify four primary screening types: full ESG; environmental; 
social; and ethical. Full ESG funds combine environment, social and governance 
screenings in their asset choice. Environmental funds focus only on environmental 
issues such as pollution and clean technology. Social funds focus only on social matters 
such as diversity, community development, human rights and labour relations. The last 
screening type, ethical, is based on the use of religious values and products, where the 
former screens out companies which produce (serve) alcohol, gambling and tobacco. At 
these screenings, full ESG and environmental screenings results in a smaller investment 
opportunity set because SRI funds with these two types employ positive screening 
instead of negative screening. With the heterogeneity in screenings used by fund 
managers, investors may react differently to the performance of fund families in 
generating outstanding financial performance.  
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Table 6.6   
The spillover effect for different screening types 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t. ESG/Environment/Social/Ethical Star 
(Bad) family takes the value of one if the ESG/environment/social/ethical constrained fund is not a star 
(bad) fund but is a member of a family with at least one SRI fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent alpha, and 
zero otherwise. I include some variables to control for past performance and for fund characteristics. FF 
Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted returns. Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of 
SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the fund. Ln Size  is the natural logarithm of current market value of total 
managed asset. Turnoveri,t is the percentage of new assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset 
value. Expense is the percentage of annual fee. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent: 
Cash Flow Growth
Constant 6.871 7.524 7.610
(5.96) *** (6.61) *** (6.61) ***
ESG Star Family 0.680 0.938
(2.65) *** (3.36) ***
Environment Star Family 0.329 1.503
(0.46) (2.06) **
Social Star Family 0.238 0.218
(0.53) (0.49)
Ethical Star Family -0.439 -0.540
(-1.21) (-1.5)
ESG Bad Family -0.199 -0.619
(-0.81) (-2.27) **
Environment Bad Family -5.083 -5.519
(-6.42) *** (-6.77) ***
Social Bad Family -2.333 -2.305
(-1.97) ** (-1.94) *
Ethical Bad Family -0.036 0.125
(-0.04) (0.14)
Ln No of Funds -0.209 -0.111 -0.210
(-2.40) ** (-1.39) (-2.41)
Ln Age -1.162 -1.153 -1.194
(-8.98) *** (-9.10) *** (-9.32)
Ln Size -0.051 -0.094 -0.079
(-0.85) (-1.60) (-1.31)
Turnover -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-2.03) ** (-1.80) * (-1.73) *
Expenses 0.030 0.039 0.030
(0.65) (0.86) (0.65)
F Value 11.02 *** 14.71 *** 11.94 ***
R-Squared 0.054 0.071 0.080
1 2 3
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Specification 1 of Table 6.6 reports the regression results for the Star Family 
dummy variables for the various screenings. This specification shows that the monthly 
cash flows growth of the full ESG funds is significantly related to the reputation of the 
fund family in creating star performing funds. The coefficient estimate on ESG Star 
Family is 0.680 (t-statistic = 2.65), indicating that star funds can positively attract 
higher cash flows to their peer SRI funds which use all ESG constraints. In economic 
terms, the existence of star SRI performers in the family contributes to an increase in 
monthly cash flows of peer full ESG-constrained funds by 0.680 percent, on average, all 
else equal. I confirm similar results for ESG funds when I combine both star and bad 
families, as shown in specification 3. Specification 3 also demonstrates the significant 
positive contribution of star funds to the cash flow of environmental funds in the same 
family, as indicated the coefficient on Environment Star Family dummy variable. 
The presence of poor performers also, however, affects the cash flows of sibling 
ESG, environmental, and social funds. Specification 2 shows a negative and significant 
coefficient on Environment Bad Family and Social Bad Family. Investors who are more 
concerned with environmental and social issues appear to withdraw their investment 
from bad SRI fund families. Specification 3 demonstrates the adverse effect of having 
poor performers in the family is not confined to only environment and social sibling 
fund, but also extends to full sibling ESG funds. The coefficient on ESG Bad Family 
Dummy variable is negatively significant at the five percent level. 
 
In summary, the intensity of the spillover is higher for SRI funds with a smaller 
investment set. Families with outstanding performers are more valued by investors who 
are concerned with full ESG and environmental values. The contribution of star 
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performers to full ESG sibling funds is higher than the negative effect of poor 
performers on the cash flows of these funds, suggesting that ESG investors are more 
likely to invest in SRI funds from star fund families than other SRI investors. However, 
for environmental funds, the spillover effect is more pronounced for families with bad 
performers. Specifically, environmental investors appear to be more sensitive to bad 
families’ identity, and that this sensitivity is greater than their positive reaction to star 
families. Conversely, social investors are sensitive only to the existence of poor 
performers in the family, and ethical investors are not concerned with the reputation of 
fund family in generating star and poor performing SRI funds.   
6.5 Chapter Summary  
A significant contribution of star SRI performing funds in the cash flows of their 
sibling SRI funds confirms the spillover effect in SRI fund families. This, in turn, 
suggests the positive spillover effect of having star performers in SRI fund families. 
Conversely, the existence of poor performing SRI funds in fund families does not affect 
the cash flows of their sibling SRI funds. Therefore, SRI investors appear to be sensitive 
to positive signals from SRI fund families, but not to the negative information. 
The results also confirm the consistency of SRI investors in absorbing the 
information about the reputation of fund families. The investment decision of SRI 
investors is not, however, related to the success of fund families in managing 
conventional funds. I also conclude there is a higher spillover effect in conventional 
funds than in SRI funds. Star SRI funds make a higher contribution to the cash growth 
of their sibling funds than the contribution of conventional star performers in their 
sibling conventional funds. That being said, the negative spillover effect from the 
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existence of poor conventional funds provide the evidence that the magnitude of 
spillover effect in SRI funds families is lower than in conventional fund families. 
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Chapter 7   
Empirical results: Cross-subsidization strategy in SRI Fund Families 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines my second research aim, which is on cross-subsidization 
in SRI fund families. I argue that the existence of cross-subsidization strategy in SRI 
fund families is sufficient to indicate a failure to adhere to ESG principles. To 
investigate the existence of cross-subsidization strategy in SRI fund families, I first 
conduct several parametric and non-parametric univariate tests in section 7.2. The 
results are discussed in section 7.3 to section 7.5. Section 7.6 summarizes and 
concludes.  
7.2 Univariate Tests 
Table 7.1 reports univariate results for the return gap of family and non-family 
pairs using parametric and nonparametric statistics, represented by t- and z-statistics 
respectively. A family pair consists of a high-contribution (HC) SRI fund and a low 
contribution (LC) SRI fund from the same family. In a non-family pair, the LC fund is 
replaced with a matched LC SRI fund from a different fund family. The tests aim to 
provide a preliminary analysis of cross-subsidization in SRI fund families. I first discuss 
whether the mean return gap to family pairs is significantly different from zero.  
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Table 7.1  
Univariate tests of difference in monthly gap between HC and LC SRI funds 
Performance gap is the monthly gross return of high-contribution (HC) funds minus that of low-contribution (LC) funds. HC funds are the winning/high-fee/young 
funds for the performance/fee/life-cycle category. Losing/low-fee/mature SRI funds are classified as LC Funds. In a family pair, the HC and LC funds come from the 
same family. In a non-family pair, a matched LC fund from a different family is used. A fund family is categorized as big (small) if the number of funds it manages is 
above (below) the sample average. Large (small) size family is defined as a fund family with TNAV above (below) the SRI industry average. Both t- and Mann-
Whitney tests are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Std Dev Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Std Dev Mean t- value Median z -value
All 0.377 *** 0.180 0.750 7.732 2.923 0.156 *** 0.180 0.150 5.182 2.761 0.221 2.49 *** 0.000 1.52
1
st
 Quarter 0.203 * 0.070 0.250 5.853 2.667 -0.017 0.180 -0.166 4.628 2.534 0.221 1.26 -0.110 1.13
2
nd
 Quarter 0.883 ** 0.270 0.170 5.273 3.414 0.652 *** 0.360 0.339 5.531 3.307 0.378 1.02 -0.090 -0.01
3
rd
 Quarter 0.299 ** 0.080 0.322 8.625 2.705 -0.079 0.185 -0.604 4.353 2.410 0.378 2.20 ** -0.106 1.54
4
th
 Quarter 0.221 ** 0.225 1.195 7.615 2.847 0.103 0.030 0.206 4.031 2.696 0.118 0.81 0.195 0.61
1
st
 Semi-annual 0.543 *** 0.225 1.195 7.615 3.079 0.317 *** 0.265 0.270 5.720 2.963 0.226 1.57 * -0.040 0.72
2
nd
 Semi-Annual 0.250 *** 0.145 0.268 7.516 2.793 0.033 0.112 -0.031 4.213 2.591 0.217 1.95 ** 0.034 1.41
Big Family (No of funds) 0.559 *** 0.230 0.841 7.703 3.220 0.121 * 0.120 0.173 4.665 3.021 0.438 3.29 *** 0.110 2.66 ***
Small Family  (No of funds) 0.166 ** 0.070 0.339 5.877 2.523 0.196 *** 0.240 0.119 5.793 2.426 -0.030 -0.27 -0.170 -0.82
Big Family (TNAV) 0.415 *** 0.160 0.623 8.332 2.916 0.012 0.140 0.105 5.004 2.879 0.335 2.78 *** 0.020 2.09 **
Small Family (TNAV) 0.347 *** 0.225 0.912 6.957 2.934 0.343 *** 0.230 0.283 5.379 2.589 0.073 0.55 -0.005 -0.09
All 0.025 0.010 0.214 6.587 2.231 0.009 0.010 0.205 7.428 2.403 0.016 0.36 0.000 0.81
1
st
 Quarter 0.087 * 0.030 0.070 4.920 2.047 0.074 0.100 0.033 4.850 2.203 0.013 0.16 -0.070 -0.30
2
nd
 Quarter 0.123 ** 0.000 1.037 9.415 2.372 -0.043 -0.205 0.810 7.184 2.459 0.166 1.79 ** 0.205 2.77
3
rd
 Quarter -0.084 0.020 -0.456 5.644 2.195 0.071 0.190 -0.222 4.751 2.340 -0.156 -1.73 ** -0.170 -1.75 *
4
th
 Quarter -0.038 -0.010 -0.091 4.322 2.289 -0.070 -0.110 0.098 10.703 2.601 0.032 0.32 0.100 0.89
1
st
 Semi-annual 0.106 *** 0.010 0.677 8.042 2.219 0.014 -0.010 0.487 6.319 2.338 0.092 1.46 0.020 1.76 *
2
nd
 Semi-Annual -0.062 0.010 -0.265 4.960 2.241 0.003 0.040 -0.050 8.336 2.471 -0.064 -0.96 -0.030 -0.63
Big Family (No of funds) 0.072 * 0.040 0.569 7.765 2.045 -0.013 -0.040 0.496 7.670 2.227 0.085 1.31 * 0.080 2.07 **
Small Family  (No of funds) -0.010 0.000 0.052 5.904 2.359 0.025 0.050 0.051 7.170 2.526 -0.034 -0.54 -0.050 -0.58
Big Family (TNAV) 0.087 ** 0.030 0.346 7.222 2.090 0.005 -0.040 0.433 6.777 2.250 0.081 1.37 * 0.070 2.19 **
Small Family (TNAV) -0.041 0.000 0.134 6.001 2.373 0.012 0.050 0.035 7.652 2.558 -0.054 -0.76 -0.050 -0.97
Panel A. Performance (Winner-
Loser)
Panel B. Fee (High-Low)
Non-Family Pairs
Difference between Family and 
Non-Family pairs
Family Pairs
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Table 7.1 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Std Dev Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis Std Dev Mean t- value Median z -value
All -0.013 0.035 -0.079 7.053 2.505 -0.086 *** -0.030 -0.311 7.912 2.641 0.073 1.44 * 0.065 1.39
1
st
 Quarter -0.046 0.020 -0.217 5.005 2.299 -0.078 -0.060 0.019 4.452 2.451 0.032 0.37 0.080 0.66
2
nd
 Quarter -0.099 * -0.010 0.425 7.366 2.697 -0.031 -0.070 0.618 8.459 2.753 -0.069 -0.63 0.060 0.04
3
rd
 Quarter -0.046 0.040 -0.711 9.815 2.547 -0.216 *** -0.030 -0.890 7.282 2.726 0.170 1.61 * 0.070 1.21
4
th
 Quarter 0.145 ** 0.110 0.098 4.941 2.485 -0.019 0.040 -1.015 10.515 2.652 0.164 1.60 * 0.070 0.93
1
st
 Semi-annual -0.071 * 0.010 0.154 6.621 2.492 -0.056 -0.060 0.354 6.880 2.595 -0.015 -0.21 0.070 0.50
2
nd
 Semi-Annual 0.032 0.070 -0.324 7.553 2.492 -0.119 ** 0.000 -0.951 8.797 2.595 0.151 2.08 ** 0.070 1.51
Big Family (No of funds) -0.131 *** 0.030 -0.737 7.067 2.641 -0.203 *** -0.055 -0.568 5.999 2.680 0.071 1.06 0.050 1.16
Small Family  (No of funds) 0.117 ** 0.040 0.414 6.747 2.641 0.043 -0.020 -0.063 9.719 2.680 0.074 0.98 0.070 0.77
Big Family (TNAV) -0.062 * 0.050 -0.713 6.944 2.366 -0.102 ** -0.030 7.252 8.934 2.645 0.040 0.63 0.080 1.25
Small Family (TNAV) 0.061 -0.030 0.548 6.818 2.700 -0.061 -0.040 -0.517 8.934 2.637 0.122 1.48 * 0.010 0.61
Difference between Family and 
Non-Family pairs
Panel C. Age (Young - Mature)
Family Pairs Non-Family Pairs
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Following Gaspar et al. (2006), I calculate the difference in the return gap 
between family and non-family pairs to see if there is evidence to support the existence 
of cross-subsidization in SRI fund families. If the return gap of family pairs is 
statistically higher than that of non-family pairs, I conclude that there is a cross-
subsidization strategy implemented in the SRI fund family. Finding otherwise would 
suggest that there is a risk-sharing strategy or a reversed cross-subsidization where HC 
SRI funds subsidize the performance of LC SRI funds. If this occurs, I expect 
significant and negative differences in the monthly returns between HC and LC funds of 
the same family. 
Table 7.1 shows that difference in the mean return gap between family and non-
family pairs is significantly positive only for the past performance criterion. The 
average monthly return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs for the performance 
criterion is 0.377 percent (significant at the 1 percent level) and 0.156 percent 
(significant at the 1 percent level) respectively. The difference in the average return gap 
is 0.221 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent level. This provides preliminary 
evidence to support the presence of cross-subsidization strategy in SRI fund families 
between winners and their losing siblings. Although nonparametric tests show no 
difference in the median return gap between family and non-family pairs, the skewness 
is higher for family pairs. This means that the above median return gap of family pairs 
is higher than that of non-family pairs.  
In Panel B, the difference in the average monthly returns of high-fee and low-fee 
SRI funds from the same family (family pairs) is 0.025 percent, which is not 
significantly different from the 0.009 percent for non-family pairs. Panel C showing 
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there is a difference in the return gap between family and non-family pairs for the life-
cycle criterion in the sense that performance subsidization is more likely to favour 
young funds at the expense of their mature siblings. The average monthly return gap of 
family and non-family pairs using the life-cycle criterion is negative (-0.013 and -0.086 
percent respectively), suggesting that young SRI funds underperform mature SRI fund 
from the same family and from different families. The nonparametric univariate 
analysis, however, shows no significant difference in the return gap between family and 
non-family pairs for the life cycle criterion.  
In Table 7.1, I also analyze time-varying differences in the return gap to examine 
whether cross-subsidization is related to timing ability such as performance dressing 
(window dressing). Results show that differences in the return gap for all criteria are not 
statistically different during the first two-quarters using the parametric and non-
parametric tests. The exception is the fee criterion, which shows a significant difference 
in the mean return gap between family and non-family pairs during the second quarter. 
According to the window dressing literature (Agarwal et al., 2014; Morey and 
O’Neal, 2006), performance enhancement is more active before the end of the fiscal 
year. The performance of HC funds is more likely to be window-dressed if the 
difference in the return gap between family and non-family pairs is higher during the 
third and fourth quarters. The results show the same evidence of performance 
enhancement for winning SRI funds during the third quarter and for young SRI funds 
during the fourth quarter, as shown by the positive return gap. The significant difference 
in the return gap between family and non-family pairs (0.217 percent for the 
performance criterion and 0.151 percent for the life cycle criterion) suggests that SRI 
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fund families tend to favour their winning and young funds before the end of the fiscal 
year. Although the difference in the return gap is not significant for the Mann-Whitney 
test, the parametric test suggests that the performance of losing and mature SRI funds is 
sacrificed for the performance of winning and young peer siblings. This is suggestive of 
the existence of a cross-subsidization strategy in SRI fund families during the last 
quarters, except for the fee criterion.  
To further analyze whether the cross-subsidization strategy is related to family 
characteristics, I rerun the univariate tests using two additional criteria. These criteria 
are the number of SRI funds managed by a family, and the size of the family. The latter 
refers to the cumulative of member SRI funds’ size within the family. 
First, I split the sample into two groups using the average number of funds 
managed by sample SRI fund families as a cutoff. I categorize a fund family as “big” if 
the number of funds it manages is above the sample average for each period of study, 
and small if it is below the sample average.22 The rationale is based on the greater 
opportunity to perform a cross-subsidization strategy in families which have a higher 
number of managed SRI funds.  
The results in Table 7.1 show that big SRI fund families tend to enhance the 
performance of their winning funds and high-fee funds. The return gap of family pairs 
using the performance criterion is on average 0.438 percent higher than that of non-
family pairs; the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
indicates that there is a larger monthly performance gap between winners and losers 
from the same the big family (0.559 percent). In comparison, for small families, the 
                                                     
22 The average number of managed SRI funds for each period is different because there are new listed 
funds and merged funds. 
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return gap of family pairs is only 0.166 percent on average or 0.03 lower than that of 
non-family pairs. Consistent with the parametric test, the Mann-Whitney test also 
presents a significant difference in the return gap of family and non-family pairs for big 
SRI fund families using the performance criterion. 
This finding thus suggests that the greater number of the SRI funds managed by 
a family, the more likely a high-fee SRI fund will be favoured because it is presumably 
easier to hide cross-subsidization activities in big families. Consistently, the median 
difference in the return gap between family and non-family pairs in big families using 
the fee criterion is significant, with a z-score of 2.065 (significant at the 5 percent level). 
Similar to the performance criterion, there is a performance-enhancement strategy in big 
fund families, where low-fee SRI funds are coordinated to support the performance of 
high-fee ones. 
There is no evidence showing that the number of managed SRI funds in a family 
is related to the favouritism toward young SRI funds in Panel C. Using sub-samples of 
big and small fund families, the return gap between family and non-family pairs is not 
statistically different in either parametric or non-parametric tests. According to the mean 
return gap of family pairs, young SRI funds outperform their mature siblings only in 
small families, as represented by the significantly positive return gap (0.117, significant 
at the 5 percent level). Compared with the mean return gap of non-family pairs, a cross-
subsidization strategy between young and mature SRI funds is not observed in both big 
and small families. 
Second, every month, I split the sample using the average monthly size of fund 
families in the SRI fund industry as a cut-off. Panel A shows the mean difference in the 
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return gap of family and non-family pairs using the performance criterion is significant 
at the 1 percent level in big-sized families, but not in small-sized families. 
Economically, the difference in the mean return gap of family and non-family pairs is 
0.355 and 0.073 percent in big-sized and small-sized families respectively. This 
suggests that large-size families are more likely to perform cross-subsidization than 
small-size families. Results from non-parametric tests concur, suggesting the return gap 
in family pairs is higher than in non-family pairs for large families.   
I also predict a cross-subsidization strategy for the fee criterion in big sized fund 
families. Both parametric and non-parametric tests support this prediction. The mean 
and median differences between the return gap of family and non-family pairs in big 
sized families are 0.081 percent and 0.07 percent respectively, significant at the 10 and 
5 percent level respectively. 
In contrast to the above two criteria, the difference in the mean return gap of 
family and non-family pairs using the life-cycle criterion is statistically significant only  
in small sized families. Therefore, small families are likely to favour their young SRI 
funds by coordinating managers of mature funds to subsidize the performance of these 
favoured funds. The higher contribution of good performing young SRI funds (Bollen, 
2007) to fund flows to the family provides the motivation for small families to favour 
young SRI funds at the expenses of mature SRI funds. This favouritism immediately 
implies the lack of conformity to ESG principles which would otherwise ensure that 
ethical strategies are implemented in fund families. For both the performance and life-
cycle criteria, SRI fund families are expected to enhance the winning (young) SRI funds 
at the expenses of the losing (mature) SRI funds. Although the parametric and non-
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parametric univariate tests show that cross-subsidization only exists for the performance 
and life-cycle criteria, there is evidence supporting the existence of this strategy in sub-
samples of families for the fee criterion, particularly in large size fund families. In terms 
of time-varying analysis, the substantial difference between the return gap of family and 
non-family pairs during the last six months of the year is suggestive of performance 
dressing toward winners and younger funds during that period, in line with the window 
dressing described in the mutual fund literature (Ling and Arias, 2013; Sias and Starks, 
1997).  
7.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Thus, the univariate tests provide preliminary results suggesting that SRI fund 
families perform cross-subsidization across their SRI funds (especially a strategy that 
involves winning and losing SRI funds). A multivariate analysis is, however, needed to 
draw sufficient evidence to support this finding. Like the univariate tests, I also conduct 
multivariate analysis on sub-samples of SRI funds to examine the role of time in the 
cross-subsidization strategy.   
7.3.1 Cross-subsidization Between Winning and Losing SRI Fund: Performance 
Criterion 
I first test cross-subsidization between winners and losers from the same SRI 
fund family based on Equation 11, where HC and LC SRI funds are determined using 
the year-to-date FF alpha in the previous month (t-1). The top 25 percent are categorised 
as HC funds and the bottom 25 percent as LC funds.  
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I run a cross-sectional regression, which uses the return gap between winners 
and losers (family and non-family pairs) as the dependent variable. To test the cross-
subsidization hypothesis, I focus on the coefficients on Same Family and Same Family 
Same Style dummies. The former shows whether differences in monthly returns 
between winners and losers from the same family are statistically higher than that those 
between winners and losers from different families. The coefficient on Same Family 
Same Style shows whether differences in the monthly returns of winners and losers with 
the same investment style are higher for pairs from the same family than for other pairs 
(different investment styles and different families). The cross-subsidization hypothesis 
is supported if the coefficient on at least one of the dummies is positively significant; 
otherwise, there is no discriminating strategy across SRI funds within fund families.  
Table 7.2 reports a positive and significant coefficient estimates on the dummy 
variable Same Family. Specification 1 shows that the coefficient on this variable is 
0.239 and significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that the monthly return gap 
between winners and losers from the same family is, on average, 24 basis points higher 
than the return gap between winners and losers from different fund families. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on Same Family remains stable after controlling for fund 
characteristics, as shown in specification 2, and fund and family characteristics, as 
shown specification 4. 
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Table 7.2  
Regressions of cross-subsidization between winning and losing SRI funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap defined as the difference in the monthly returns of winning and losing SRI 
funds. Same Family equals one if both winning and losing funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. 
Same Family Same Style equals one if winning and losing funds are from the same fund family and in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if winning and losing funds are in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the winning (losing) fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of total net asset value 
(TNAV) of winning (losing) SRI funds. Morningstar Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of winning (losing) 
funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold divided by TNAV of winning 
(losing) funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers own shares in the winning (losing) fund they 
manage, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating 
expenses to TNAV of winning (losing) funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of TNAV of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln 
Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-
Fund Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the 
family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
  
Constant 0.167 ** 0.543 -0.189 0.143
(2.47) (0.51) (-0.27) (0.12)
Same Family 0.239 ** 0.267 *** 0.239 ** 0.273 ***
(2.50) (2.71) (2.52) (2.79)
Same Family Same Style -0.131 -0.027 -0.131 -0.020
(-0.50) (-0.10) (-0.51) (-0.08)
Same Style -0.084 -0.175 -0.143 -0.238
(-0.46) (-0.91) (-0.78) (-1.25)
Ln Age HC 0.145 * 0.186 **
(1.86) (2.12)
Ln Age LC -0.187 ** -0.250 ***
(-2.23) (-2.94)
Ln Size HC -0.092 * -0.102 **
(-1.93) (-2.00)
Ln Size LC 0.075 * 0.121 ***
(1.69) (2.71)
Morningstar Rating HC 0.046 0.046
(1.25) (1.24)
Morningstar Rating LC -0.123 ** -0.090 *
(-2.50) (-1.82)
1 2 3 4
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Table 7.2 – Continued 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4
Ownership HC 0.361 *** 0.335 **
(2.84) (2.54)
Ownership LC -0.176 -0.207
(-1.38) (-1.55)
Turnover HC 0.003 * 0.001
(1.90) (0.85)
Turnover LC -0.001 0.000
(-0.66) (-0.35)
Expense Ratio HC 0.150 *** 0.166 ***
(3.09) (3.35)
Expense Ratio LC -0.119 ** -0.099 **
(-2.44) (-1.98)
Ln No of Funds -0.068 -0.074
(-0.93) (-0.90)
Ln Family Size -0.057 * -0.070 *
(-1.70) (-1.92)
Ln Family Age 0.206 ** 0.152
(2.37) (1.29)
Cross Fund Deviation 0.451 *** 0.473 ***
(8.24) (8.38)
F Value 2.59 *** 3.77 *** 12.23 *** 7.29 ***
R Squared 0.002 0.014 0.021 0.034
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Therefore, in line with univariate results, there is evidence of cross-subsidization 
in SRI fund families. SRI fund families are more likely to favour winning SRI funds at 
the expense of losing SRI funds, supporting the cross-subsidization hypothesis H4. The 
results are robust to controlling for heteroscedasticity (see Appendix 10). Accordingly, 
the persistence in SRI fund performance, as suggested by Abdelsalam et al. (2014), is 
not only determined by fund managers’ skill but also by the favouritism shown toward 
past winners by the family. The strategy that enhances the performance of past winners 
is consistent with the mutual fund literature which suggests the motivation for families 
to benefit from the persistent performance of winning funds (Gaspar et al., 2006). In the 
concept of ESG principles, this strategy is unethical since it discriminates against the 
investors of losing funds for the future returns of investors of winning funds. 
Furthermore, despite Gaspar et al.’s (2006) findings about cross-subsidization between 
investment style funds in the family, SRI fund families disregard the investment style of 
their SRI funds in performing the cross-subsidization strategy. Pairing two funds with 
different styles is possible since fund managers can shift the style of their managed 
funds to achieve particular returns (Chan et al., 2002). 
Analyzing the coefficient on Same Family Same Style allows me to identify 
intra-style cross-subsidization in the family. Table 7.2 shows that the coefficient 
estimate on this variable is statistically insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that 
SRI fund families do not use subsidization strategy between their SRI funds with the 
same investment style. The less likelihood of cross-subsidization between the same 
style funds is suggested by the lower return gap between same style funds than the 
return gap between different style funds (see Appendix 13). 
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The remaining results for the control variables show that the return gap between 
winners and losers also varies with other fund attributes. The positive coefficient on Ln 
Age HC suggests that older winning funds have a higher return gap. Then, pairs with 
larger winners have a lower return gap than pairs with smaller winners. This is 
supported by a complicated strategy of enhancing the subsequent performance of large 
funds (Berk and Green, 2004). Conversely, pairs with larger losers have a smaller return 
gap, implying that SRI fund families prefer not to sacrifice their large losing funds to 
benefit the performance of their winning funds. Presumably, fund families prefer not to 
take actions that may adversely affect the performance of their highly visible losing 
large funds.  
The coefficient on Ownership HC is significant, suggesting that the monthly 
return gap between winners and loser is larger if managers of winners own shares in 
their managed SRI funds. This is consistent with prior studies that show a positive 
relation between manager ownership and future performance (Evans, 2008; Khorana et 
al., 2007). Accordingly, manager ownership in winning funds will boost the 
performance of those funds, thus increasing the performance gap between winners and 
losers. In economic terms, past winning SRI funds with manager ownership have an 
average of 36 basis points higher return gap between winners and losers than if the 
managers do not own shares in them. There is, however, no association between 
manager ownership of losing SRI funds and the return gap. These results therefore 
suggest that the favouritism toward winners is more likely to occur in funds where the 
managers are also the investors. 
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Results show pairs with active winning funds (represented by high turnover) 
have a higher return gap than those with lower turnover winners. The association 
between turnover of winning funds (Turnover HC) and the return gap is economically 
significant if family characteristics are included in the model, as shown in specification 
4. The insignificant coefficient on Turnover LC in specifications 2 and 4 suggests that 
the return gap is not associated with whether losing SRI funds use an active or passive 
strategy. Irrespective of whether they are winners or losers, with a higher expense ratio 
have better performance. The significant positive coefficient on Expense Ratio HC in 
specifications 2 and 3 implies that the outperformance of higher-fee winners against 
their losing SRI siblings is higher than that of pairs with the lower fee winners. The 
Expense Ratio LC is negatively associated with the return gap, meaning that losing 
funds with higher fees provide incentives for fund managers to boost the performance of 
their managed funds and to reduce the performance gap with winning funds. Consistent 
with Massa and Patgiri (2009) who find a higher expense ratio incentivize for managers 
to boost performance.  
Furthermore, the Morningstar rating of losing funds are negatively associated 
with return gap, shown by significantly negative coefficient on Morningstar Rating LC. 
I also use subsamples of the Morningstar difference between winning and losing funds. 
The result, presented in Appendix 17, shows the cross-subsidization does not exist if 
losing funds have ratings that are higher than their matched winning siblings.  
In terms of fund family characteristics, there are some interesting findings. First, 
the higher return gap is more likely to be higher in small and mature fund families. In 
Specification 3, a one percent increase in the natural logarithm of family size decreases 
 
 
132 
 
the average monthly return gap between winners and losers by 0.057 percent. Older SRI 
fund families are more likely to use cross-subsidization strategy, as shown by the 
positive coefficient on Ln Family Age. Older SRI funds families are more experienced 
in using strategies that can provide higher incentives for the family. However, when I 
pooled both fund and family attributes, family age is not statistically related to the 
performance differences between winners and losers.  
7.3.2 Cross-subsidization Between High-Fee and Low-Fee SRI Funds 
To test for cross-subsidization in SRI fund families using the fee criterion, I 
classify SRI funds with expense ratios above (below) the 75
th
 (25
th
) percentile of 
expense ratios within the family as HC (LC) SRI funds. In Table 7.3, the return gap 
between high and low-fee funds is the dependent variable. In all specifications, the 
coefficients on dummy variables Same Family and Same Family Same Style are 
statistically insignificant. There is a sense that SRI fund families do not benefit from the 
potentially higher fee incomes that are generated by high-fee funds. The gap in average 
monthly returns between high-fee and low-fee funds is indistinguishable. Thus, I find 
no evidence to support the cross-subsidization hypothesis H5 that SRI fund families 
favour their high-fee SRI funds, or that they perform a cross-subsidization between high 
and low-fee SRI funds. This finding is robust to the heteroscedasticity presented in 
Appendix 11.  
My findings contrast the existence of cross-subsidization in conventional fund 
families (Gaspar et al., 2006). The additional non-financial constraints do not only 
distinguish the asset selection used by SRI funds but also the strategy performed by 
fund families in favour of high and low-fee funds. Although there is cross-subsidization 
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between winners and losers, SRI fund families do not discriminate between high-fee 
and low-fee funds. One possible explanation for this result is that low-fee funds possess 
stronger attributes, including size and Morningstar ratings (see Table 7.1). SRI fund 
families are unlikely to sacrifice their low-fee funds; if they do, they will face a large 
number of disgruntled investors. Sacrificing the performance of low-fee funds with 
higher Morningstar ratings can also potentially downgrade their rating, leading to 
negative flows (Guercio and Tkac, 2008).  
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Table 7.3  
Regressions of cross-subsidization between high-fee and low-fee SRI funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap defined as the difference in the monthly returns of high-fee and low-fee SRI 
funds. Same Family equals one if high-fee fund and low-fee funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. 
Same Family Same Style equals one if high-fee and low-fee funds are from the same fund family, and in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if high-fee and low-fee funds are in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the high-fee (low-fee) fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the total net asset 
value (TNAV) of high-fee (low-fee) funds. Morningstar Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of high-fee (low-
fee) funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold divided by TNAV of high-
fee (low-fee) funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers own shares in the high-fee (low-fee) fund they 
manage, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating 
expenses to TNAV of high-fee (low-fee) funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of TNAV of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln 
Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-
Fund Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the 
family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Constant 0.002 0.150 -0.393 -0.132
(0.04) (0.31) (-1.17) (-0.25)
Same Family 0.008 -0.062 0.008 -0.074
(0.13) (-0.99) (0.13) (-1.17)
Same Family Same Style -0.022 0.084 -0.023 0.096
(-0.23) (0.85) (-0.24) (0.97)
Same Style 0.063 0.014 0.071 0.002
(0.93) (0.20) (1.04) (0.03)
Ln Age HC 0.129 *** 0.142 ***
(4.39) (4.52)
Ln Age LC 0.048 0.049
(1.52) (1.54)
Ln Size HC -0.068 *** -0.078 ***
(-3.58) (-3.93)
Ln Size LC 0.033 * 0.029
(1.78) (1.56)
Morningstar Rating HC -0.007 -0.006
(-0.40) (-0.35)
Morningstar Rating LC -0.049 ** -0.050 **
(-2.49) (-2.53)
1 2 3 4
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Table 7.3 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
  
Ownership HC 0.022 0.032
(0.39) (0.54)
Ownership LC -0.058 -0.053
(-1.11) (-0.99)
Turnover HC -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(-3.57) (-3.49)
Turnover LC -0.000 -0.000
(-0.86) (-0.95)
Expense Ratio HC -0.018 -0.020
(-0.92) (-1.05)
Expense Ratio LC 0.031 0.0330
(0.78) (0.82)
Ln No of Funds -0.026 -0.023
(-0.83) (-0.68)
Ln Family Size 0.010 0.038
(0.54) (1.94) *
Ln Family Age 0.044 -0.047
(0.98) (-0.95)
Cross Fund Deviation 0.013 0.009
(0.49) (0.33)
F Value 0.48 3.93 *** 0.49 3.31 ***
R Squared 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006
1 2 3 4
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I also control for fund characteristics that potentially increase or decrease the 
performance differences between high-fee and low-fee SRI funds. In specification 2, the 
performance gap between the high-fee and low-fee funds widens when a high-fee fund’s 
age is higher. The age and size of low-fee SRI funds widen the performance gap 
between the high-fee and low-fee funds if those two attributes increase.  
Some fund characteristics are negatively related to the expected return gap. 
These characteristics include the size of high-fee funds, the turnover of high-fee funds, 
and the rating low-fee funds. The performance of bigger high-fee funds is not as 
pronounced as that of their low-fee pairs. A higher turnover of high-fee funds also 
reduces the return gap, as shown by the negative coefficient on Turnover HC in 
specification 2. I expect the performance gap to decrease when low-fee funds have 
better Morningstar ratings. A fund family may be less likely to sacrifice the 
performance of their higher-MS rating funds, despite the lower fee contribution of these 
funds. The consequences of a decrease in the Morningstar rating might be more severe 
than the benefits earned from good performance of high-fee funds because a rating 
downgrade economically causes a substantial outflow from the fund itself (Guercio and 
Tkac, 2008; Nanda et al., 2004). 
Ln No of Funds and Ln family Age are negatively related to the monthly return 
gap. Therefore, the difference in monthly gross returns of high-fee and low-fee funds 
from big and old families is less than that of funds from small and young fund families. 
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7.3.3 Cross-subsidization Between Young and Mature SRI Funds 
I also run a regression based on Equation 11 to investigate the existence of 
cross-subsidization in SRI fund families using the life-cycle criterion. To recap, young 
SRI funds are funds below the age of six years, and mature funds are six years of age or 
older. Young SRI funds have a higher expected contribution to the family through their 
higher flow-performance relationship, and are thus classified as HC funds. Mature funds 
are classified as LC funds. The dependent variable is the monthly return gap between 
young and mature SRI funds.  
Specification 1 of Table 7.4 shows that without controlling for fund and family 
characteristics, Same Family, Same Family Same Style, and Same Style are insignificant. 
There is thus an insignificant difference in the monthly returns of young SRI funds and 
their mature siblings.  
Controlling for other variables, only Same Style has a significantly negative 
coefficient (specifications 2 and 4). Therefore, the monthly returns of mature SRI funds 
are, on average, higher than those of young SRI funds with the same investment style. 
Regardless of whether young and mature SRI funds are from the same family, the latter, 
on average, outperform the former. These results are in line with the results in Table 
7.1, where the average return gap for both family and non-family pairs are negative,        
-0.013 and -0.086 percent respectively.  
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Table 7.4   
Regressions of cross-subsidization between young and mature SRI funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs. This is defined as the 
difference in the monthly returns of young and mature SRI funds. Same Family equals one if young fund 
and mature funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals one 
if young and mature funds are from the same fund family, and in the same investment style, and zero 
otherwise. Same Style takes value one if young and mature funds are in the same investment style, and 
zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the 
inception date of the young (mature) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of total managed assets of young (mature) SRI funds. MORNINGSTAR Rating HC (LC) is the 
Morningstar rating of young (mature) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets 
purchased and assets sold divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of young (mature) SRI funds. 
Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers of young (mature) SRI funds own shares in their 
managed fund, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus 
fund operating expenses to TNAV of young (mature) SRI funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm 
of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets values of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of 
calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-Funds Deviation is the average deviation of 
the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Constant -0.046 -0.057 0.342 0.112
(-1.07) (-0.10) (0.74) (0.16)
Same Family 0.069 0.040 0.069 0.039
(1.13) (0.66) (1.13) (0.64)
Same Family Same Style 0.012 -0.011 0.012 -0.014
(0.11) (-0.10) (0.11) (-0.13)
Same Style -0.126 -0.190 ** -0.112 -0.220 ***
(-1.64) (-2.31) (-1.44) (-2.64)
Ln Age HC -0.151 ** -0.092
(-2.30) (-1.30)
Ln Age LC -0.199 *** -0.230 ***
(-4.02) (-4.20)
Ln Size HC -0.025 -0.016
(-0.91) (-0.58)
Ln Size LC 0.108 *** 0.118 ***
(5.09) (5.53)
Morningstar HC 0.138 *** 0.143 ***
(6.43) (6.50)
Morningstar LC -0.114 *** -0.124 ***
(-4.46) (-4.83)
1 2 3 4
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Table 7.4 – Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ownership HC 0.187 *** -0.013
(3.01) (-0.15)
Ownership LC 0.017 0.030
(0.30) (0.52)
Turnover HC -0.001 *** -0.002 ***
(-4.03) (-5.15)
Turnover LC 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(3.14) (3.33)
Expense Ratio HC -0.002 0.002
(-0.06) (0.05)
Expense Ratio LC -0.012 -0.011
(-1.10) (-0.96)
Ln No of Funds -0.118 *** -0.080
(-3.02) (-1.47)
Ln Family Size -0.009 -0.047 **
(-0.42) (-2.00)
Ln Family Age 0.046 0.167 **
(0.67) (2.12)
Cross Fund Deviation -0.062 ** -0.125 ***
(-2.15) (-4.16)
F Value 2.33 * 9.32 *** 5.67 *** 8.99 ***
R Squared 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.016
1 2 3 4
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Therefore, my findings show no evidence to support the cross-subsidization 
hypothesis using the life-cycle criterion, robust to controlling for heteroscedasticity 
reported in Appendix 12. SRI fund families do not appear to coordinate their fund 
managers to subsidize the performance of their young SRI funds, despite these funds 
being more promising in attracting higher flows than mature funds (Bollen, 2007). This 
result is not in line with the cross-subsidization hypothesis H6 which expects the 
existence of cross-subsidization between young SRI and mature SRI funds.  I argue that 
the non-financial constraints used by SRI fund families are more likely to prevent them 
from performing a cross-subsidization strategy between their young and mature SRI 
funds. Similar to the fee criterion, a ‘too big to fail’ rationale may cause SRI funds 
family to avoid the performance enhancement of young funds at the expense of mature 
SRI funds since the mature SRI funds’ are, on average, more than twice as large as the 
young SRI funds. 
At the control variables, I find the number of SRI funds in the family (Ln No of 
SRI Funds), the age of SRI funds (Ln Age HC/ LC), the turnover of young funds 
(Turnover HC), and the Morningstar rating of mature funds (Morningstar Rating LC) 
are negatively related to the performance gap between young and mature SRI funds. 
SRI fund families with a larger number of managed SRI funds are less likely to cross-
subsidise between their young and mature funds. The turnover of young funds also 
reduces the gap, as shown by the negative coefficient on Turnover HC.  Mature funds 
with a higher Morningstar rating are less likely to be coordinated by their fund families 
to subsidize the performance of their young siblings due to the adverse consequence to 
the whole family if their mature funds’ ratings are downgraded (Guercio and Tkac, 
2008).   
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Conversely, some control variables widen the performance gap between young 
and mature SRI funds. The positive coefficient on Morningstar Rating HC suggests that 
fund families are more likely to favour young funds that have higher ratings. The 
positive coefficient on Ownership HC suggests that cross-subsidization is more likely to 
occur in young SRI funds whose managers also own shares in them. Ln Size LC is 
positively related to the return gap of young and mature SRI funds. In line with mutual 
fund literature, large funds are less able to increase their future performance, resulting in 
a higher return gap between young and mature funds.23 
7.3.4 The Role of Managerial Ownership in Low Contribution Funds in Cross-
Subsidization Strategy 
Information asymmetry between fund managers with superior information about 
their managed funds and investors with limited information about the funds they hold 
can lead to agency conflict. Similar to corporate governance, mutual fund manager 
ownership can also reduce the agency conflicts between managers and investors (Evans, 
2008). Khorana et al. (2007) find manager ownership can make a positive contribution 
to fund performance. Accordingly, fund manager ownership can potentially affect the 
success of strategies based on a family that coordinates between two or more funds for 
one family objective.   
According to the cross-subsidization literature, LC funds are in an unfavourable 
position when a fund family performs the cross-subsidization strategy. However, the 
literature does not investigate whether managers of LC funds will fully follow the cross-
subsidization strategy if they own shares in the LC fund. As employers of a fund family, 
                                                     
23 Chen et al. (2004) provide the evidence that before and after fees performance are negatively related to 
lagged fund size.  
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managers have a responsibility to support their employer’s (the fund family) strategy 
including a strategy that subsidizes the performance of HC funds by sacrificing the 
future returns of LC funds. I argue that fund managers who own investments in the LC 
fund that they manage are less likely to comply with the cross-subsidization strategy.  
In Table 7.5, I report results from regressions on subsamples of funds with and 
without manager ownership. Losers with managerial ownership (Ownership>0) do not 
subsidize the future performance of their winning peers, as shown by the insignificant 
coefficients on Same Family and Same Family Same Style. These findings suggest that 
the monthly gross return of losers with managerial ownership is not statistically 
different from that of those peer winning SRI funds within the family. However, Same 
Family has a significant positive coefficient in SRI fund without manager ownership, 
suggesting the existence of cross-subsidization between winners and losers. I conclude 
that cross-subsidization between winning and losing SRI funds only happens if fund 
managers do not own shares in the losing funds. 
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Table 7.5  
Cross-subsidization and manager ownership 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, defined as the difference in monthly returns of high contribution (HC) and low 
contribution (LC) SRI funds. Same Family equals one if the HC SRI fund and its LC SRI pair are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. Same Family Same 
Style equals one if the HC SRI fund and its LC SRI pair are from the same fund family and in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value 
one if HC SRI fund and its LC SRI pair are in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Fund and family characteristics are controlled for. Ln Age HC (LC) is the 
natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the HC (LC) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
total managed assets of HC (LC) SRI funds. Morningstar Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of HC (LC) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new 
assets purchased and assets sold divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of HC (LC) SRI funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers of HC (LC) SRI 
funds own shares in their managed fund, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses to TNAV 
of HC (LC) SRI funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets values of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-
Funds Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent: 
Monthly Return Gap 
Constant 8.658 -0.397 -1.254 -0.269 -1.748 1.784 *
(2.52) (-0.27) (-1.54) (-0.34) (-1.47) (1.77)
Same Family 0.064 0.342 *** -0.195 * -0.075 0.107 0.005
(0.21) (3.11) (-1.80) (-0.88) (1.10) (0.05)
Same Family Same Style 0.208 -0.019 0.212 0.009 -0.322 * 0.185
(0.22) (-0.06) (1.36) (0.07) (-1.90) (1.19)
Same Style 0.169 -0.239 0.005 -0.011 -0.101 -0.352 ***
(0.41) (-1.04) (0.06) (-0.11) (-0.85) (-2.86)
Control
Fund Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Family Characteristic yes yes yes yes yes yes
F Value 2.09 *** 8.34 *** 2.46 *** 3.37 *** 5.30 *** 6.24 ***
R Squared 0.055 0.043 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.017
Panel C: AgePanel B: FeesPanel A: Performance
Ownership>0 Ownership=0Ownership>0 Ownership=0Ownership>0 Ownership=0
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A similar finding is reported in Panel B for the performance gap between high 
and low-fee SRI funds. The coefficient on Same Family is negative (-0.195) and 
significant at the 10 percent level. This suggests that the monthly return gap between 
high-fee and low-fee SRI funds which are owned by their fund managers is 0.195 lower 
than that of matched non-family pairs. The results indicate a reverse-subsidization 
strategy whereby high-fee funds subsidize the performance of their low-fee counterparts 
with manager ownership. For the sub-sample of low-fee funds without manager 
ownership, Same Family and Same Family Same Style are statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, fund manager ownership in low-fee funds can reduce and even avoid cross-
subsidization strategies between high and low-fee funds. The low-fee SRI funds which 
are owned by their fund managers can even outperform their high-fee counterparts. 
Panel C presents the role of manager ownership in mature SRI funds in the 
cross-subsidization strategy. Same Family Same Style has a significant negative 
coefficient for the subsample of funds with manager ownership (Ownership>0). This 
suggests that mature funds with manager ownership outperform their young SRI 
siblings in the same investment style. The monthly return gap between young SRI funds 
and their mature SRI counterparts with manager ownership is on average 0.322 lower 
than that between young and matched SRI funds. Without manager ownership, mature 
SRI funds underperform their peer young SRI funds within the family, as shown by the 
positive coefficient on Same Family Same Style. The difference is, however, 
insignificant. 
My findings suggest the importance of manager ownership in eliminating the 
discriminated strategy in SRI fund families. I confirm that agency conflicts in mutual 
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funds can be mitigated by allowing fund managers to own investments in their managed 
SRI funds. The unethical strategy in the SRI fund industry can be minimized by 
mandating good governance in managing funds since the ESG principles alone are not 
sufficient to prevent the discriminated strategy. This finding supports hypotheses H4A, 
H5A and H6A which hypothesize the lower probability of LC SRI funds with manager 
ownership to subsidize the performance of their HC SRI siblings than that of LC SRI 
funds without manager ownership.  
I subsequently analyze whether the manager ownership level on LC SRI funds 
matters in cross-subsidization strategy.24 The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 7.6. I partition manager ownership in LC SRI funds into three tiers: <$100,001; 
$100,001-$500,000; and >$500,000. The base case is >$500,000 ownership level. 
Results show that higher manager ownership in losing SRI funds is associated with a 
lower return gap between winning and losing SRI funds. Those losing funds even 
outperform their paired winning funds, as shown by the negative coefficients on 
Ownership $100,001-$500,000. Specifically, the coefficient in specification 2 (-0.459) 
is significantly negative at the 10 percent level. The average return gap between winners 
and losers, where losing fund managers’ ownership stake is within the $100,001-
$500,000 range in losing SRI funds, is 0.459 lower than that with >$500,000 manager 
ownership in losers. The higher ownership also generates negative returns for fee 
criterion, but coefficients on Ownership $100,001-$500,000 are statistically 
insignificant. In terms of age criterion, I find that there are no significant coefficients on 
that Ownership<$100,001 and Ownership $100,001-$500,000.  
                                                     
24The  Morningstar Direct places the manager ownership level into seven categories: (1) None; (2) $1-
10,000; (3)$10,001-$50,000; (4) $50,001-$100,000; (5) $100,001-$500,000; (6) $500,001-$1,000,000; 
(7)Above $1,000,000. 
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In summary, the ownership level only matters for performance criterion where the 
possibility of cross-subsidization between winners and losers is lower if managers of 
losers own more than $100,000 shared in their managed funds. Those losing SRI funds 
seem to be excluded in subsidizing the performance of their winning siblings. This is 
consistent with the agency theory where lower agency problem in mutual funds implies 
good future performance.  
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Table 7.6  
Cross-subsidization and tiers of manager ownership 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, defined as the difference in 
monthly returns of high contribution (HC) and low contribution (LC) SRI funds. Ownership<$100,001 
equals 1 if the manager ownership on LC SRI fund is below $100,001, and zero otherwise. Ownership 
$100,001 - $500,000 equals 1 if the manager ownership on LC SRI fund is between $100,001 - $500,000, 
and zero otherwise. Same Family equals one if HC fund and its LC pair are from the same fund family, 
and zero otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals one if the HC fund and its LC pair are from the same 
fund family and in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if the HC 
fund and its LC pair are in the same investment style, and zero otherwise.  *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.293 *** -0.115 0.035 -0.101 -0.052 * 0.082
(6.07) (-0.09) (1.29) (-0.19) (-1.79) (0.11)
Ownership<$100,001 -0.111 0.042 -0.0055 0.053 -0.026 -0.023
(-0.74) (0.26) (-0.06) (0.59) (-0.31) (-0.27)
Ownership $100,001 - 
$500,000 -0.285 -0.459 ** -0.045 -0.053 0.037 0.086
(-1.47) (-2.15) (-0.77) (-0.84) (0.52) (1.19)
Same Family 0.290 ** -0.072 0.048
(2.96) (-1.13) (0.74)
Same Family Same Style -0.002 0.096 -0.015
(-0.01) (0.97) (-0.14)
Same Style -0.268 0.002 -0.224 **
(-1.40) (0.03) (-2.69)
Control
Fund Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Family Characteristic No Yes No Yes No Yes
F Value 1.269 7.054 0.300 3.111 0.214 8.610
R Squared 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.016
Panel A: Performance Panel B: Fees Panel C: Age
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7.3.5 Screening and Cross-subsidization 
In this section, I investigate whether cross-subsidization is different across 
heterogeneous screening types used by SRI funds. This is important because the 
screenings that have been used affect the investment opportunity set and thus the 
performance of SRI funds (Renneboog et al., 2008). SRI funds that use all of the ESG 
principles have a smaller opportunity set than those which use sub-ESG principles. A 
fund family is more likely to perform the subsidization strategy for SRI funds with a 
larger opportunity set. This is because these funds have more asset choices which 
facilitate fund families’ influence on the portfolio of their funds.     
Table 7.7 reports the results on how screening types affect cross-subsidization, 
where the return gap between family and non-family pairs is the dependent variable. I 
construct the dummy variable Same Family-Ethical/Social/Environment/ESG, which 
equals one if the HC and LC SRI funds are from the same fund family and constrained 
by ethical/social/ environment/ESG screenings, and zero otherwise. Same Family Same 
Style-Ethical/Social/Environment/ESG equals one if the HC and LC funds are from the 
same fund family, have the same investment style, and are constrained by ethical/social/ 
environment/ ESG screening, and zero otherwise. Same Style-
Ethical/Social/Environment/ESG equals one if the HC and LC funds have the same 
investment style and are constrained by ethical social/ environment/ESG screenings, 
and zero otherwise. 
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Table 7.7   
Cross-subsidization and screening type of SRI funds 
The dependent variable is the monthly return gap between high contribution (HC) and low contribution (LC) SRI 
funds. Same Family-Ethical/Social/Environment/ESG equals one if an HC SRI fund is from the same fund family and 
in the same ethical/ social/ environment/ ESG screening with its LC SRI fund pair, and zero otherwise. Same Family 
Same Style-Ethical/ Social/ Environment/ ESG equals one if an HC SRI fund is from the same fund family, using the 
same ethical/ social/environment/ESG screening and in the same investment style with its LC SRI fund pair, and zero  
otherwise. Same Style-Ethical Ethical/Social/ Environment/ ESG equals one if an HC SRI fund is from the different 
fund family and using the same ethical/social/ environment/ ESG screening with its LC SRI fund pair, and zero 
otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
  
Dependent: 
Monthly Return Gap 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.167 0.403 -0.018 -0.211 -0.045 0.113
(2.47) (0.30) (-0.43) (-0.37) (-1.05) (0.14)
Same Family-Ethical 0.427 ** 0.555 *** -0.150 * -0.182 * 0.288 *** 0.031
(2.36) (2.81) (-1.68) (-1.90) (3.01) (0.28)
Same Family Same Style-Ethical -0.617 -0.598 0.056 0.200 -0.259 -0.009
(-1.22) (-1.14) (0.31) (1.06) (-1.38) (-0.05)
Same Style-Ethical 0.089 0.209 0.164 0.116 -0.111 -0.368 ***
(0.26) (0.58) (1.38) (0.92) (-0.91) (-2.80)
Same Family-Social -0.056 -0.034 0.054 -0.081 -0.252 -0.212
(-0.30) (-0.15) (0.46) (-0.63) (-1.36) (-1.07)
Same Family Same Style-Social -0.460 0.084 -0.022 0.135 0.519 0.270
(-0.39) (0.07) (-0.06) (0.38) (1.11) (0.57)
Same Style-Social -0.276 -0.014 -0.170 -0.185 0.012 -0.042
(-0.34) (-0.02) (-0.74) (-0.76) (0.04) (-0.13)
Same Family-Environment 0.087 -0.136 0.035 0.360
(0.22) (-0.34) (0.06) (0.59)
Same Family Same Style-Environment -0.028 0.201
(-0.06) (0.41)
Same Style-Environment 0.178 0.212 -0.149 -0.519
(0.90) (0.99) (-0.35) (-1.15)
Same Family-ESG 0.258 ** 0.256 ** 0.105 -0.004 0.014 0.060
(2.44) (2.33) (1.52) (-0.06) (0.20) (0.86)
Same Family Same Style-ESG 0.000 0.068 -0.085 0.022 0.090 -0.044
(0.00) (0.22) (-0.74) (0.18) (0.68) (-0.32)
Same Style-ESG -0.137 -0.385 * 0.045 -0.026 -0.151 * -0.150
(-0.63) (-1.71) (0.59) (-0.32) (-1.66) (-1.51)
Control
Fund Characteristic No Yes No Yes No Yes
Family Characteristic No Yes No Yes No Yes
F Value 1.52 5.80 *** 1.05 2.57 1.79 * 6.59 ***
R Squared 0.003 0.035 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.017
Panel C. AgePanel A. Performance Panel B. Fees
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Panel A shows that ethical funds are more likely to be the subject of the cross-
subsidization strategy. I find evidence of cross-subsidization between winning funds 
and losing ethical funds. There is evidence of favouritism towards ESG winners, as 
captured by the positive and significant coefficient on Same Family-ESG.  
In Panel B, I find evidence of cross-fund strategy amongst the ethically-
constrained funds. There is a reverse cross-subsidization strategy toward low-fee ethical 
and high-fee ethical funds. With and without controlling for fund and family 
characteristics, I find high-fee ethical funds support the performance of low-fee ethical 
funds, but no evidence of cross-subsidization between high-fee and low-fee 
social/environment/ESG funds.  
Panel C shows that despite no evidence to support cross-subsidization using the 
age criterion, there is a positive and significant coefficient on Same Family-ethical. 
Therefore, there appears to be some performance subsidization between young and 
mature SRI funds which use ethical screening. The coefficient is, however, not 
statistically significant when I control for fund and family characteristics.  
In summary, the cross-subsidization strategy is performed mainly for SRI funds 
with larger higher investment sets, in line with hypothesis H7. I argue that ethically-
constrained funds have greater opportunity and ability to support fund families’ strategy 
in enhancing the performance of their HC funds because these funds have a higher 
number of acceptable assets. These funds only exclude assets that do not meet particular 
ethical criteria, for example, companies that are responsible for alcohol and gambling. 
Their opportunity set is larger than other SRI funds which consider social, 
environmental issues, labour relationship, and governance. 
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7.3.6 Time-varying Cross-subsidization  
I consider the time-varying cross-subsidization strategy in SRI fund families, 
since the literature detects the time-varying performance of mutual funds. Fund 
managers tend to enhance the performance of their managed fund before the annual 
disclosure dates (Agarwal et al., 2014; Morey and O’Neal, 2006). If SRI fund families 
allow their fund managers to boost the performance before the announcement of 
financial reports of funds, they may prefer to boost the performance of their HC SRI 
funds. This performance boost aims to benefit from the higher flows to HC funds. 
Accordingly, the cross-subsidization is more likely to occur during that dressing period. 
According to Table 7.8, the results are mixed for the fee and performance 
criteria. Using the fee criterion (Panel B), the coefficients on Same Family in the first 
and third quarter are significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent level respectively. The 
coefficients are -0.209 and -0.253 respectively, suggesting that high-fee SRI funds tend 
to underperform their low-fee siblings during those quarters where a reversed cross-
subsidization strategy is in place. For the same investment style funds, meanwhile, there 
is a cross-subsidization strategy during the first quarters, suggesting a time-varying 
cross-subsidization strategy for fee criterion. Time-varying cross-subsidization strategy 
is also reported in relation to the performance criterion (Panel A). SRI fund families are 
more likely to coordinate their losing SRI funds to support the performance of their 
winning funds in the first and third quarter of a year. This time-varying pattern may aim 
to make their discriminated action unobservable. 
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Table 7.8  
Time-varying cross-subsidization  
I split the sample into four sub-samples: first, second, third and fourth quarter. The dependent variable is monthly the return gap between high contribution (HC) 
and low contribution (LC) SRI funds. For each sub-sampling, I run Equation 11 with the three main dummy variables: Same Family, Same Family Same Style, and 
Same Style. The Same Family equals one if an HC SRI fund is from the same fund family as its LC SRI fund pair, and zero if otherwise. The Same Family Same 
Style equals one if an HC SRI fund is from the same fund family and in the same investment style with its LC SRI fund pair, and zero if otherwise. The Same Style 
equals one if an HC SRI fund is in the same investment style with its LC SRI pair, and zero if otherwise. I use Age, Size, Morningstar Rating, Turnover, 
Ownership and Expense Ratio to control the fund characteristics. I also control the family characteristic that consists of No of Funds, Family Size, Family Age, and 
Cross-Funds Deviation. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
 
Constant 10.054 *** -5.840 ** -2.112 0.325 0.894 * 5.401 *** -0.827 0.809 -3.235 *** 5.401 *** 2.272 -2.908 *
(4.62) (-2.15) (-1.00) (0.13) (0.94) (3.46) (-0.78) (0.69) (-2.67) (3.46) (1.46) (-1.81)
Same Family 0.327 * 0.321 0.383 ** 0.135 -0.209 * 0.098 -0.253 ** -0.021 0.021 -0.108 0.070 0.182
(1.90) (1.49) (2.30) (0.69) (-1.78) (0.78) (-2.07) (-0.15) (0.19) (-0.85) (0.57) (1.49)
Same Family Same Style -0.211 -0.125 0.055 0.278 0.312 *** 0.135 -0.097 0.104 -0.074 -0.051 0.203 -0.111
(-0.46) (-0.22) (0.12) (0.53) (1.71) (0.66) (-0.51) (0.49) (-0.41) (-0.21) (0.88) (-0.49)
Same Style 0.233 -0.543 -0.295 -0.367 -0.361 0.061 0.126 0.119 -0.553 *** -0.177 -0.011 -0.054
(0.69) (-1.29) (-0.90) (-0.95) (-2.79) (0.43) (0.93) (0.78) (-4.04) (-0.96) (-0.06) (-0.31)
Control
Fund Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Family Characteristic yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
F Value 5.42 *** 5.84 *** 5.97 *** 6.02 *** 5.40 *** 2.16 ** 7.82 *** 1.85 ** 8.40 *** 6.04 *** 8.51 *** 6.24 ***
R Squared 0.090 0.097 0.098 0.099 0.038 0.015 0.055 0.014 0.050 0.042 0.058 0.017
Panel A: Performance
Q1 Q3 Q4
Panel C: Age
Q1 Q4Q2 Q2 Q3
Panel B: Fees
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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Meanwhile, using the age criterion, the results suggest that there is no statistical 
evidence to support the time-varying cross-subsidization strategy. The coefficient 
estimates on Same Family and Same Family Same Style (shown in Panel C) are not 
statistically significant for all quarters. SRI fund families do not attempt to boost the 
performance of their young funds before the end of the year. 
7.4 Robustness Tests 
I assume that the cross-subsidization strategy can be easily identified when the 
cross-section of monthly gross returns of HC SRI funds is higher than those of LC SRI 
funds. In Table 7.9, I estimate a logit regression that estimates whether HC SRI funds, 
on average, outperform LC SRI funds. The dependent variable is Positive Return Gap, 
which equals one if the monthly gross returns of HC SRI funds is higher than those of 
LC SRI funds, and zero if otherwise.  
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Table 7.9  
Logit regressions of cross-subsidization between HC and LC SRI funds  
The dependent variable equals one if the monthly return of HC funds is higher than that of LC funds, and zero if otherwise. Same Family equals one if the pair of 
HC and LC SRI funds is from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals one if the pair of HC and LC SRI funds is from the same 
fund family and in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style equals one if the pair of HC and LC SRI funds have the same investment style, and 
zero otherwise. I use Age, Size, Morningstar Rating, Turnover, Ownership and Expense Ratio to control the fund characteristics. I also control the family 
characteristic that consists of No of Funds, Family Size, Family Age, and Cross-Funds Deviation. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.712 *** 0.802 *** 0.480 *** 0.480 *** 0.187 0.344
(3.32) (4.32) (4.13) (4.59) (1.34) (3.10)
Same Family 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.021 * 0.020 *
(0.03) (0.00) (-0.30) (-0.20) (1.73) (1.71)
Same Family Same Style 0.078 * 0.078 * -0.003 -0.005 -0.027 -0.027
(1.70) (1.70) (-0.15) (-0.24) (-1.28) (-1.25)
Same Style -0.070 * -0.067 ** -0.001 0.004 -0.032 ** -0.033 **
(-2.09) (-2.01) (-0.04) (0.24) (-1.98) (-2.06)
Control
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristic Yes No Yes No Yes No
F Value 5.45 *** 6.01 *** 2.03 *** 2.17 *** 3.72 *** 4.09 ***
R Squared 0.0252 0.022 0.004 0.003 0.0068 0.0059
Panel B. Fees Panel C. AgePanel A. Performance
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Specifications 5 and 6 show results of cross-subsidization using the age 
criterion. I find evidence of cross-subsidization between young and mature SRI funds. 
The positive coefficient (0.021) on Same Family suggests that young funds outperform 
their mature siblings. However, there is no evidence to support the cross-subsidization 
hypothesis for high-fee and low-fee funds. By controlling fund and family 
characteristics, Same Family and Same Family Same Style are statistically insignificant. 
In terms of the performance criterion, the existence cross-subsidization amongst 
winners and loser is robust, as shown in this logit regression. Specification 1 shows a 
positive coefficient on Same Family Same Style, which is significant at the 10 percent 
level. Similar results are presented in specification 2, suggesting that the monthly 
returns of winners are higher than those of losing siblings with the same investment 
style.  
7.5 Dynamic Model in Predicting Future Return Gap 
My previous regression estimates (full sample and sub-sampling) consistently 
suggest the existence of a cross-subsidization strategy between winning and losing SRI 
funds. The evidence is consistent with the literature on delegated asset management that 
winning funds tend to receive the special treatment from their fund family. 
Subsequently, I conduct a dynamic analysis to investigate whether the past monthly 
return gap can predict the future return gap. If the future return gap of winners and 
losers can be explained by historical return gaps, investors could be able to earn 
abnormal returns by holding the current SRI winners. Conversely, if the future return 
gap is not associated with its past records, SRI fund families may review their cross-
subsidization strategy to avoid the lower performance persistence on losing funds. 
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Table 7.10  
Dynamic modelling: The association between past return gap and current return gap of winning and losing SRI funds 
The dependent variable is the current monthly return gap (RG) between winning and losing SRI funds. The RG-1, RG-1, RG-2, and RG-3 represent the monthly 
return gap between winning and losing funds during the months t-1, t-2 and t-3 respectively. I use Age, Size, Morningstar Rating, Turnover, Ownership and 
Expense Ratio to control fund characteristics. I use Age, Size, Morningstar Rating, Turnover, Ownership and Expense Ratio to control the fund characteristics. I 
also control the family characteristic that consists of No of Funds, Family Size, Family Age, and Cross-Funds Deviation. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent: Current Return Gap 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.252 *** -1.435 0.231 *** -1.514 0.226 *** -1.515
(4.45) (-0.93) (4.06) (-0.99) (3.96) (-0.99)
RG-1 0.069 *** 0.063 *** 0.062 *** 0.056 *** 0.061 *** 0.055 ***
(3.62) (3.33) (3.28) (2.98) (3.18) (2.89)
RG-2 0.065 *** 0.070 *** 0.064 *** 0.070 ***
(3.29) (3.60) (3.24) (3.56)
RG-3 0.018 0.017
(0.88) (0.84)
Fund Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Family Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
F Value 13.07 *** 8.11 *** 11.98 *** 8.41 *** 8.24 *** 8.01 ***
R Squared 0.005 0.049 0.009 0.054 0.008 0.054
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I determine the winning and losing SRI funds at month-3. Table 7.10 suggests 
that there is a positive association between the current and past monthly return gap 
between winners and losers. This is shown by positive coefficients on the RG-1 in all 
specifications (before and after controlling for fund and family characteristics). Similar 
results are also presented by coefficients on the RG-2, suggesting a persistent return gap 
of past two-month data. The past three-month return gap, meanwhile, cannot explain the 
current monthly return gap. SRI funds investors can benefit from the short-run 
momentum by holding winners and selling losers. The momentum, however, seems to 
be lower over the next three months, suggesting that the current return gap fails to 
predict the long-run return gap. The results also suggest that SRI fund families seem to 
avoid the long-term persistence of the monthly return gap due to the fact that there will 
be a substantial outflow from LC funds with long-term persistence in low performance. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
Unlike Gaspar et al. (2006) who find a cross-subsidization in mutual fund 
families between higher contribution (winning and high-fee) funds and lower 
contribution (losing and low fee) funds, I find an evidence of cross-subsidization only 
between winning and losing SRI funds. I find that there is no evidence to support the 
cross-subsidization hypotheses for fees and age criterion. The return gap between 
winners and losers tend to be persistent for a short time period. Therefore, SRI fund 
families appear to be more ethical in their investment strategies because they do not 
seem to sacrifice the performance of their low-fee and mature SRI funds for the 
performance their high-fee and young SRI funds respectively. The results are consistent 
with the controlling for heteroscedasticity, presented in Appendices 9, 10, and 11. The 
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integration of ESG principles is driven in part by SRI fund families having to satisfy 
both the financial and non-financial objectives of their investors (Kempf and Osthoff, 
2007). I argue that, motivated by ESG principles, SRI fund families focus on corporate 
social responsibility to ensure that their policies do not discriminate against any of their 
investors.  
I also find that manager ownership plays a positive role in reducing 
discriminated strategies such as cross-subsidization strategy. LC SRI funds with 
manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the performance of their HC funds. 
When the managers of LC funds “eat their own cooking”, the performance of their 
managed funds appears not to differ from HC funds. Higher manager ownership level in 
LC SRI funds appear to reduce the return gap between HC and LC funds, especially for 
losing SRI funds.  
The results suggest that there is a relationship between screening and the cross-
subsidization strategy. Ethical constrained funds seem to be more likely than other 
screening types to be part of the cross-subsidization strategy.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion and Future Research 
 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis investigates the role played by SRI fund families and its impact on 
SRI funds through examinations of (i) spillovers in the flow of SRI funds in families 
with a stellar (poor) performing fund, and (ii) cross-subsidization strategy. Since SRI 
investors are less sensitive to financial performance, they provide an ideal avenue for us 
to further my understanding of these investors’ behaviour in response to fund families’ 
attributes. For examples, the evidence of spillover effect suggests that ESG-constrained 
investors are not different from conventional investors in making investment decisions.      
 By employing a sample of 782 SRI mutual funds in the United States from 2000 
to 2012, the results show that the presence of star performers in SRI fund families can 
attract higher flows (an additional 0.696 percent of monthly cash flow growth) to other 
SRI funds in the same family. There is strong support for a spillover effect in SRI 
families that own outstanding performing SRI funds. The result is robust to the use of 
Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) alpha and Morningstar ratings to proxy the past 
performance of SRI funds. SRI funds with an outstanding FFC alpha or a five-star 
rating attract a substantial flow into peer SRI funds in the family. However, bad SRI 
funds do not negatively affect the cash flow of other SRI funds in the family. Although 
they potentially signal negative information about SRI fund families, SRI investors do 
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not appear to be sensitive to this information. The social objectives and higher 
switching costs are the reasons why SRI investors do not withdraw their investments 
from bad families. Overall, I find evidence to support my first hypothesis that the 
spillover effect exists in SRI fund families. This evidence is consistent with the 
preference hypothesis from Bollen (2007). According to this hypothesis, SRI investors 
are more (less) sensitive to positive (negative) information than conventional investors.   
This study analyses the role of affiliated star (poor) conventional funds in the 
cash flows of their SRI counterpart funds. In contrast to my hypothesis, I find that the 
existence of star (poor) conventional funds has an insignificant effect on the cash flow 
growth of their peer SRI funds within the family. This, in turn, suggests that SRI 
investors only absorb information about the achievement of fund families from their 
SRI funds' performance, instead of the success of families in creating star conventional 
funds. The implication of this result is that spreading the information about the 
existence of star conventional funds in the family is not absorbed by SRI investors to 
ascertain the reputation of fund family in managing SRI funds. In practice, for example, 
SRI investors are unable to ascertain the skill of SRI fund managers in Vanguard fund 
family using the information about the success of Jeffrey S. Van Harte and his team in 
managing Vanguard U.S Growth Portfolio (a conventional fund).  
My subsequent analysis compares the spillover effect in the SRI fund families 
and their matched conventional fund families. I find that star SRI and conventional 
funds can have positive spillover effects on the cash flows growth of their peer SRI and 
conventional funds respectively within the family. The spillover effect from the 
presence of star SRI funds in the cash flows of their peer SRI funds within the family is 
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economically higher than the contribution of star conventional funds to cash flows of 
conventional funds siblings. The main difference is the spillover effect in bad families. 
The cash flow growth of SRI funds is not affected by the presence of poor SRI 
performers in the family.  
Conversely, poor conventional performers can negatively affect the cash flow 
growth of peer conventional funds within the family. The results contribute to the 
literature on a mutual fund, as I found that ESG-constrained investors are less sensitive 
to the financial reputation of the fund family than conventional investors.   
Overall, I conclude that the intensity of the spillover effect in conventional fund 
family is higher than the intensity of the spillover effect in SRI fund families. This is 
because it is only in conventional fund families that both star and bad conventional 
funds are associated with the cash flows of their peer conventional funds. The results 
contribute to the literature on delegated asset management by showing that the 
reputation of fund families is less attractive for ESG-constrained investors than it is for 
conventional investors.  
In the second part of the study, I examine whether ESG principles can lessen 
discriminatory strategies in SRI fund families, or whether the use of ESG principles is 
unsuccessful in creating ethical investment strategies in SRI fund families. My analysis 
of the performance (monthly gross returns) difference between winning/high-fee/young 
SRI funds and losing/low-fee/ mature SRI funds siblings shows strong support for the 
hypothesis that SRI fund families are more likely to enhance the performance of their 
winning SRI funds at the expense of their losing funds. After controlling for fund and 
family characteristics, the monthly return gap between winning funds and their losing 
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siblings is, on average, 27 basis points higher than non-same family pairs (the same 
winning SRI funds and matched losing SRI funds).  
However, there is no evidence to suggest that SRI fund families perform the 
cross-subsidization strategy between high-fee and low-fee SRI funds. My results show 
the average monthly return gap between high-fee and low-fee SRI siblings is not 
statistically different from that of matched pairs from other fund families. In terms of 
the life cycle criterion, I find no difference between the monthly return gap of young 
SRI funds and their (matched) mature SRI siblings. These results suggest that SRI funds 
families do not coordinate their fund managers to subsidize the performance of their 
young funds at the expense of their mature funds.  
I find that cross-subsidization is less likely to take place in fund families where 
LC fund managers own shares in the fund. This suggests that ESG principles (with their 
strong values in treating investors, environment, and governance) must be supported by 
internal governance mechanism, i.e., manager ownership, to mitigate strategies that can 
potentially harm a particular subset of investors and simultaneously benefit others.  
I find that the likelihood of cross-subsidization is also determined by the 
screening type used by SRI funds. Ethical funds that exclude only non-ethical/sinful 
assets are more likely to be coordinated by fund families to pursue the family objective 
of attracting higher flows to their high contribution funds. This is due to ethical funds 
having a larger investment opportunity set than SRI funds with social, environmental, 
and full-ESG screenings. The larger investment set enables the family to intervene in 
the fund’s portfolio because there will be more assets choices which can oppositely 
traded between two or more funds in the family.  
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My study emphasizes the significant role played by family strategies in 
influencing the preference of SRI investors. SRI fund families should not only 
concentrate on the ESG issues to attract higher capital; they should also concentrate on 
financial performance enhancement. SRI investors are not philanthropic investors who 
are only concerned with social engagement. They are investors who want to invest in a 
fund that is “doing good while doing well” (Richardson, 2009). They prefer to 
collaborate with a fund family that has a historically higher risk-adjusted performance. 
My study also highlights the continuing debate on whether SRI funds are really 
different from conventional funds. Despite the fact that ESG principles are used in 
screening assets, the principles do not appear to be always adhered to in the investment 
strategies performed by SRI fund families. Certain SRI investors or funds still receive 
special treatment through the cross-subsidization strategy at the expense other SRI 
funds. The future returns of losing funds’ investors are more likely to be sacrificed for 
the future returns of winning funds because the latter promises to attract higher flows. 
8.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This research has a limitation that is important to consider when analyzing the 
effect of investors’ objective on flow-peer performance relationship. Since SRI funds 
are traded in the same market as conventional funds, certain investors may view SRI 
funds as a set of investment opportunities. For example, hedge funds which hold SRI 
funds may aim to maximize their financial returns instead of contributing to society and 
the environment. If these investors are majority shareholders, flow-performance 
relationship on SRI funds is less related to ESG issues. The online Morningstar Direct, 
however, does not provide detailed information about the current investors of SRI 
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funds. Even for institutional investors, it could be difficult to ascertain whether they buy 
SRI funds for the social engagement or for the financial returns. Thus, it could be 
important to distinguish SRI funds’ investors into conventional and SRI investors, 
because the former hold the SRI funds for diversification purposes. 
There are some potential issues relating to SRI funds that could be the subjects 
of future studies. These issues include: the role of media/analyst coverage in the 
spillover effect of SRI fund families; the role that a hedge fund’s ownership in SRI 
funds plays in influencing the cross-subsidization in SRI fund families; and how the 
relationship between the country investment destination and the flow-performance 
relationship impacts on on international SRI funds. Future studies could also investigate 
who are the investors in SRI funds (that is, pension funds, hedge funds or individual 
investors); and undertake comparative studies on the relationship between front-load 
and end-load fees SRI funds and investors’ decisions. 
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Appendix 1  
List of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Symbol Hypotheses statement 
Hypothesis 1 H1 A star SRI fund positively contributes to the cash flow of peer SRI funds within a fund family. 
Hypothesis 2 H2 A star conventional fund positively affects the cash flow of peer SRI funds within the fund family. 
Hypothesis 3 H3 The intensity of the spillover effect for SRI fund families is lower than for conventional fund families. 
Hypothesis 4 H4 Losing SRI funds are more likely to subsidize the performance of their winning SRI siblings. 
Hypothesis 4A H4A Losing SRI funds with manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the future performance of their 
peer winning funds.  
Hypothesis 5 H5 Low-fee funds are more likely to subsidize the performance of their high-fee SRI siblings. 
Hypothesis 5A H5A Low-fee funds with manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the future performance of their peer 
high-fee funds within the family. 
Hypothesis 6 H6 Mature SRI funds are more likely to subsidize the performance of their young SRI siblings. 
Hypothesis 6A H6A Mature SRI funds with manager ownership are less likely to subsidize the future performance of their 
young peer funds within the family. 
Hypothesis 7 H7 SRI funds with the lower screening constraints are more likely to be paired by the family in the cross-
subsidization strategy than SRI funds with the higher screening constraints. 
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Appendix 2  
Variable Definition 
No Variables Definition 
1 CF Growthi,t  The new cash flows of fund i at time t to its total net asset 
at t-1 
2 FF Alphai,t-1 The intercept of the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model 
(Fama and French, 1993) 
3 Star Familyi,t-1 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if fund i is 
not a star fund but it belongs to the family that has at least 
one fund in the top 5 percent alpha and zero if otherwise 
4 Star Fundi,t-1 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fund’s 
alpha is in the top 5 percent and zero otherwise 
5 Star Fund Ratioi,t-1 The ratio of the number of star funds to the total number of 
funds in the family 
6 Bad Familyi,t-1 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if fund i is 
not a star (bad) fund but it belongs to the family that has at 
least one fund in the bottom 5 percent alpha and zero 
otherwise 
7 Bad Fundi,t-1 A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fund’s 
alpha is in the bottom 5 percent and zero otherwise 
8 Bad Fund Ratioi,t-1 The ratio of the number of bad funds to the total number of 
funds in the family 
9 Ln Agei,t Natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since 
the inception date of fund i 
10 Ln Age HC Natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since 
the inception date of the high contribution (HC) fund 
11 Ln Age LC Natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since 
the inception date of the low contribution (LC) fund 
12 Ln Sizei,t Natural logarithm of the current market value of total 
managed assets of fund i 
13 Ln Size HC Natural logarithm of the current market value of total 
managed assets of the HC fund 
14 Ln Size LC Natural logarithm of the current market value of total 
managed assets of the LC fund 
15 Turnoveri,t The percentage of the amount of new assets purchased and 
assets sold in a month divided by total net asset value 
(TNAV) of fund 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
No Variables Definition 
16 Turnover HC The percentage of the amount of new assets purchased and 
assets sold in a month divided by the TNAV of HC fund 
17 Turnover LC The percentage of the amount of new assets purchased and 
assets sold in a month divided by the TNAV of LC fund 
18 Expensesi,t The ratio of total amount of fees paid by investors plus 
fund’ operating expenses; and TNAV of funds 
19 Expenses HC The ratio of total amount of fees paid by investors plus 
fund’ operating expenses; and the TNAV of HC funds 
20 Expenses LC The ratio of total amount of fees paid by investors plus 
fund’ operating expenses; and the TNAV of LC funds 
21 Return Gap The differences in the monthly gross returns of HC and LC 
funds 
22 Same Family  A dummy Variable that equals one if HC and LC funds are 
from the same fund family, and zero if otherwise 
23 Same Family Same 
Style  
A dummy variable that equals one if HC and LC funds are 
from the same fund family, and in the same investment 
style, but zero if otherwise 
24 Same Style A dummy variable that takes value one if HC and LC funds 
if in the same investment style, but zero if otherwise 
25 Morningstar Rating HC The Morningstar rating of winning funds 
26 Morningstar Rating LC The Morningstar rating of losing funds 
27 Ownership HC  A dummy variable that equals one if fund managers of an 
HC SRI fund own shares in their managed fund, and zero if 
otherwise 
28 Ownership LC  A dummy variable that equals one if fund managers of an 
LC SRI fund own shares in their managed fund, and zero if 
otherwise 
29 Ln Family Size  Natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family 
30 Cross-Funds Deviation  The average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds 
and the average monthly return of the family 
31 Ln No of Fundsi,t Natural logarithm of the number of fund in a fund family 
32 Ln Family Age  Natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since 
the inception date of the family 
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Appendix 3  
Kernel density estimate of monthly cash flow growth of SRI funds 
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Appendix 4  
Contributions of star (bad) performing SRI funds to SRI fund siblings: Control for 
Heteroscedasticity 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t.  Star (Bad) Fund takes the value of one 
if fund’s alpha is in the top (bottom) 5 percent FF risk-adjusted returns, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) 
Family equals one if the SRI fund is not a star (bad) fund but is a member of a family with at least one 
SRI fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent FF risk-adjusted returns, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) Fund 
Ratio is the percentage of star (bad) funds in the family. FF Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted 
returns. Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. 
Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the fund. Ln 
Size  is the natural logarithm of current market value of total managed asset. Turnoveri,t is the percentage 
of new assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset value. Expense is the percentage of annual fee. 
*,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Constant 0.111 0.143 6.307 *** 0.150 * 6.747 ***
(1.21) (1.56) (5.43) (1.64) (5.62)
Star Fund 0.197 -0.611 -1.079 ** 0.519 0.330
(0.44) (-1.16) (-2.04) (0.95) (0.60)
Star Family 0.212 0.195 0.304 0.421 ** 0.696 ***
(1.15) (1.07) (1.51) (2.13) (3.12)
Star Fund Ratio -2.514 *** -3.256 ***
(-2.44) (-3.15)
Bad Fund
Bad Family
Bad Fund Ratio
FF Alpha 0.872 ** 0.935 *** 0.955 *** 1.037 ***
(3.26) (3.32) (3.58) (3.70)
Ln No of Funds -0.143 * -0.242 **
(-1.67) (-2.77)
Ln Age -1.146 *** -1.138 ***
(-8.72) (-8.74)
Ln Size -0.038 -0.053
(-0.60) (-0.83)
Turnover -0.002 ** -0.002 *
(-2.26) (-2.01)
Expense Ratio 0.037 0.045
(0.52) (0.52)
F Value 0.729 4.147 *** 16.51 *** 5.081 *** 15.55 ***
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.061 0.014 0.070
Panel A
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Appendix 4 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
  
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Constant 0.204 ** 0.164 * 6.616 *** 0.164 * 6.828 *** 6.749 *** 7.413 ***
(2.18) (1.76) (5.76) (1.77) (5.91) (5.79) (6.10)
Star Fund -0.890 * 0.516
(-1.67) (0.95)
Star Family 0.348 * 0.738 ***
(1.66) (3.22)
Star Fund Ratio -3.268 ***
(-3.18)
Bad Fund -0.734 -0.182 -1.102 ** 0.155 -0.517 -1.021 * -0.423
(-1.46) (-0.35) (-2.08) (0.31) (-1.06) (-1.89) (-0.85)
Bad Family 0.0442 0.064 0.075 0.232 0.415 0.0146 0.271
(0.25) (0.37) (0.41) (0.94) (1.56) (0.08) (1.00)
Bad Fund Ratio -1.185 -2.123 -2.116
(-0.95) (-1.59) (-1.59)
FF Alpha 0.666 *** 0.406 0.653 ** 0.360 * 0.650 * 0.718 **
(2.68) (1.61) (2.63) (1.44) (2.25) (2.53)
Ln No of Funds -0.092 -0.149 * -0.164 * -0.308 ***
(-1.17) (-1.85) (-1.93) (-3.49)
Ln Age -1.145 *** -1.161 *** -1.170 *** -1.178 ***
(-8.81) (-8.98) (-8.98) (-9.17)
Ln Size -0.057 -0.058 -0.052 -0.069
(-0.89) (-0.91) (-0.81) (-1.07)
Turnover -0.002 ** -0.002 * -0.002 ** -0.002 *
(-2.29) (-2.32) (-2.15) (-1.92)
Expense Ratio 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.049
(0.51) (0.54) (0.51) (0.53)
F Value 1.140 3.032 ** 16.64 2.335 * 14.85 *** 13.95 *** 12.35 ***
R-squared 0.002 0.007 0.060 0.008 0.063 0.064 0.076
Panel B Panel C
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Appendix 5  
Contributions of conventional funds to sibling SRI funds: Before and after 2005 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t. Mixed Star(Bad) Family equals one if 
the SRI fund is not a star (bad) fund but is a member of a family with at least one conventional fund in the 
top (bottom) 5 percent alpha, and zero otherwise. Percentage of SRI Funds is the percentage of the 
number of SRI funds in the mixed fund family. Control variables consist of fund and family 
characteristics: FF Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted returns; Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm 
of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family;  Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of 
calendar months since the inception date of the fund; Ln Size  is the natural logarithm of current market 
value of total managed asset;  Turnoveri,t  is the percentage of new assets purchased and sold divided by 
total net asset value; and Expense is the percentage annual fee. *,** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 8.907 8.772 9.139 2.281 2.413 2.435
(1.55) (1.56) (1.58) (0.90) (0.95) (0.96)
Mixed Star Family 0.468 0.471 0.116 -0.077
(0.28) (0.28) (0.25) (-0.15)
Mixed Bad Family -0.339 -0.340 0.306 0.341
(-0.36) (-0.36) (0.75) (0.72)
Percentage of SRI Funds 1.629 1.232 1.571 0.041 0.044 0.043
(0.91) (0.92) (0.87) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39)
Lagged FF Alpha Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Value 1.722 1.729 1.537 7.606 7.672 6.813
R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.078 0.079 0.079
Before 2005 2005 and after
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Appendix 6  
Contributions of conventional funds to sibling SRI funds: Pooled mixed and 
focused fund families 
This table demonstrates the relationship between the performance of conventional funds and the cash 
flow growth of SRI funds in the same family. More than half of SRI fund families are mixed families 
where they manage conventional and SRI funds at the same time. I investigate whether the success of 
fund families in managing conventional funds will attract higher cash flow to peer SRI funds using the 
following equation: 
𝐶𝐹 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑏3𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where CF Growthi,t is the new cash flows of SRI fund i to its total net asset at time t-1. Star Mixed Family 
takes the value of one if SRI fund i is a member of a family with at least one conventional fund in a top 5 
percent alpha, zero otherwise. Bad Mixed Family equals one if SRI fund i is a member of a family with at 
least one conventional fund in a bottom 5 percent alpha, and zero if otherwise. Mixed Family takes the 
value of one if SRI fund i is a member of a family consisting of SRI and conventional funds, zero 
otherwise. I include some control variables to control fund characteristics. First, FF Alphai,t-1 represents 
year to date of risk-adjusted returns of an SRI fund i. Next, Ln No of Fundsi,t is natural log of number 
managed funds in the family of SRI fund i. Meanwhile, Ln Agei,t is the natural log of month differences 
between current period and the inception date of SRI fund i. Ln Sizei,t  represents the natural log of market 
values of total assets held by SRI fund i. Turnoveri,t represents the percentage of an SRI fund’s holding 
traded over a period. Expensei,t represents the percentage annual fees charged by SRI fund i. 
 
 
 
 
  
Constant 5.764 *** 5.844 *** 5.745 ***
(4.70) (4.77) (4.69)
Mixed Star Family -0.396 -0.649
(-1.24) (-1.76)
Mixed Bad Family 0.170 0.485
(0.55) (1.36)
Mixed Family 0.652 ** 0.508 * 0.574*
(2.62) (2.01) (2.25)
Lagged FF Alpha Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
F Value 12.48 12.31 11.30
R-squared 0.048 0.047 0.048
1 2 3
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Appendix 7  
Regression on spillover effect: Sub-sampling young and mature SRI funds 
This regression involves the cross-sectional SRI fund data from 2000 to 2012.  I define star (bad) funds as 
funds that are in the top (bottom) five percent FF risk-adjusted returns of SRI mutual fund industry. The 
dependent variable is CF Growth which represents the new cash flows to Total Net Asset of SRI fund i at 
t-1. Meanwhile, the explanatory variables consist of some dummy variables and star (bad) fund ratio.  
Star (Bad) Fundi,t-1 is the dummy variable where it will be one if fund’s alpha is on the top (bottom) 5 
percent, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) Familyi,t-1 equals one if SRI fund i is not a star (bad) fund but it is 
a member of the family with at least one SRI fund on the top (bottom) 5 percent alpha, zero otherwise.  
Then Star (Bad) Fund Ratioi,t-1 is the percentage of star (bad) funds in the family. I control some fund 
characteristics. First, FF Alphai,t-1 represents year to date of risk-adjusted returns of an SRI fund I at 
month t-1. Next, Ln No of Fundsi,t is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund 
family.  Meanwhile, Ln Agei,t is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since 
the inception date of the fund. Ln Sizei,t  is the natural logarithm of the current market value of total 
managed assets of fund i. Turnoveri,t  is defined as the percentage of the amount of new assets purchased 
and assets sold in a month divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of fund i at month t Expensei,t 
represents the percentage annual fees charged by SRI fund i.  *,** and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 1 2 3
Constant 12.646 12.704 11.689 5.636 4.745 5.558
(4.01) *** (4.03) *** (3.74) *** (4.11) *** (3.44) *** (4.12) ***
Star Family 1.032 0.829 0.596 0.631
(2.37) ** (1.94) * (2.59) *** (2.79) ***
Star Fund 0.032 0.021 0.011 0.006
(0.57) (0.38) (0.37) (0.21)
Star Fund Ratio -1.507 -1.559 -4.178 -4.314
(-1.31) (-1.36) (-5.80) *** (-6.07) ***
Bad Family -0.332 -0.096 0.261 0.389
(-0.64) (-0.19) (0.98) (1.45)
Bad Fund -0.514 -0.302 -0.296 -0.590
(-0.52) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-1.09)
Bad Fund Ratio -2.410 -2.473 -0.326 -0.305
(-1.59) (-1.64) (-0.29) (-0.27)
Lagged Returns Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Value 4.5 *** 5.18 *** 4.95 *** 6.79 *** 5.23 *** 8.66 ***
R Squared 0.084 0.075 0.072 0.065 0.040 0.064
Young SRI Fund Mature SRI Fund
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Appendix 8  
Contributions of star (bad) performing conventional funds to conventional fund 
siblings 
The dependent variable is the cash flow growth of fund i at time t.  Star (Bad) Fund takes the value of one 
if fund’s alpha is in the top (bottom) 5 percent FF risk-adjusted returns, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) 
Family equals one if the conventional fund is not a star (bad) fund but is a member of a family with at 
least one SRI fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent FF risk-adjusted returns, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) 
Fund Ratio is the percentage of star (bad) funds in the family. FF Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted 
returns. Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. 
Ln Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the fund. Ln 
Size  is the natural logarithm of current market value of total managed asset. Turnoveri,t is the percentage 
of new assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset value. Expense is the percentage of annual fee. 
*,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4
Constant 4.648 *** 4.837 *** 4.821 *** 4.970 ***
(25.66) (26.53) (26.59) (27.03)
Star Fund -0.128 -0.0339 0.107
(-1.23) (-0.35) (1.01)
Star Family 0.312 *** 0.240 *** 0.323 ***
(6.12) (5.59) (6.33)
Star Fund Ratio -0.934 ** -0.937 ***
(-3.29) (-3.30)
Bad Fund -0.930 *** -1.069 *** -0.905 ***
(-9.34) (-11.66) (-8.91)
Bad Family -0.120 * -0.223 *** -0.135 **
(-2.36) (-5.00) (-2.64)
Bad Fund Ratio -1.090 *** -1.036 ***
(-3.88) (-3.68)
Lagged FF Alpha Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 396.1 *** 408.1 *** 369.6 *** 310.1 ***
R-squared 0.042 0.044 0.044 0.044
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Appendix 9 
Robustness test: Four-factor (Fama-French Carhart) alpha  
CF Growth is the dependent variable, representing new cash flows to total net asset. Star (bad) funds are 
funds that are in the top (bottom) five percent FFC risk-adjusted returns of SRI mutual fund industry. Star 
(Bad) Fund takes the value of one if fund’s FFC alpha is in the top (bottom) 5 percent, and zero 
otherwise. Star (Bad) Family equals one if the SRI fund is not a star (bad) fund but is a member of a 
family with at least one SRI fund in the top (bottom) 5 percent FFC alpha, and zero otherwise. Star (Bad) 
Fund Ratio is the percentage of star (bad) funds in the family. I include some variables to control for past 
performance and for fund characteristics. FFC Alpha is the year-to-date risk-adjusted returns. Ln No of 
Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the fund. Ln Size  is the 
natural logarithm of current market value of total managed asset. Turnoveri,t is the percentage of new 
assets purchased and sold divided by total net asset value. Expense is the percentage of annual fee. *,** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
 
1 2 3
Constant 6.610 6.724 6.849
(5.40) *** (5.49) *** (5.58) ***
Star Family 0.642 0.591
(2.69) *** (2.48) **
Star Fund 0.963 1.098
(1.72) * (1.96) **
Star Fund Ratio -3.040 -2.981
(-3.54) *** (-3.47) ***
Bad Family 0.919 0.851
(2.99) *** (2.76) ***
Bad Fund 0.291 0.311
(0.51) (0.54)
Bad Fund Ratio -3.586 -3.516
(-2.93) *** (-2.87) ***
FF Alpha 1.548 0.973 1.143
(5.47) *** (3.34) *** (3.51) ***
Ln No of Funds -0.012 -0.015 -0.022
(-2.08) ** (-2.28) ** (-3.19) ***
Ln Age -0.970 -1.024 -1.009
(-7.22) *** (-7.62) *** (-7.49) ***
Ln Size -0.114 -0.100 -0.110
(-1.81) * (-1.59) (-1.76) *
Turnover -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.44) (-1.73) * (-1.47)
Expense Ratio 0.048 0.045 0.045
(2.02) ** (1.90) * (1.92) *
F Value 13.02 *** 12.86 *** 10.98 ***
R-Squared 0.064 0.064 0.070
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Appendix 10  
Regressions of cross-subsidization between winning and losing SRI funds: Control 
for heteroscedasticity 
The dependent variable is the return gap defined as the difference in the monthly returns of winning and losing SRI 
funds. Same Family equals one if both winning and losing funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. 
Same Family Same Style equals one if winning and losing funds are from the same fund family and in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if winning and losing funds are in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the winning (losing) fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of total net asset value 
(TNAV) of winning (losing) SRI funds. Morningstar Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of winning (losing) 
funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold divided by TNAV of winning 
(losing) funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers own shares in the winning (losing) fund they 
manage, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating 
expenses to TNAV of winning (losing) funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of TNAV of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln 
Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-
Fund Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the 
family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Constant 0.167 * 0.543 -0.189 0.143
(2.49) (0.55) (-0.28) (0.12)
Same Family 0.239 * 0.267 ** 0.239 * 0.273 **
(2.41) (2.60) (2.44) (2.69)
Same Family Same Style -0.131 -0.028 -0.131 -0.020
(-0.65) (-0.13) (-0.63) (-0.09)
Same Style -0.084 -0.175 -0.143 -0.238
(-0.54) (-1.07) (-0.89) (-1.42)
Ln Age HC 0.145 0.186 *
(1.73) (2.00)
Ln Age LC -0.187 * -0.250 **
(-2.06) (-2.72)
Ln Size HC -0.092 -0.102
(-1.76) (-1.86)
Ln Size LC 0.075 0.121 **
(1.78) (2.80)
Morningstar Rating HC 0.046 0.046
(1.37) (1.36)
Morningstar Rating LC -0.123 * -0.090
(-2.43) (-1.76)
Ownership HC 0.361 ** 0.335 *
(2.89) (2.39)
Ownership LC -0.176 -0.207
(-1.54) (-1.76)
Turnover HC 0.003 0.001
(1.88) (0.90)
Turnover LC -0.001 -0.000
(-0.72) (-0.37)
Expense Ratio HC 0.150 *** 0.166 ***
(4.08) (4.47)
Expense Ratio LC -0.119 ** -0.098 *
(-2.87) (-2.31)
Ln No of Funds -0.068 -0.075
(-1.09) (-1.02)
Ln Family Size -0.057 -0.070
(-1.70) (-1.86)
Ln Family Age 0.206 * 0.152
(2.49) (1.31)
Cross Fund Deviation 0.451 *** 0.473 ***
(5.69) (5.81)
F Value 2.61 ** 4.834 *** 6.191 *** 6.339 ***
R Squared 0.002 0.014 0.020 0.033
1 2 3 4
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Appendix 11  
Regressions of cross-subsidization between high fee and low fee SRI funds: Control 
for heteroscedasticity  
The dependent variable is the return gap defined as the difference in the monthly returns of high-fee and low-fee SRI 
funds. Same Family equals one if high-fee fund and low-fee funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. 
Same Family Same Style equals one if high-fee and low-fee funds are from the same fund family, and in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if high-fee and low-fee funds are in the same 
investment style, and zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the high-fee (low-fee) fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the total net asset 
value (TNAV) of high-fee (low-fee) funds. Morningstar Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of high-fee (low-
fee) funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold divided by TNAV of high-
fee (low-fee) funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers own shares in the high-fee (low-fee) fund they 
manage, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating 
expenses to TNAV of high-fee (low-fee) funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of TNAV of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln 
Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-
Fund Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the 
family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Constant 0.002 0.150 -0.393 -0.132
(0.03) (0.32) (-1.16) (-0.25)
Same Family 0.008 -0.062 0.008 -0.074
(0.12) (-0.91) (0.13) (-1.07)
Same Family Same Style -0.022 0.084 -0.023 0.096
(-0.24) (0.86) (-0.25) (0.98)
Same Style 0.063 0.014 0.071 0.002
(0.92) (0.20) (1.02) (0.03)
Ln Age HC 0.129 *** 0.142 ***
(4.47) (4.65)
Ln Age LC 0.048 0.049
(1.50) (1.54)
Ln Size HC -0.068 *** -0.078 ***
(-3.35) (-3.59)
Ln Size LC 0.033 0.029
(1.78) (1.57)
Morningstar Rating HC -0.007 -0.006
(-0.38) (-0.34)
Morningstar Rating LC -0.049 * -0.050 *
(-2.44) (-2.48)
Ownership HC 0.022 0.032
(0.39) (0.55)
Ownership LC -0.058 -0.053
(-1.09) (-0.98)
Turnover HC -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(-3.78) (-3.72)
Turnover LC -0.000 -0.000
(-0.82) (-0.91)
Expense Ratio HC -0.018 -0.020
(-1.05) (-1.19)
Expense Ratio LC 0.031 0.0330
(0.68) (0.72)
Ln No of Funds -0.026 -0.023
(-0.77) (-0.63)
Ln Family Size 0.010 0.038
(0.53) (1.89)
Ln Family Age 0.044 -0.047
(0.86) (-0.87)
Cross Fund Deviation 0.013 0.009
(0.32) (0.21)
F Value 0.43 3.82 *** 0.49 3.30 ***
R Squared 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006
1 2 3 4
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Appendix 12  
Regressions of cross-subsidization between high young and mature SRI funds: 
Control for heteroscedasticity 
The dependent variable is the return gap defined as the difference in the monthly returns of young and mature SRI 
funds. Same Family equals one if young and mature funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. Same 
Family Same Style equals one if young and mature funds are from the same fund family, and in the same investment 
style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if young and mature funds are in the same investment style, and 
zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of 
the young (mature) fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the total net asset value (TNAV) of young 
(mature) funds. Morningstar Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of young (mature) funds. Turnover HC (LC) 
is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold divided by TNAV of young (mature) funds. Ownership HC 
(LC) equals one if fund managers own shares in the young (mature) fund they manage, and zero otherwise. Expense 
Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses to TNAV of young (mature) 
funds.  Ln No of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size 
is the natural logarithm of TNAV of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the 
number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-Fund Deviation is the average deviation of 
the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Constant -0.046 -0.057 0.342 0.112
(-0.96) (-0.10) (0.79) (0.16)
Same Family 0.069 0.040 0.0689 0.039
(1.03) (0.61) (1.03) (0.59)
Same Family Same Style 0.012 -0.011 0.0123 -0.014
(0.13) (-0.11) (0.13) (-0.15)
Same Style -0.126 -0.190 * -0.112 -0.220 **
(-1.80) (-2.47) (-1.59) (-2.78)
Ln Age HC -0.151 * -0.092
(-2.31) (-1.28)
Ln Age LC -0.199 *** -0.230 ***
(-4.36) (-4.47)
Ln Size HC -0.025 -0.016
(-0.98) (-0.61)
Ln Size LC 0.108 *** 0.118 ***
(5.27) (5.63)
Morningstar Rating HC 0.138 *** 0.143
(6.35) (6.53)
Morningstar Rating LC -0.114 *** -0.124 ***
(-4.59) (-4.98)
Ownership HC 0.187 ** -0.013
(3.05) (-0.13)
Ownership LC 0.017 0.030
(0.30) (0.53)
Turnover HC -0.001 *** -0.002 ***
(-4.30) (-5.54)
Turnover LC 0.002 ** 0.002 **
(3.04) (3.20)
Expense Ratio HC -0.002 0.002
(-0.07) (0.05)
Expense Ratio LC -0.012 -0.011
(-1.42) (-1.23)
Ln No of Funds -0.118 ** -0.080
(-2.88) (-1.33)
Ln Family Size -0.009 -0.047 *
(-0.45) (-2.02)
Ln Family Age 0.046 0.167 *
(0.78) (2.42)
Cross Fund Deviation -0.062 -0.125 **
(-1.49) (-2.90)
F Value 2.82 ** 9.56 *** 5.28 *** 8.44 ***
R Squared 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.016
1 2 3 4
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Appendix 13  
The difference in monthly return of same (different) style funds from family and 
non-family pairs 
A performance criterion is based on the lagged FF alpha where the SRI fund in the above 75 (below 25) 
percentile of industry lagged alpha is categorized as a winning (losing) SRI fund. The fee criterion is 
based on expense ratio of fund. High (low) fee funds are identified as funds that are positioned above the 
75
th
 percentile (below 25
th
 percentile) of expense ratios within the family. The age is the number of 
calendar months since the inception date of fund. SRI funds with an age of six years or below are 
classified as young funds and the rest are classified as mature funds. 
 
 
 
  
Performance
Same Style 0.190 0.083 0.107
Different Style 0.406 0.167 0.137
Fees
Same Style 0.050 0.048 0.002
Different Style 0.009 -0.017 0.026
Age
Same Style -0.091 -0.172 0.081
Different Style 0.023 -0.046 0.069
Average Monthly Return Gap
Family pairs Non-Family Pairs
Family pairs - 
Non-family pairs
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Appendix 14  
The cross-subsidization: The subsample of big and small SRI fund families 
Big (small) fund families are defined as SRI fund families whose number of their managed SRI funds 
above (below) the average number of SRI funds in SRI fund industry. The dependent variable is the 
return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, defined as the difference in the monthly returns of HC 
and LC SRI funds. Same Family equals one if HC fund and LC funds are from the same fund family, and 
zero otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals one if HC and LC funds are from the same fund family, 
and in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if HC and LC funds are 
in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number 
of calendar months since the inception date of the HC (LC) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of total managed assets of HC (LC) SRI funds. MS Rating HC (LC) is the 
Morningstar rating of HC (LC) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased 
and assets sold divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of HC (LC) SRI funds. Ownership HC (LC) 
equals one if fund managers of HC (LC) SRI funds own shares in their managed fund, and zero 
otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses 
to TNAV of HC (LC) SRI funds.  Ln No Of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI funds 
managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the 
inception date of the family. Cross-Funds Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI 
funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Constant -27.710 *** 4.147 ** 4.549 * -0.703 * 10.427 *** -2.782 **
(-3.35) (2.23) (1.79) (-0.87) (2.78) (-2.40)
Same Family 0.488 *** 0.038 0.108 -0.151 0.010 0.082
(3.34) (0.30) (1.12) (-1.72) (0.13) (0.89)
Same Family Same Style 0.371 -0.072 -0.027 0.202 0.040 -0.084
(0.95) (-0.21) (-0.19) (1.41) (0.28) (-0.51)
Same Style -0.828 *** 0.178 0.111 -0.033 ** 0.090 -0.428 ***
(-2.81) (0.71) (1.10) (-0.33) (0.72) (-3.43)
Control:
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Value 10.79 *** 1.79 ** 2.71 3.21 *** 11.85 *** 6.45 ***
R Squared 0.085 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.038 0.023
Panel A: Performance Panel B: Fees Panel C: Age
Big Small Big Small Big Small
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Appendix 15  
The cross-subsidization: The subsample of large- and small-size SRI fund families 
Large-(small-) size fund families are defined as SRI fund families whose total size is above (below) the 
mean of family size. The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, 
defined as the difference in the monthly returns of HC and LC SRI funds. Same Family equals one if HC 
fund and LC funds are from the same fund family, and zero otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals 
one if HC and LC funds are from the same fund family, and in the same investment style, and zero if 
otherwise. Same Style takes value one if HC and LC funds are in the same investment style, and zero if 
otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception 
date of the HC (LC) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the market value of total 
managed assets of HC (LC) SRI funds. MS Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of HC (LC) SRI 
funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold divided by the total 
net asset value (TNAV) of HC (LC) SRI funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers of HC 
(LC) SRI funds own shares in their managed fund, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the 
ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses to TNAV of HC (LC) SRI funds. Ln No 
Of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the 
natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-Funds 
Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of 
the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Constant -32.674 1.153 4.873 -0.153 12.996 -3.935
(-4.34) *** (0.56) (2.11) ** (-0.18) (3.27) *** (-3.20) ***
Same Family 0.334 0.221 0.041 -0.115 -0.012 0.134
(2.28) ** (1.62) (0.44) (-1.29) (-0.15) (1.50)
Same Family Same Style 0.314 -0.079 -0.003 0.179 0.071 -0.102
(0.78) (-0.23) (-0.02) (1.24) (0.48) (-0.64)
Same Style -0.397 -0.122 0.079 -0.032 0.015 -0.482
-1.30 -0.48 0.79 -0.32 0.13 -3.85
Control:
Fund characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Value 6.11 *** 4.6 *** 1.82 ** 2.66 *** 8.83 *** 6.42 ***
R Squared 0.054 0.039 0.007 0.009 0.030 0.022
Panel A: Performance Panel B: Fees Panel C: Age
Large Size Small Size Large Size Small Size Large Size Small Size
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Appendix 16  
Determinants of return gap between HC and LC SRI funds: From the 
characteristics of SRI fund families 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, defined as differences in 
the monthly returns of HC SRI funds (winners, high-fee SRI funds and young SRI funds) and LC SRI 
funds (losers, low-fee SRI funds and mature SRI funds). Independent variables consist of three fund 
family characteristics. Ln Family Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI 
funds managed by a family. Ln No Of Funds represents the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of calendar 
months since the inception date of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Dependent Var: Monthly Return Gap
Constant 0.855 -0.752 0.888
(0.88) (-1.69) ** (1.42)
Ln Family Size -0.042 0.023 -0.029
(-0.86) (0.94) (-0.95)
Ln No of Funds 0.276 *** -0.008 -0.109 **
(2.78) (-0.19) (-2.14)
Ln Family Age -0.080 0.058 0.011
(-0.65) (0.97) (0.11)
F Value 2.93 *** 1.40 5.48 ***
R Squared 0.004 0.001 0.003
Performance Fee Age
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Appendix 17  
Cross-subsidization between winning and losing SRI funds: Sub-sampling based 
Morningstar rating of paired funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, defined as the difference in 
the monthly returns of winning and losing SRI funds. Same Family equals one if winning fund and losing 
funds are from the same fund family, and zero if otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals one if 
winning and losing funds are from the same fund family, and in the same investment style, and zero if 
otherwise. Same Style takes value one if winning and losing funds are in the same investment style, and 
zero if otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the 
inception date of the winning (losing) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of total managed assets of winning (losing) SRI funds. MS Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar 
rating of winning (losing) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and 
assets sold divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of winning (losing) SRI funds. Ownership HC (LC) 
equals one if fund managers of winning (losing) SRI funds own shares in their managed fund, and zero if 
otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses 
to TNAV of winning (losing) SRI funds. Ln No Of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI 
funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI 
funds managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the family. Cross-Funds Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly 
return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Constant -2.524 -4.536
(-1.48) (-1.07)
Same Family 0.208 * 0.292
(1.73) (1.02)
Same Family Same Style -0.008 -0.413
(-0.03) (-0.46)
Same Style -0.228 -0.182
(-1.08) (-0.29)
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes
F Value 4.376 *** 6.409 ***
R squared 0.031 0.155
Winning Fund > LosingFund Winning Fund < Losing Fund
Morningstar Rating
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Appendix 18  
Cross-subsidization between high-fee and low-fee SRI funds: Sub-sampling based 
MS rating of paired funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, which is defined as the 
difference in the monthly returns of high-fee and low-fee SRI funds. Same Family equals one if high-fee 
fund and low-fee funds are from the same fund family, and zero if otherwise. Same Family Same Style 
equals one if high-fee and low-fee funds are from the same fund family, and in the same investment style, 
and zero if otherwise. Same Style takes value one if high-fee and low-fee funds are in the same investment 
style, and zero if otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months 
since the inception date of the high-fee (low-fee) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of 
the market value of total managed assets of high-fee (low-fee) SRI funds. MS Rating HC (LC) is the 
Morningstar rating of high-fee (low-fee) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets 
purchased and assets sold divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of high-fee (low-fee) SRI funds. 
Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers of high-fee (low-fee) SRI funds own shares in their 
managed fund, and zero otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus 
fund operating expenses to TNAV of high-fee (low-fee) SRI funds.  Ln No Of Funds is the natural 
logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm 
of total assets values of SRI funds managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the 
number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-Funds Deviation is the average 
deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
  
Constant -1.114 1.406
(-1.21) (1.62)
Same Family 0.195 -0.321 ***
(1.61) (-3.34)
Same Family Same Style -0.040 0.150
(-0.23) (0.98)
Same Style -0.050 0.023
(-0.39) (0.21)
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes
F Value 2.171 *** 4.901 ***
R squared 0.013 0.021
Morningstar Rating
High Fee Fund > Low 
Fee Fund
High Fee Fund < Low Fee 
Fund
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Appendix 19  
Cross-subsidization between young and mature SRI funds: Sub-sampling based 
MS rating of paired funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, which is defined as the 
difference in the monthly returns of young and mature SRI funds. Same Family equals one if young fund 
and mature funds are from the same fund family, and zero if otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals 
one if young and mature funds are from the same fund family, and in the same investment style, and zero 
if otherwise. Same Style takes value one if young and mature funds are in the same investment style, and 
zero otherwise. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the 
inception date of the young (mature) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of total managed assets of young (mature) SRI funds. MS Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating 
of young (mature) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets 
sold divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of young (mature) SRI funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals 
one if fund managers of young (mature) SRI funds own shares in their managed fund, and zero otherwise. 
Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses to TNAV 
of young (mature) SRI funds. Ln No Of Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds 
managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI funds 
managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the 
inception date of the family. Cross-Funds Deviation is the average deviation of the monthly return of SRI 
funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Constant -2.331 1.896 **
(-1.24) (1.97)
Same Family -0.004 -0.056
(-0.03) (-0.74)
Same Family Same Style 0.074 0.013
(0.32) (0.09)
Same Style -0.497 *** -0.063
(-2.64) (-0.57)
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes
F Value 2.230 *** 6.178 ***
R squared 0.021 0.019
Morningstar Rating
Young Fund < Mature FundYoung Fund > Mature Fund
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Appendix 20  
Descriptive statistic of return gap between HC and LC SRI fund by manager ownership on LC funds 
The return gap is the difference in the monthly return of HC (winning, high fee and young) SRI funds and their paired LC (losing, low fee and mature) SRI funds. 
Ownership=0 represent family pairs without manager ownership in LC funds, and Ownership>1 otherwise. Ownership>$100,000 means a family pair in which its LC 
fund’ managers own $100,001 and above share in the fund. Conversely, Ownership≤$100,000 is family pair where the fund managers own $1 - 100,000 in their 
managed LC fund. 
 
  
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Performance 0.409 2.985 0.100 2.325 0.151 2.755 0.060 1.925
Fees 0.027 2.300 0.020 2.095 0.025 2.064 -0.002 2.244
Age -0.023 2.587 0.002 2.370 -0.028 2.265 0.080 2.623
Ownership = 0 Ownership ≤ $100,000Ownership > 0 Ownership > $100,000
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Appendix 21  
OLS regression of subsample of manager ownership in low contribution (LC) funds 
The dependent variable is the return gap of family pairs and non-family pairs, defined as the difference in monthly returns of high contribution (HC) and low 
contribution (LC) SRI funds. Ownership>$100,000 represent LC funds with the cumulative managerial ownership above $100,000, while Ownership ≤ $100,00 is vice 
versa.  Same Family equals one if the HC SRI fund and its LC SRI pair are from the same fund family, and zero if otherwise. Same Family Same Style equals one if the 
HC SRI fund and its LC SRI pair are from the same fund family and in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Same Style takes value one if HC SRI fund and 
its LC SRI pair are in the same investment style, and zero otherwise. Fund and family characteristics are controlled for. Ln Age HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the 
number of calendar months since the inception date of the HC (LC) SRI fund. Ln Size HC (LC) is the natural logarithm of the market value of total managed assets of 
HC (LC) SRI funds. MS Rating HC (LC) is the Morningstar rating of HC (LC) SRI funds. Turnover HC (LC) is the percentage of new assets purchased and assets sold 
divided by total net asset value (TNAV) of HC (LC) SRI funds. Ownership HC (LC) equals one if fund managers of HC (LC) SRI funds own shares in their managed 
fund, and zero if otherwise. Expense Ratio HC (LC) is the ratio of total fees paid by investors plus fund operating expenses to TNAV of HC (LC) SRI funds.  Ln No of 
Funds is the natural logarithm of the number of SRI funds managed by a fund family. Ln Family Size is the natural logarithm of total assets values of SRI funds 
managed by a family. Ln Family Age is the natural logarithm of the number of calendar months since the inception date of the family. Cross-Funds Deviation is the 
average deviation of the monthly return of SRI funds and the average monthly return of the family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent: 
Constant 14.450 3.485 -1.681 -2.193 -2.259 * -4.004
(1.18) (0.54) (-1.86) (-0.69) (-1.78) (-0.81)
Same Family -0.021 -0.293 -0.185 -0.235 -0.097 0.625 **
(-0.04) (-0.47) (-1.51) (-0.90) (-0.82) (2.47)
Same Family Same Style 0.534 0.241 -0.189 -0.174 -1.612 **
(0.58) (1.41) (-0.43) (-0.98) (-2.29)
Same Style 0.220 -0.442 -0.019 0.035 -0.057 0.070
(0.15) (-0.72) (-0.18) (0.15) (-0.46) (0.17)
Control
Fund Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Value 1.03 1.98 *** 2.06 *** 2.71 *** 5.20 *** 2.52 ***
R Squared 0.062 0.089 0.011 0.060 0.024 0.043
Panel C: Age
Ownership ≤ $100,000Monthly Return Gap Ownership > $100,000 Ownership ≤ $100,000 Ownership > $100,000 Ownership ≤ $100,000 Ownership>$100,000
Panel A: Performance Panel B: Fees
